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ABSTRACT 
ANALYZING COUNTRY RISK:
Estimating the Probability of External Debt Repudiation 
in the Post-Oil-Embargo Decade
by
Thomas J. Webster 
Advisor: Professor Michael Edelstein
This dissertation examines the use of logit analysis as 
a tool for assessing the likelihood that a sovereign risk 
cannot, or will not, adhere to the terms of its foreign debt 
obligations as a result of adverse political, social, 
economic, or financial disruptions. The discussion is 
divided into two parts. Part one is devoted to a review of 
the topic of assessing the likelihood of debt servicing 
difficulties by borrower nations by first tracing the growth 
of international bank lending activities by U.S. commercial 
banks, followed by a general discussion of the international 
deot crisis and a brief survey of some of the conventional 
approaches employed by many international institutions to 
assess overseas lending risk. Part one continues with a 
survey of a variety of social, economic, and political 
considerations incorporated into the risk evaluation process 
and concludes with a discussion of how these factors are 
integrated into the microeconomics of international bank 
lending.
v
Part two of this study discusses specifically the use of 
logit analysis as a tool for evaluating country risk under 
alternative sub-set data specifications. It begins with a 
review of the major empirical studies on the use of 
econometric techniques for predicting the incidence of 
foreign debt repudiations followed by an investigation of the 
rescheduling process subsequent to the first oil price 
"shock" in 1973-74. The analysis attempts to improve and 
expand upon the work of others by specifically addressing a 
variety of empirical and theoretical deficiencies present in 
earlier studies. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the possible presence of dynamic elements in the rescheduling 
process which may ultimately help to improve upon the 
predictive performance of the logit model.
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PREFACE
Between 1974 and 19bl I had the opportunity of 
working for two of the largest money center banks in the 
United States. The first of these banks is located in 
Chicago where I was a loan officer in the International 
Division. A few years later I held the position of an 
international economist with one of the largest New York 
based commercial banks. Coincidentally, the period since 
1974 has been one of monumental change in the U.S. banking 
industry. Starting with the OPEC oil embargo in late 1973 
and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices the commercial 
banking system assumed ever increasing importance in the 
international financial community. This has also been a 
learning period for the major western banks, and has not been 
without its share of growing pains.
Today the international financial community stands at a 
crossroad. Massive overseas exposure in the form of 
outstanding loans and repayment problems are prompting a 
fundamental reevaluation of the basic tenets of free 
enterprise in international lending. Not the least of these 
concerns, and one which has haunted commercial bankers since 
the late 1970's, is the evaluation of country risk as it 
relates to present and future lending decisions. This paper 
is an attempt to focus on this issue and hopefully to provide
a clearer understanding of the issues involved and the 
dilensna currently facing economic policy makers.
This paper will examine a few of the multitude of 
considerations facing analysts when examining the liklihood 
that a particular sovereign risk cannot, or will not, honor 
its overseas obligations. In particular, this paper will 
focus on the use of logit analysis as a tool for assessing 
default risk, in spite of the fact that this technique has 
been shown to suffer from a combination of theoretical and 
practical shortcomings. Part one of this paper is devoted 
primarily to a review of the general topic of assessing the 
liklihood of debt servicing difficulties of borrower nations. 
Chapter one discusses the growth of international lending 
activities by U.S. commercial banks as veil as its present 
involvement in the international debt crisis. In addition, 
this chapter will examine the genesis of the prevailing 
international debt crisis as well as its potential impact not 
only on the commercial banking system in the United States 
but its macroeconomic implications as well. Chapter two 
takes a closer look at the subject of international bank 
lending per se. In particular, this chapter will provide a 
working definition of what is commonly referred to as 
"country risk" and provides a theoretical paradigm of the 
rescheduling process. The chapter will close with a brief 
discussion of seme of the conventional approaches employed by 
many commercial banks to assess country risk thereby 
developing a framework within which to ascertain the
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likelihood of a debt repudiation. Chapter three will then
lay the foundation for the actual process of country risk
evaluation by first discussing a variety of social, economic, 
and political considerations, and then to integrate these
considerations into the microeconomics of commercial bank
overseas lending. The discussion is by no means 
comprehensive but is intended to provide a flavor for the 
actual considerations employed in the lending process.
Part two of this study discusses the use of logit
analysis as a tool in the evaluation of country risk.
Specifically, logit analysis is an econometric technique 
which is used for predicting the probability of a binary 
valued event; in this case the incidence of "default" or "no 
default." Chapter four reviews sane of the principal studies 
in the use of econometric techniques for predicting the 
incidence of foreign debt reschedulings that have been
employed since the early 1970's. Chapter five constitutes an 
empirical investigation of debt reschedulings which have
occurred since the OPEC oil embargo and subsequent oil price 
"shocks." This analysis will utilize the logit analysis 
framework under alternative data specifications. The
purpose of this procedure is to investigate the predictive 
performance of the logit model in the light of the major 
international structural shifts which have occurred in the 
advent of the developments of the early 1970's. After this a 
number of innovations will be introduced in an attempt to 
improve upon the model's descriptive and predictive accuracy. 
Chapter six will summarize the results of the empirical
3
investigations presented in chapter five followed oy a orief 
discussion of the possible presence of dynamic elements in 
the rescheduling process which may improve upon the model's 
predictive performance. Chapter six will close with some 
brief concluding remarks.
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PART I: AN OVERVIEW
Chapter 1 
Introduction
During the course of the last two decades the banking
industry in the United States has undergone many changes. Of
these the most significant has been the broadening
participation of large money center and regional U.S. banks
in overseas activities. In 1965, for example, the U.S.
foreign banking presence was represented by 13 large banks
operating 211 overseas branches with assets of only $9.1
billion. By 1971, there were 91 U.S. oanks operating 583
overseas branches with combined assets totalling $67.1
billion. Six years later the number of oanks stood at 130,
with 738 overseas branches and assets of $259.0 billion,
almost four times the total overseas assets of 1971. This
figure equalled 22 percent of domestic bank assets and over
three times the total equity capital of U.S. banks. By
December 3i, 1983, total assets of U.S. money center and
regional commercial banks ballooned to a phenominal $376.3
billion, more than 400 percent of the figure recorded just
(1)
eighteen years earlier. Several factors contributed to
this expansion. The tremendous growth of international 
trade, full convertibility of most major currencies, and the 
rapid overseas expansion of major U.S. corporations in the 
1960's which generated the need for a U.S. banking presence
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abroad. Moreover, during this period a new financial 
institution developed in the form of the Euromarket which 
enabled foreign branches of commercial banks to raise needed 
funds outside the U.S. without being subject to domestic 
reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings. 
Additionally, in the period 1965 to 1974 U.S. banks were 
affected by the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program that 
restricted the making of foreign loans directly from their 
domestic offices. As a result, banks were encouraged to fund 
their overseas lending from external sources. This meant 
that banks without foreign branches, or at least what was 
called "a window on the Eurodollar market," were at a 
disadvantage in competing for international business.
Beginning in 1974, international banking took on a new 
character with new dimensions. The quadrupling of oil prices 
at the end of 1973 and early 1974 resulted in massive trade 
and payments surplusses for oil-exporting countries while the 
major oil-importing countries suffered severe reversals in 
their international payments accounts. Commercial banks 
played a key role in the process of financial intermediation 
between the surplus and the deficit nations. As a result, 
international lending expanded by an impressive 44 percent in 
the short period between year-end 1974 and 1976.
With the explosion of international banking activities 
in the past two decades and consequent large scale overseas 
lending, however, the international financial system has 
become vulnerable to the potential impact of outright default 
or serious disruption of external debt servicing obligations
by, especially, East European and non-oil-producing less
developed countries (NOLDC's). This vulnerability stems not
only from the fact that a large proportion of this
outstanding debt is owed to private commercial banks, but
also because the amounts owed are rather substantial relative
to bank capital. Because of the pivotal role which
commercial banks play in national economies, especially as
regards to the domestic monetization process, and because
outstanding loans are highly leveraged against a relatively
small capital base, significant debt repudiations could
(2)
jeopardize international economic stability.
Table 1 illustrates the trend in U.S. bank lending in
the period 1977-82. Since 1977 the ratio of bank exposure to
capital has risen from 131.6 percent to 155.0 percent in
1982. Of the nine largest U.S. commercial banks this figure
has grown from 188.2 percent to 221.2 percent, although it
ought to be kept in mind that in spite of these figures this
represents only a modest portion of total bank loans. For
example, in spite of the fact that outstanding loans
accounted for 282.8 percent of capital of the nine largest
U.S. catniercial banks in 1982, this was only 14 percent of
(3)
total bank assets.
As a further illustration of the severity of the 
present situation consider table 2 which highlights the 
exposure of the eighteen largest U.S. banks to five Latin 
American countries, all of which experienced debt servicing 
problems since 1982. For Citibank, BankAmerica, Chase
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Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Chemical, and Crocker 
National exposure to these five countries alone was in excess 
of 150 percent of total bank capital.
What are the implications of these developments to the
U.S. banking system? As of mid-1982 the ten largest debtor
(4)
nations owed U.S. commercial banks a total of §221 
billion. The top five (Mexico, Brazil, Argintina, Chile, and 
Venezuela) alone owed $56 billion to the sixteen largest U.S. 
commercial banks (with capital in excess of $1 billion) 
leveraged against total bank capital of $36 billion 
(including shareholder's equity, subordinated notes, and 
reserves against possible loan loses). On this basis these 
banks generated total net profits of roughly $4 billion ($7 
billion pretax). In a worst case scenario a unilateral 
repudiation of just a single year's interest and principal 
repayments could amount to some $17 billion. After wiping 
out profits this would mean that $10 billion would have to be 
absorbed from bank capital, i.e. a 28 percent reduction. 
This loss of capital would force banks to reduce their 
outstanding loans by roughly $200 billion in order to conform 
to the 5 percent ratio of capital to loans adopted for large 
banks in mid-1983 by bank regulators. This, of course, would 
translate into a severe contraction of the domestic money 
supply necessitating massive federal intervention. As Michas 
and Wojtyla have noted:
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"In a crisis the Fed could pump in reserves, but 
reserves aren't bank capital, so the Fed or the Congress 
would have to inject government capital into the banks. 
Would all the banks be saved or would there be mass 
mergers, such as are going on in the oil industry with 
the top 16 (30?) banks reduced to just three or four?"(5)
Even under the worst of circumstances this body of debt 
would unlikely oecome worthless overnight. Nevertheless, in 
light of recent overseas lending activity can there be any 
doubt as to why the Federal Reserve, indeed the entire 
international financial community is deeply worried about the 
prevailing external debt situation? Can there be any doubt, 
for instance, why Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker has 
repeatedly urged Congress to lessen the size of the federal 
deficit in order to relieve the pressure on the overall 
interest rate structure there by reducing the burden of debt 
servicing by the non-oil producing less developed countries?
Historical Background
On October 19-20, the Organization of Petroleum
(6)
Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo on exports 
of oil to the United States and the Netherlands following the 
onset of the third Arab-Israeli war earlier in the month. 
This was followed shortly thereafter by a rise in the posted 
price of petroleum from $3,011 to $5,119 per barrel, an 
increase of almost 70 percent. In subsequent years the spot 
market price of Saudi Arabian light crude rose from roughly 
$2.70 per barrel in 1973 to around 11.50 per barrel in 1976. 
By year-end 1983 the price of crude oil had risen to 
approximately $30 per barrel. These price hikes, or "shocks"
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as they were popularly dubbed by the press, were to have 
profound social, political, and economic consequences.
For many Americans the embargo and subsequent oil price
increases are remembered for the irritations of long lines at
gasoline stations and for relatively minor reductions in real
living standards. For the rest of the world, however,
particularly the non-oil-producing less developed countries,
these events were to foreshadow a profound change in those
countries economic and political fortunes. The events of the
early and mid-1970's represented a transfer of current
economic resources from one sector of the global economy to
another unparalleled in history. A cursory examination of
(7)
sectoral current account balances serves to illustrate the 
magnitude of the transfer. In 1973 the Organization ' for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a consortium of 
the world's most economically advanced nations, ran a 
combined current account surplus totalling $9.9 billion, 
while the NOLDC's exhibited a deficit of $6.2 billion. OPEC, 
on the other hand, ran a combined current account surplus of 
$7.7 billion. One year later the OECD countries were 
sporting a combined deficit of $27.5 billion (a turnaround of 
$37.4 oillion), while the NOLDC's deficit increased to $23.3 
billion (or a worsening of $17.1 billion). On the other 
side, the current account surplus of OPEC expanded to $59.5 
billion (or an increase of nearly $52 billion).
The first major concern of the petroleum importing 
countries during the initial stages of the oil price increase 
was how to ameliorate the impact of these developments on
10
economic growth. Virtually all parties involved in the
formulation of policy at this time feared a severe downturn
in world economic growth. For the most developed countries
(MDC's) the increased petroleum bill could be financed in
large measure by reduced consumption of non-essential imports
and the promulgation of commercial policies designed to
promote exports, notably manufactures. In the case of the
United States, by virtue of the fact that petroleum sales
were denominated in U.S. dollars, the increase in prices
eventually manifested itself as a growing federal budgetary
deficit, an accelerated inflation rate, and domestic economic
recession. For the NOLDC's the problem was even more
vexatious. The NOLDC's did not possess the import
compressibility of the MDC's and the prospects of a severe
economic depression were imminent. To make matters worse,
NOLDC exports (typically agricultural and primary products)
(8)
were demand inelastic. For these countries the
consequences of widespread unemployment and higher prices for 
essential imports threatened political instability and social 
chaos.
Within international economic circles the quintessential 
question was how to channel the considerable petroleum 
revenues of OPEC back to the NOLDC's to enable them to pay 
for higher priced oil imports. This was the so-called 
"petrodollar" recycling problem. In retrospect the short-run 
solution to the initial problem appears to have been 
relatively painless. Most of the oil revenues earned by OPEC
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during this period made its way back to the OECD countries
through the system of international financial intermediation.
Flush with oil dollars the 'petroleum exporting countries
enthusiastically pumpea these funds back into North America,
Europe, and Japan by purchasing real and financial assets,
including real estate, corporate and government securities,
precious metals, bank deposits, etc. In no time at all the
coffers of the major western banks were overflowing with
petrodollars. Given the worsening state of the world economy
and the magnitude of the dollars involved there was only one
place for these funds to go —  right back to the NOLDC's. As
John Makin poignantly ODserved:
"The huge transfer of resources from oil importers to oil 
exporters was a banker's dream. Overnight it (the first 
oil price shock) created a whole new category of 
borrowers and lenders: the oil Duyer and the oil seller.
The sellers were not very sophisticated in financial 
matters - they wanted to put their money in the bank. At 
first the bank's biggest problem was to recycle the money 
fast enough - to get it into the hands of borrowers in 
huge chunks while collecting their fees, which shot up 
simply as a reflection of the delightful fact that 1 
percent of $100 million is ten times larger than 1 
percent of $10 million. Jumbo loans are just as easy to 
make as large loans and yet much more profitable."(9)
By 1977 the process of recycling petrodollars back to the
NOLDC's following the initial oil price shock was complete
and the major commercial banks were patting themselves on the
back for having resolved a major international financial
crisis.
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The LDC Debt Crisis
The recycling of petrodollars has continued to the
present day, however, the crisis is far from over. The
solution to the short-run problem is having serious long-run
side effects. In 1973 total outstanding and disbursed
medium- and long-term foreign debt of the less developed
countries (LDC's), both oil and non-oil producing, was
approximately $135 billion. Four years later this figure had
risen to $211 billion. By sane estimates total outstanding
debt of the LDC's in 1984 will have reached as high as $790
billion. For a more detailed profile of the total debt
(10)
picture consider tables 3 and 4.
The single most important cause for the phenominal 
growth in total external debt, particularly of the NOLDC's, 
was the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973-74 and again in 
1979-80. Consider, for example, table 5 which illustrates a 
variety of external debt indicators for NOLDC's in the period 
1973-82. As a percentage of total, oil imports rose from 
roughly 6 percent in 1973 to around 20 percent in 1980-82. 
Table 6 illustrates the hypothetical impact of higher oil 
prices on these countries in terms of the cumulative 
additional costs over and above what would have occured had 
the price of oil risen by no more than the U.S. wholesale 
price index. As indicated by the table the cumulative total 
of additional costs incurred amounted to nearly $260 billion 
in the decade 1974-84. This figure does not, of course, refer 
to the actual rise in foreign debt since there are a variety
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of mitigating and debilitating factors to consider, such as 
export trends, policy measures to reduce oil imports, 
interest rate movements, etc., nevertheless it does provide 
an overall sense of the pressures which must have been felt 
by local authorities to increase the inflow of foreign 
capital.
It is clear, therefore, that the surges in oil prices 
set the stage for the phenominal increase in external debt 
over the last decade. Yet, this burden might have 
ameliorated over time with no untoward consequences had it 
not been for the global recession and skyrocketing interest 
rates of 1980-82.
In addition to the dramatic growth in LDC debt
outstanding there was also a hardening of financing terms.
Prior to 1976 the bulk of developing country financing was
done at the official level at relatively soft terms, i.e.
below market interest rates with liberal repayment schedules.
After 1976, however, not only did the terms of official
borrowings begin to harden somewhat out debtor nations had
begun to turn towards private financial institutions with
increasing regularity. The bulk of private financing came
from the large western commercial banks at interest rates
which were, more often than not, based upon eitner the London
Inter-Bank Offer (LIBOR) or U.S. prime rate, with much
(11) (12) 
shorter payout periods. Cline has estimated, for
example, that in the period 1961-70 average real interest
(13)
rates on NOLDC external debt averaged 4.1 percent. This
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rate dropped to an incredible -.8 percent in the period 1971-
80. In 1979 and 1980 although nominal rates were very high
(LIBOR averaged 13.2 percent) so too was the U.S. inflation
rate. By 1981-82, however, real interest rates had begun to
explode as declines in inflation were not similarly matched
by drops in nominal interest rates. In fact, LIBOR in 1981-
82 rose to an average 14.8 percent, resulting in real
interest rates of 7.5 and 11.0 percent, respectively. It has
(14)
also been estimated by Cline that this surge in interest
rates, caused by expansionary fiscal and tight monetary
policies in the U.S., accounted for approximately $41 billion
in total excess interest payments in the period 1981-82
beyond what would have been anticipated on the basis of real
(15)
interest rates over the previous two decades.
As a consequence of these developments many debtor
nations found it increasingly more difficult to service its
external obligations. To make matters worse, a worldwide
recession in 1980-82 caused commodity prices to fall thereby
squeezing export earnings of many developing nations. Export
unit values fell from 100 in 1980 to 94 in 1981 and to 90 in
(16)
1982 for non-oil producing developing countries, while
import unit values rose from 100 in 1980 to 103 in 1981
before falling back to 100 the following year. The total
loss to NOLDC's in the period 1981-82 as a result of these
changes applied on a trade basis has been estimated by Cline
(17)
at $79 Dill ion. Unfortunately, these developments were
not offset by growth in volume as real exports of non-oil 
developing countries, which averaged 8.1 percent in 1971-80
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and 9.9 percent in 1981 before falling to 1.2 percent in 
1982.
As a result of these developments Cline has established 
that the ex ante impact of these exogenous shocks was to 
increase external debt of NOLDC's by $401 billion. These 
figures are summarized in table 7 which also shows that the 
actual increase in debt amounted to $482 billion. Although 
these figures are not adjusted for policy measures 
promulgated by some countries to reduce the deficits they do, 
nonetheless, suggest that the huge increase in developing 
country debt may be attributed to developments largely 
outside the control of the countries themselves.
In addition to these exogenous shocks the oorrowing 
nations themselves share some of the responsibility for their 
deteriorated deot situation. In some instances, notably in 
Brazil, short-term policies of rapid debt accumulation for 
the purpose of high rates of ecoonomic growth backfired when 
the resulting legacy of huge external debts became an 
oppresive burden in the face of a weakened international 
economy. In other cases, Argentina for example, faulty 
exchange rate policies resulted in overvalued currencies 
which culminated in high imports and poor export performance. 
In Venezuela and Mexico attempts to maintain an overvalued 
currency on a fully convertible basis, coupled with domestic 
interest rate policies, resulted in capital flight. In 
Argentina and Venezuela this outflow of capital is estimated 
to have accounted for roughly one-third of total debt, and
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approximately one-fifth in Mexico.
In addition to short-term policy errors, long-term
development strategies have been myopic. Over pricing of
labor, excessive protection of industrialization programs
based upon import substitution, ill-conceived and inefficient
government enterprise activities, and other distortions have
(18)
hindered growth.
By 1982-83 the situation had deteriorated so badly that
debt servicing problems had become epidemic. International
debt problems were further aggravated oy what Cline terms
"psychological shifts" in the credit markets. Debt servicing
breakdowns by a major country, according to Cline, has
resulted in severely restricting capital flows to most of the
rest of the region, to wit Poland's quasi-default in 1981
which pushed Romania into a debt rescheduling and other East
European countries into severe debt servicing problems;
Mexico's debt crisis in August 1982 causing a credit supply
shock to Latin America resulting in reschedulings by Brazil,
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, along with debt-servicing
difficulties by Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
The sharp curtailment of credit to Latin America is evidenced
by data on U.S. bank loans outstanding which grew from $68.1
billion in June 1982 to $69.3 billion in December, an
increase of only $1.2 billion, compared with $7.3 billion
(19)
during the same period in 1981.
Debt servicing disruptions during 1982-83, including 
formal reschedulings, reached approximately two-thirds of 
commercial bank debt owed by East European and developing
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countries, while by year-end 1982 no less than 34 countries 
were in arrears on their debt. The amounts of debt formally 
rescheduled rose from $2.6 billion in 1981 to $5.5 billion in 
1982, and again to roughly $90 billion in 1983.
In short, the international financial crisis which 
reached a peak in 1982-83 can be traced to five fundamental 
causes: higher oil prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80, high
interest rates and global recession in 1980-82, local 
economic mismanagement, and the psychological shift in the 
international credit market which, as a result of debt 
servicing breakdowns, severely restricted the flow of new 
credit.
Recent Concern About the Risk of Overseas Lending
With the rapid rise in international lending and with an 
unstable international economic environment, lending risk has 
became the subject of much discussion in recent years. Much 
of the increased attention has focused on the growth of loans 
to LDC's. The magnitude of U.S. bank overseas lending, cases 
of debt reschedulings, and the greater possibility of 
outright default have contributed much to the fervor ot these 
discussions.
(20)
Between 1956 and 1975 eleven countries underwent a
total of 32 multilateral debt rescheduling exercises which
(21)
provided about $7.5 billion in debt relief. From 1976
until 1981, a mere half-dozen years later, there were an 
additional 23 major debt reschedulings involving fourteen
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(22) (23)
countries, and providing $9.7 billion in debt relief.
In 1982 alone there were four major financial rescue
operations undertaken involving the world's largest debtor
nations - Brazil, Mexico, and, Argentina, along with
Yugoslavia. Principal rescheduling was the essential element
in each of these four cases, and typically involved
restructuring on a five-to-eight year basis. Excluding 
(24)
Yugoslavia, $30 billion in external debt was rescheduled,
coupled with an additional $39 billion in additional
financial support (including Yugoslavia), $14.7 billion of
which was in the form of new loans from U.S. commercial
oanks. These rescue packages also typically carried
rescheduling fees ranging from .5 to 1.5 percentage points,
with relatively wide spreads above either LIBOR or the U.S.
(25)
prime rate, usually around 2 percentage points.
In l¥77, hearings on overseas lending were conducted by 
the Senate Committee of Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Development. Concern over the impact of overseas lending 
activities upon the stability of the U.S. hanking system was 
voiced by the three regulatory authorities charged with the 
responsibility of regulating the banking industry: The
Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Together these 
agencies conducted a joint survey of foreign lending by U.S. 
commercial banks covering claims on foreign residents held at 
all domestic and foreign offices of 119 banks with assets of 
$1 billion or more. The findings of the survey led to a 
proposal by the Comptroller of the Currency to impose a legal
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lending limit on national tanks to foreign governments. The 
proposal expanded and clarified the federal regulation which 
prohibited any federally chartered bank from lending more 
than 10 percent of capital to any single forign government.
Under the ruling, national banks were no longer able to
view government and state-controlled agencies as seperate and
independent from the central government unless the borrower
was able to demonstrate, first, that it had independent
resources and income to pay back the loan, and second, that
the proceeds of the loan would be used for the specific
purpose intended. More recently, the regulatory authorities
have explicitly considered the notion of "transfer risk" in
sovereign lending which results from the inability of a
country to generate sufficient foreign exchange to service
(26)
its external debt. In the past, commercial bankers have
contended that sovereign lending was without risk due to the
fact that there is no dissolution of the borrower as might
otherwise occur under commercial bankruptcy. Together, these
three agencies promulgated a five point program of bank
regulation including: (a) a stricter examination of country
exposure, (b) greater public disclosure of a bank's overseas
(27)
portfolio, (c) new loan classifications for writting-off 
or provisioning into reserves "bad" loans, (d) a stretch-out 
of reported income from loan fees, and (e) increased 
cooperation with foreign bank regulators including a greater 
sharing of International Monetary Fund (IMF) information on 
external debt. This program supplements the system developed
20
in 1978 to measure and monitor country risk as it is 
reflected in a bank's exposure and exposure management 
systems. This approach focuses on the degree of country 
concentration and diversification of foreign loans in 
individual bank portfolios and on the quality of information 
possessed by a bank in assessing the degree of risk attached 
to that portfolio. Authorities have, however, shied away 
from ratings of risk on a country by country basis since this 
would be tantamount to directing or influencing the flow of 
bank credit.
At the international level, a number of agencies are now 
attempting to improve international statistical information 
on capital movements. For example, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), through the cooperation of 
major central banks, has developed a reporting system on 
external private borrowing and lending. Similar data on 
Eurodollar credits and loans from public sources have been on 
stream for quite a few years.
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Chapter 2
Distinguishing Aspects of International Bank Lending
As in domestic lending, international lending involves 
risk as is subject to the same basic credit principles —  
namely the definition of that risk, adequate knowledge and 
understanding of the borrower, including a thorough financial 
history, position and prospects, and a clear indication that 
the loan will be repaid.
The element that most distinguishes overseas lending 
from domestic lending, however, is the concept of country 
risk (with all that is involved) and the presence of 
sovereign risk. Even if the foreign customer is financially 
able to repay a loan, i.e., there is an acceptable banking 
risk in the sense of prospects of commercial bankruptcy, that 
customer's government may prevent the appropriate conversion 
of local currency into foreign exchange to repay the bank 
loan. This may result in default on the national level 
rather than the local private level.
The most widely accepted definition of sovereign risk is 
that it is the risk involved when claims are either against a 
foreign government itself or is backed by the full faith and 
credit of that government. Such risk is usually regarded as 
superior to non-sovereign risk because the government has 
management, good or ill, over its existing foreign assets as 
well as the flows of receipts and payments, stimulation or 
dampening, over goods and services exports and imports. On 
the other hand, the sovereign entity usually cannot be sued
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due to its immunity to foreign prosecution, unless it waives 
that immunity. The principle of sovereign immunity 
recognizes the independent integrity of each sovereign state, 
asserting that no one state is superior to any other, and 
reflects general acceptance in international law that a 
sovereign cannot, without consent, be made a respondent in 
the courts of another sovereign.
In this connection, the U.S. passed the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976 which set the standards by 
which questions of iirmunity are to be resolved as far as this 
country is concerned. The Act contains a general grant of 
inmunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States to each foreign state. An immunity from attachment, 
arrest, and execution is also granted with respect to a 
foreign state's property in the United States. Among the 
exceptions to such immunity are cases in which a foreign 
state engages in a commercial activity. In large degree this 
Act represents a codification of court-created law over the
years rather than the breaking of any new ground.
The Nature of Country Risk
Country risk is the risk that a particular country
cannot or will not adhere to the terms of its external
obligations as a result of adverse political, social,
economic, and financial developments. The term "default" is
widely used in the literature to describe such debt servicing
disruptions although this is a somewhat of a misnomer. Eaton
(29)
and Gersovitz point out, for example, that a loan is not
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legally in default until the lender has declared that the 
borrower has failed to meet the terms of its obligations, a 
situation which has rarely been taken with respect to 
sovereign debt. When arrears have occurred, reschedulings 
have usually ensued. Such circumstances have, nonetheless, 
been referred to in the literature as "defaults." In what is 
to follow the terms defaults, reschedulings, and repudiations 
have been used interchangeably, unless where otherwise 
obvious from the text.
Whether the borrower is a government, a quasi-public 
company or a private entity, an appraisal of economic, 
social, and political conditions in the country becomes a 
vital element in evaluating the desirability of lending to 
the prospective borrower. Adverse political developments 
include such actions as expropriations, crippling legal 
restrictions, freezing of assets and nationalization; 
financial risks include devaluation, inconvertability of 
currency and rescheduling of external debt. They can occur 
singly or in combination and are usually the result of 
adverse economic or political changes. Thus, it is of 
crucial importance to the overseas lending operations of 
commercial banks to carefully assess the political, social, 
and economic environment of those countries in which they 
have outstanding committments.
The fundamental concern of every international lender is 
that sufficient foreign exchange will be available to 
countries in order to facilitate the orderly servicing of
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their external debt. It is essential, therefore, to consider 
those factors which bear on a country's ability to meet its 
external obligations. Such factors are essentially those 
related to the availability of foreign exchange or the 
possible reduction in foreign exchange expenditure. The most 
important factors to be considered include:
- Revenues derived from exports of goods and services;
- Net factor remittances;
- Net inflow of capital through direct investment;
- External borrowings and foreign aid;
- International reserve holdings;
- Maneuverability for reduction of imports of goods and 
services.
These factors will be developed more fully in subsequent 
discussions regarding the choice of economic indicators used 
in flagging potential servicing disruptions.
When extending credit facilities to a foreign country, 
the question frequently arises as to the extent to which a 
bank ought to expose itself in any given country, not only in 
absolute terms but also in proportion to other countries. In 
this, concern is not over the countries with a high credit 
standing, nor with those countries where excessive political 
and commercial risks are so obvious that they are not 
regarded as creditworthy by private lenders. The 
international bank lender is rather concerned with the "in- 
between" cases. Who are they? How do they measure up in 
relation to each other? Where does the lender desire to 
place his finite resources in order to optimize his
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international portfolio within the context of maximum return, 
liquidity, and security. In other words, the international 
lender is concerned, first, with the degree of exposure 
within each country individually, and then» more importantly, 
the net placed at risk in that country in relation to other 
countries as influenced by the size of his total portfolio 
commitment to foreign credit operations.
What then is exposure? Exposure in a foreign country 
consists of short-term credit lines and individual 
transactions with banks, individuals, private and government 
corporations, and governments for letters of credit, stand-by 
letters of credit, acceptances and advances, including 
temporary overdrafts. It also includes layoffs and foreign 
exchange positions and lines. Also included are firm unused 
commitments and term loans.
A commercial bank's exposure in any given country is the 
result of its cumulative credit decisions, possibly over many 
years, and represents the total commitment in any given 
country. A bank's first concern is how to determine limits 
to country exposure, while its basic preoccupation is with 
how much is at risk and the likelihood that a particular 
country will experience problems which might jeopardize the 
viability of its commitments.
The International Credit Market and Credit Rationing
We have thus far considered the possibility of a debt 
repudiation at the purely microeconomic level, i.e. from the
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point of view of the individual lender. In other words, the
discussion has thus far been centered exclusively on the
topic of sane sort of breakdown in the international credit
market without having first given form and substance to the
underlying nature of this market.
We know that a country's decision to default on its 
foreign debt is very often the result of that country's 
inability to earn, attract through investment, or borrow an 
amount of foreign exchange consistent with its perceived or 
actual requirements. As and when such conditions arise then 
a sovereign nation must make certain policy decisions. 
Either that country must implement domestic measures, such as 
import reductions, which may have adverse economic or 
political consequences, or it must reduce its outflow of 
foreign exchange through, say, a restructuring of its 
external debt obligations. In other words, a country is 
capable of reducing the drain in its financial resources 
through either internal measures, external measures, or a 
combination of the two.
In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the
determinants of the international credit market consider the
following simplistic short-run model of a global economy
which is characterized by two countries, a net borrower and a
net lender, and a financial intermediary. It will be assumed
(30)
that exchange rates are fully flexible. A flexible-
exchange-rate system is a convertible-currency system in 
which the exchange rate is market determined after which no 
"deficit" in the balance of payments is possible. In other
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words, the current account (defined as exports less imports 
plus net tourist expenditures, dividends, interest payments, 
insurance and shipping receipts, etc.) must be identically 
equal to the sign reversed capital account (defined as net 
borrowings from abroad, net purchases of foreign securities, 
and draw-downs of foreign bank accounts) with no change in 
international reserve holdings. A flexible-exchange-rate 
system stands in contrast to a fixed-exchange-rate system in 
which the government ouys and sells foreign exchange in order 
to maintain the exchange rate at some fixed value. As a 
result international reserve holdings are likely to 
fluctuate. Consider, therefore, equations (2.1) and (2.2) 
which illustrate a simplified version of the oalance of 
payments accounting identity for the borrower and the lender, 
respectively.
F
(2.1) dR = [X(Y*)-M(Y)-iD] + [B+I(i-i*)-Q]=0
F
(2.2) dR*= [X*(Y)-M*(Y*)-iD]+[B*+I(i-i*)-Q]=0
where
dR = the change in international reserves;
X = exports of goods and services as a function of 
foreign income;
M = imports of goods and services as a function of home 
income;
i = the real interest rate paid by the borrowing 
country;
D = total outstanding external debt;
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iD = total interest payments;
Q = principal repayments on borrowings from foreign 
banks;
iD+Q = total debt service payments to foreign banks;
B = total new public and private borrowings from
foreign banks;
L (=B-Q) = new net lending;
F
I(i-i*) = new net non-bank borrowings as a function of 
the difference between interest rates 
prevailing in the borrower country and the
lender country,respectively.(31)
For the sake of simplicity it will be assumed that there
exists no net dividend payouts to foreigners. This
assumption is at least partially supported by the fact that
many developing countries have imposed prohibitive
restrictions on capital outflows. The inclusion of net
foreign purchases of interest bearing securities into the
analysis is justified on the grounds that the period since
the late 1960's and early 1970's witnessed an unparalleled
integration of the global economy as capital flows became
increasingly sensitive to interest rate differentials. Both
i* and Y* are assumed to be exogenously determined.
Following from equations (2.1) and (2.2) it can be seen,
therefore, that
(2.3) [X(Y*)-M(Y)-iD] = - [X*(Y)-M*(Y*)+iD]
F F
(2.4) [B+I(i-i*)-Q] = -[B*+I*(i-i*)-Q*]
Define total investment demand of the borrowing country
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as
D F
(2.5)
D
where I(i,Y) is domestic investment as a function of the 
domestic interest rate and national income. The hypothesized 
first partials are
Attempting to model the behavior of diverse sovereign nations 
simultaneously as regards to their attitudes towards foreign 
capital inflows is problematical. Sane countries, for 
example, seek to attract foreign capital in order to sustain 
or to increase present consumption levels as was certainly 
the case for many NOLDC's following the first and second oil 
price shocks. Increased consumption may take the form of 
greater military outlays (Argentina) or increased borrowing 
for the purpose of fixing the exchange rate to keep down the 
price of imported commodities (Egypt and Turkey). Sane 
countries since the early 1970's, notably such oil-producing 
LDC's like Mexico and Indonesia or non-oil-producing LDC's 
with seemingly tremendous latent potential for rapid economic 
gorwth such as Brazil, sought to attract foreign capital in 
order to encourage total investment expenditures. In other 
words, it is quite difficult to formulate a single unified 
theory of policy objectives of the state given the
(2.6)
D D F  
I <0, I >0, I >0 
i y i
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variegation of nations considered in the present study.
One reasonable, albeit limited, hypothesis is that 
developing countries attempt in any given period to maximize 
total investment subject to the constraints imposed upon it 
by the availability of domestic savings and/or its ability to 
generate foreign exchange. To the extent that other 
considerations such as the level and composition of household 
and government consumption expenditures are concerned, it 
will merely be assumed that such considerations are policy 
variables which have been built into the "programmed" balance 
of payments (see footnote 45) and as such are exogenously
determined and reflected in the trade balance. This
admittedly feeble argument is endorsed by the fact that a
large proportion of LDC internal investment is intended as a 
foreign exchange saver through import substitution. It can 
easily be demonstrated from the standard national income
accounting identities that,
D
(2.7) (S +S -I ) = (X-M-iD) + (G-T)
HH B
where S represents household savings, S business savings,
HH B
and G-T the federal budgetary surplus (or deficit). If we
define government savings as -S =G-T, then (2.7) becomes
G
D
(2.8) (S-I ) = (X-M-iD)
where S=S +S +S . Equation (2.1) may, therefore, be rewritten 
HH B G
as
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(2.1)'
D F
dR = (S-I ) + (B+I(i-i*)-Q) = 0
We can rearrange (2.1)' to provide a basic description of the
(32)
so-called "two-gap" model of foreign lending, i.e. that 
net foreign lending is required to bridge the gap between 
domestic savings and foreign exchange availability to finance 
domestic investment;
D F
(2.9) L = I -I -S = B-Q
The problem, therefore, is to mazimize (2.5) subject to 
(2.1);
D F
(2.10) max I = I(i,Y)+I(i-i*)
F
s.c. X(Y*)-M(Y)-iD+B+I(i-i*) -Q =0
Forming the expression
D F
(2.11) G = I(i,Y)+I(i-i*)+g[X(Y*)-M(Y)-iD+B
F
+I(i-i*)-Q]
where g is the lagrangian multiplier, and taking the partial 
derivatives with respect to i and Y, the following first 
order (necessary) conditions are obtained:
D F F
(2.12) G = i +1 +g[-D+I ] = 0
i i i i
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D
(2.13) G = I +g[-M ] = 0
y y y
F
(2.14) G = X(Y*) - M(Y) - iD + B + I(i-i*) - Q = 0
9
where M >0. The second order (sufficient) conditions for a
y
global maximum are:
D F F D D
I + I - I I / M  I -M
ii ii ii y y iy y
D D F
(2.15) I I I > 0
yi yy ii
F
-M 1 0
y ii
Solving equations (2.12) through (2.14) and rearranging 
yields the demand for net foreign credit as
D F
(2.16) L = M(Y)-X(Y*)-I(i-i*)
D F D F
+i{ ([I +1 ]/I )M +1 }
i i y y i
Turning to the supply side of the international credit 
market, although the supply of credit is essentially the 
current account surplus of the creditor nation, these 
surplusses are channeled through financial intermediaries. 
It is assumed that these financial institutions are private 
profit maximizing firms. The profit function may be 
generalized as
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(2.17) H = (i+k)L[r(i+k)]-i*A
where H is profit, k is the bank's spread above the 
prevailing interest rate i, and A is the availability of 
foreign credit defined as
(2.18) A = -X(Y*)+M(Y)+iD
In equation (2.16) the extension of net credit by the private 
bank is functionally related to perceived risk, r. It is 
assumed that the extension of credit is negatively related to 
risk, and that risk is positively associated with the spread, 
i.e.
(2.19) L <0, r >0
r k
Maximizing profit with respect to the spread above the market 
interest rate yields the supply of credit equation
S
(2.20) L = -kL r -iL r
r k r k
Although the coefficient of i in equation (2.17) is sign
D D F
indeterminant, if we assume that I >0 and that I > I
iy i i
and utilizing the condition in (2.16) from which it might be
D D F  
inferred that I , 1  , 1  <0, then
ii yy ii
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(2.21)
D D F D
L = [(I +1 )/l ]M 
i i i y y
D D F  
+i{M [I (I +1 )
y y ii ii
D F D2 F
+ (I +1 )]/I +1 } < 0
i i y iiy 11
Furthermore, if it is assumed that r >0, i.e. that the
ki
compensation for perceived risk must rise at an increasing 
rate, then from equation (2.21)
From these results, equations (2.16) and (2.20) are depicted 
diagramatically in figure 1, panel A.
One way to interpret the incidence of a temporary 
repudiation of debt servicing obligations is to view the 
event as the consequence of a failure of the international 
credit market to clear, i.e. a situation in which there is a 
failure to reach an equilibrium. External debt reschedulings 
or repudiations may occur when the demand for international 
credit exceeds the amount which foreign banks are willing or 
able to supply, possibly even after an array of domestic 
austerity measures, devaluations, etc. have been implemented. 
To clarify this sort of market failure it is useful to
illustrate this concept consider panel A in diagram 1. 
Unlike most commodity markets where prices rise continuously 
until equilibrium between supply and demand is established.
(2.22)
S
L = - (i+k)L r - r L > 0 
i r ki k r
(33)
consider the theory of credit rationing. In order to
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in credit markets there is an interest ceiling beyond which
lenders are unwilling to supply additional credit. The
reason for this is usually attributed to the paucity of
information about borrowers, particularly developing
countries where up-to-date and accurate data is notoriously
suspect. As a result, lenders use the interest rate which
borrowers are willing to pay as a proxy for the desperateness
of the borrower's situation. If the interest rate which the
potential borrower is willing to pay rises above some
(34)
conventional norm then this would be viewed as evidence
of the borrower's desperate situation in which case
additional funding might, in fact, dry up altogether thereby
hastening a financial crisis. Such circumstances might be
viewed by foreign creditors as constituting an unacceptable
level of risk. Note also in the diagram that below some
interest rate, say i', the supply of new credit (SS) is zero,
where i' represents the cost of loanable funds to the lender
(say LIBOR plus a minimum spread representing transaction 
(35)
costs). At the ceiling rate, i", the supply of new
credit, L, becomes totally inelastic.
The demand for foreign credit (DD) can be viewed
conventionally as being inversely related to the interest
rate, which in turn reflects the scarcity of domestic capital
(36)
and foreign exchange. In the diagram equilibrium occurs
at i(t) at an amount L(t) of new lending.
Consider now the disequilibrium case depicted in panel B 
of the same diagram. In this case we have a contraction in
36
the supply of credit as depicted by a left-shift in the
supply curve (S'S')f an expansion in the demand for foreign
credit as depicted by a right-shift in the demand curve
(37)
(D'D')r or both. Under these circumstances at i",
L(d)>L(s), with the resulting gap, G, representing a 
disequilibrium in the foreign credit market. The manner in 
which the borrowing country is able to rectify this situation 
is of paramount importance from the point of view of the 
international lender. As Cline has pointed out:
"Under normal circumstances the country can take
adjustment measures to shift the demand curve for 
foreign borrowing backward to the left, often with IMF 
guidance. Indeed, the announcement of an adjustment 
package (especially one with IMF participation) may 
serve to shift the supply curve of international loans 
outward to the right because, other things being equal, 
it will give foreign lenders more confidence."(3a)
Under more extreme circumstances, however, it .may be
infeasible to shift either the demand curve to the left
through the imposition of domestic austerity measures due to
the possibility of political paroxysms, or to shift the
supply curve to the right due to a jittery international
lending climate. Under these circumstances external debt
rescheduling becomes an incipient possibility. The relative
degree to which either the DD curve will be left shifted or
the SS curve right-shifted will depend upon the bargaining
position of the parties involved.
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(39)
Conventional Approaches to Assessing Country Risk
Even before recent efforts by U.S. bank regulatory 
authorities to more closely monitor overseas lending 
activities, large U.S. commercial banks were acting more 
systematically and formally to protect themselves against 
overseas risk. They developed their own individual systems 
for evaluating economic conditions in foreign countries. 
Moreover, smaller banks which used to rely on the larger 
banks' decisions when participating in loan syndications
began to develop their own risk evaluation systems as well.
(40)
A survey conducted by Eximbank of 37 U.S. banks 
revealed the variety of different types of systeas utilized 
when assessing country risk, i.e. debt rescheduling or 
repudiation, and for determining the extent of country 
exposure. Eximbank found that the analytical approaches used 
by banks in evaluating country risk varied significantly in 
nature and scope. 3anks with small international portfolios 
had no systan, and evaluated country risk only when a loan 
application necessitated it. Most banks, however, employed a 
systanatic procedure for assessing the creditworthiness of 
countries. The analytical approaches used range from the 
strictly qualitative —  involving little or no numerical or 
statistical analysis appearing in the final country review —  
to those that are fundamentally quantitative in character. 
Some banks used more than one system.
In general, four types of country evaluation systems
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can be distinguished: fully qualitative, structured
qualitative, checklist, and quantitative econometric. A 
fully qualitative systam is structured around a country
evaluation report whose format, detail, and scope may vary
from country to country. Banks which used this system tended 
to be those which were just beginning to do systematic
country reviews and are therefore using this system while
seeking to develop a more structured system more suitable to 
their particular needs. This approach is an entirely
subjective approach.
In contrast, the structured qualitative system has a
standardized format and a well defined scope, with some
statistical analysis generally included. Nearly 75 percent
of the banks surveyed used a structured qualitative system.
An example of this type of country evaluation report from a
major New York commercial bank is presented in Appendix
(41)
I.
The checklist system is both quantitative and subjective
in nature, using a scoring technique to scale a country's
strengths with respect to a set of chosen indicators and 
predetermined criteria, variables. The indicators are often 
quantitative and to that extent the scoring requires no 
judgement or first-hand knowledge of the country. On the 
other hand, subjective judgements, especially with respect to 
political and social features or likely trends may require 
intimate familiarity with specific countries. The score for 
each indicator may be aggregated into a summary rating for 
each country using a common set of subjectively determined
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weights —  the weighted checklist approach. Some banks use 
both a weighted checklist and a structured qualitative 
system. Other banks combine the weighted checklist with an 
experimental quantitative technique. The indicators are 
subjectively selected and any built-in bias will affect the 
quality of the result, although these short-comings will 
apply accross the board to all countries evaluated.
The quantitative econometric approach involves 
statistically more sophisticated evaluation techniques. Such 
methods include discriminant analysis, principal components, 
linear probability models, logit and probit transforms. 
These approaches attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the 
checklist system which lie in the subjectivity involved in 
selecting the most significant variables to be used in the 
evaluation process. Standard econometric and statistical 
tests of predictive accuracy are used to select the most 
relevant explanatory variables and to predict potential debt 
servicing difficulties.
It was found that of the 37 banks surveyed by Eximbank 
26 used the results of country evaluation reports to set 
maximum exposure limits for countries and, in some cases, to 
set sub-limits for specific loan maturities and categories. 
Country exposure ceilings, however, were not determined 
solely by the evaluation results. Other factors such as a 
bank's marketing strategy and competitive position also 
played important roles in the setting of country exposure 
limits.
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Chapter 3
Assessing Country Risk
Traditionally, the assessment of country risk has 
involved two important technical steps: The selection of
risk indicators (together with an implicit or explicit 
weighting scheme) and the choice of a formula to grade or 
rank potential country exposure. This chapter discusses the 
quantitative and qualitative ingredients generally considered 
to be essential for making relative, albeit limited, 
comparisons across countries.
Economic conditions alone cannot accurately mirror a 
country's ability to service its external debt obligations. 
Furthermore, even if this were possible an analysis of such 
conditions would not reveal local policy makers' willingness 
to meet is foreign comnittments. A truly thorough evaluation 
must therefore also consider those social and political 
realities which may impinge upon a country's capacity to 
service its external debt. The necessary approach, 
therefore, is to consider risk evaluation within the context 
not only of economic developments, but of prevailing 
commercial, political, and social circumstances as well.
A carefully conceived risk appraisal framework, 
especially if performed on a repetitive basis, can provide 
the analyst with a time series of evaluations against which 
to make a considered appraisal of an individual country's 
strenghts and weaknesses. By pointing out improvement, 
deterioration, or turning points in a country's overall
41
position, this process can help to focus attention early on 
incipient economic, social, or political developments which 
may serve as a basis for taking early corrective measures in 
order to reduce exposure risks or for moving promptly to 
capitalize on new opportunities.
Economic Indicators
While taking into account every conceivable economic 
indicator is neither feasible nor necessary from a practical 
point of view, it is possible to select a few of the most 
significant and use them as analytical tools. Key data and 
ratios are then scored in order to provide the analyst with 
a basis of comparison in order to measure relative economic 
stability, strength, and growth.
The main concern is, of course, with the borrowing 
country's capacity to service its debts. The most directly 
relevant economic indicators, therefore, relate to the 
balance of payments, the debt structure, and the 
international liquidity of the country.
Most country risk analysts start with the appraisal of 
the elements of the country's balance of payments. As a 
general rule, balance of payments (especially current 
account) surplusses are healthy in as much as they provide an 
indication of a country's ability to generate the foreign 
exchange with which to service outstanding debt. If a 
country experiences a persistent balance of payments deficit 
and adverse trends in, say, its trade account, then the
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possibility of an underlying fundamental disequilibrium
exists, often accompanied by an overvalued currency and
capital flight caused by speculation that the country's
currency will weaken. The most common risks are that severe
balance of payments deficits may lead to either a short-fall
in available foreign-exchange or inconvertibility of local
currency into hard currency.
Exports and imports of goods and services and transfer
payments make up the current account. A current account
surplus is a good indicator since a stagnant economy or poor
country management does not easily attract capital from
abroad whereas a growing economy that is sound would be more
likely to receive private capital as a result of foreign
direct investment and lending, as well as official capital
inflows resulting from active development efforts.
The next point of focus is the debt structure of a
country. Unfortunately, data on foreign debt and debt
structure have historically been unavailable or only
partially available and, therefore, analysts often look to a
(42)
truncated version of the debt service ratio as a
convenient yardstick for assessing country risk.
Finally, it is advisable to observe changes in the net
foreign asset position of a country. International liquid
assets consists of gold, special drawing rights (SDR's),
(43)
foreign currencies —  preferably convertible currencies
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—  and the country's position with the IMF. Any drawdown of
that international liquidity is an indication that the
(44)
country is running a balance of payments "deficit."
Most careful country risk analysts advocate the
observation of past performance over a period of, say, five
years in order to ferret out momentary blips from more or
less stable trends. Projections should also be taken into
consideration in order to obtain a notion of future trends as
perceived by country officials, i.e. the official
(45)
"programmed" balance of payments. Wherever long-term
plans exist they ought to be looked at as an indication of
the direction in which the government intends to lead the
economy, but the observer should attempt to distinguish
between real plans and aggregations of project proposals.
Selection of actual key data and ratios included in a
formal country assessment is one of the most cricital
elements in the preparation of the model. Avramovic et 
(46)
al have examined several factors pertaining to a
country's ability to service its short- and long-term 
external obligations. Their approach suggested the use of 
several economic indicators for evaluating country risk. The 
most commonly used indicators include: the ratio of debt
service payments to exports (the debt service ratio), the 
ratio of external debt (public and private) to exports, the 
ratio of external debt to gross national product (GNP), the 
ratio of international reserves to imports (the liquidity 
ratio), the growth rate of exports (usually a moving average 
over a number of years), the ratio of imports to CNP, and per
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(47)
capita income. Frank and Cline in their important study
on the measuranent of debt servicing capacity examined such
indicators as an index of export fluctuation, the ratio of
"non-compressible imports" to total imports, and the ratio of
debt amortization to total outstanding debt. In addition,
recognizing the impact of inflation on debt relief some
(48) (49)
authors, notable Saini and Bates and Smith have
argueci either for the inclusion of an additional indicator,
say, the consumer price index, or to deflate debt service
(50)
payments by an index of dollar export prices. 
Unfortunately, despite their widespread use, the fact that 
there exists no conceptual framework for selecting specific 
indicators and for assigning them the appropriate weights 
renders than of limited usefulness. Most of the research 
conducted in recent years, particularly by various U.S. 
government and international agencies, has focused on 
identifying statistically significant explanatory variables 
for use in evaluating country risk and, more specifically, 
flagging potential debt servicing problems.
Commercial Indicators
The second important category of conditions to be
(51)
analyzed in country risk is the commercial. Carmercial
indicators are oest derived from first-hand experience and 
in-depth knowledge of a country. Commercial indicators may 
be divided into four basic types, all of which are 
necessarily somewhat subjective and dynamic. These types of
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indicators include: Business confidence and activity,
purpose of financing, climatic conditions, and access to 
energy resources.
Countries with liberal attitudes towards private 
investment (domestic and foreign) tend to be lower risk areas
from the viewpoint of the extension of credit. In some
countries not only private but overall comnercial activity is 
adversely affected due to pervasive government intervention 
of various forms and to various degrees in basic and other 
industries, ourdensome and changing regulations and taxes,
and official discrimination. On the other hand, in centrally
planned economies where private investment, either foreign or 
domestic, may or may not be sanctioned, this factor, in the 
narrow sense, has to be removed from the broad risk
assessment rather than regarding it as being heavily
negative. Judgements are affected by the official, and 
actual, attitude toward foreign business, the climate for 
conducting negotiations and operations, and the stability of 
economic, commercial, and political policies. Other 
barometers of business confidence normally include stability 
of the indiginous labor supply, the tax structure, the cost 
of capital, government incentives to promote commerce and
industry, and government organizations or agencies
established to assist foreign business and finance.
Loan purpose is most important, not only from the 
microeconomic point of view of judicious lending practices, 
but as an explicit element not only in the future economic 
growth of the country, but also as it relates (especially in
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the U.S.) to the regulatory procedures covering bank lending 
to governments and government-owned entities. Credit risk is 
considered minimized if the loan involves an efficient 
export-oriented industry (a foreign exchange earner) or,
secondarily, and import-substitution industry (a foreign 
exchange saver). They may have the tacit or formal support 
of the government and, more fundamentally, tends to have a 
direct impact upon the country's capacity to service its 
foreign aebt.
Many less developed countries suffer from periodic
geophysical catastrophies: tornadoes, earthquakes, floods,
drought, etc. Such natural calamities may affect
agricultural exports particularly, either generally or 
specific crops, or products from specific areas of the 
country. Ability to meet debt obligations may become 
erratic. The reason why such considerations are placed under 
the rubric "commercial" rather than "economic" is that they 
are judged only as a likelihood of occurrence. As and when 
such incipient dangers become reality and their impact 
courses through the societal structure are they then 
reclassified as economic.
Many less developed countries lack domestic energy
resources to sustain growing industrial and agricultural 
production. Again, this fact is not explicitly obvious in 
national income data, but is reflective of indiginous 
attempts to overcome such deficiencies. The importance of 
energy resources has become abundantly clear since the first
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OPEC price hikes in 1974. Oil is a prime, non-diginous, 
source of energy in many LDC's and fluctuations in oil prices 
have had a major impact on a number of these countries. 
Whatever the form, energy resources, their adequacy, 
conservation, development, and financing have assumed 
increasing importance in recent years, both from the point of 
view of the domestic economy but also with respect to the 
country's balance of payments.
Political and Social Indicators
When assessing country risk the analyst must be 
concerned not only with a country's ability to service its 
external obligations (this is the primary function of the use 
of economic indicators), but also whether that country has 
the willingness to do so. The scope of political analysis 
for purposes of country risk assessment is necessarily 
limited. The basic aim is to determine whether drastic 
changes in policy or political stability is likely to 
jeopardize a country's continued ability or willingness to 
service in an undisturbed manner its foreign obligations. 
More fundamentally, the analyst must be concerned not only 
with the financial integrity and political longevity of an 
existing political regime but also, in the event of a change 
in the ruling clique, the degree of stability in the 
transition process. Such changes may lead not only to 
disruptions of existing economic conditions which themselves 
may lead to an inability to service external obligations but 
may also cause governments to reevaluate its position with
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regards to that debt or with whatever priorities that
repayment may carry. As Donaldson has stated:
"In the case of government lending political risk
covers conscious refusal to pay for whatever reason. It 
may involve a new government repudiating external debts
'improperly' incurred or 'not in the national interest.' 
Alternatively, an existing government may repudiate some 
or all of its debts. This is harder to justify 
psychologically and even more damaging to the country's 
credit standing, but can happen."(52)
As a rule, a less developed country is more vulnerable
to political disruptions since its political institutions are
usually relatively new, its capable leaders few, and its tier
of middle management thin. Furthermore, a restless and
dissatisfied populace seeking profound change will likely
lead to political upheavels. As Makin has quipped: "Bankers
are impressed by an aura of control, particularly where
(53)
disarray has gone before."
The assessment of political stability is highly 
judgemental. It does not readily lend itself to statistical 
comparison. Nevertheless, focus on a few key considerations, 
measured against standards, can provide a framework for 
interpreting political information about a particular 
country. The objective is to identify significant trends 
which, within the historical context of that country, can 
provide for an understanding of the political dynamics of its 
society. This permits some judgement about the vulnerability 
of the political system to disruptive change and gives a 
basis for comparison with other countries.
Political stability depends closely on the nature of the 
government (not necessarily its form), the extent of power of
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the political leadership, the availability of capable 
leaders, the level of institutionalization of the political 
system (most importantly, arrangements for an orderly 
transition and succession of governments), and the ability of 
the administration to quickly respond to critical economic 
and social problems so as to defuse potentially explosive 
confrontations.
The degree of the leader's power is most important 
because it determines the government's decision-making 
capacity and options. Government measures can deeply affect 
the business and investment climate of the country. Such 
areas of focus, therefore, should begin with the leadership's 
capacity to maintain itself in power and carry out its 
policies. From this the probability of nationalization, 
restrictions on capital movements, desire for foreign 
investment, limits on foreign ownership, government 
intervention in business and similar factors affecting 
business efficiency and climate can be assessed.
In matters of analysis, financial and judicial 
institutions are of utmost importance. If a country's 
financial establishment is strong, it usually reflects a 
regard for financial responsibility with an awareness of 
international implications and suggests that foreign debt 
problems, if they arise, will receive the attention they 
deserve.
An efficient central bank and a well established network 
of financial institutions is capable of surviving the fall of
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a political regime (although the top government political 
personalities change) at least in terms of routine 
adminsitration if not always in terms of policy direction. 
In some instances where the central bank is strong and 
influential there may be continuity in economic and financial 
policy (Italy has provided good examples of this). In many 
countries, regimes have been toppled and government 
structures changed, yet the central banks and their 
international bank relations have remained relatively 
untouched. The analyst must also look for a high attention 
to debt management and planning capacity on the part of the 
country's financial authorities.
Judicial institutions are a major factor in the 
recognition and the enforcement of claims. Judicial 
institutions are often, but not always, able to surive 
political changes, even drastic ones, and to resolve debtor- 
creditor disputes in an even-handed manner. Where the 
judicial system is not sufficiently established and stable to 
outlive a change in regime, the reliability of any type of 
claim is significantly weakened.
Social factors such as homogeneity of population, 
religious beliefs, destribution of wealth and incane, 
unemployment, level of urbanization, educational 
opportunities, rate of illiteracy, will significantly affect 
the political stability of the country. Major 
dissatisfaction and discontent in any of these areas may lead 
to political, and therefore economic, disruptions.
External factors have an important impact on the
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country's political and economic stability. Obviously a 
country threatened by foreign invasion is likely to 
concentrate its resources on military defense and have little 
left for economic development (as was the case in Thailand 
and its oellicose neighbor Vietnam in the late-1970's). It 
is also essential to assess the impact of international 
economic and political events. Such phenomena as world 
recession, inflation, oil price increases, or political 
affiliations certainly have profound repercussions on the 
economies of the underdeveloped countries, and the 
industrially advanced as well.
The political component of country risk involves 
primarily the question of probable political staoility and 
continuity. This is important from the point of view of 
external debt management because it provides some insights 
into a country's willingness to meet its foreign obligations 
which, in the final analysis, is the key element in 
understanding the default process. This is so because in 
times of crisis, when local administrators are confronted 
with the hard decision of whether to tighten belts 
domestically in order to continue servicing its foreign debt 
or whether to default so as to avoid instituting politically 
unpopular corrective economic measures, such considerations 
provide an insight into which way a county will choose to go.
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Illustrative Methods for Comparing Country Exposure
One application of country risk analysis is to make or 
review decisions regarding the extension of credit or an 
increased involvanent within a geographical area. Another 
application, perhaps the broadest, is in connection with an 
overall review of a bank's international asset portfolio as 
an aid to strategic planning for development and 
diversification.
The basic idea behind the use of risk analysis for this 
purpose is to "rank" or "grade" countries through the use of 
a surtinary measure or "score" in order to make overall 
relative comparisons of the strenyths and weaknesses of the 
countries under review. The scoring system is based upon a 
variety of weighted risk indicators (economic, social, 
political, etc.) which are then scored in order to arrive at 
individual country ratings. The indicators themselves might 
be comprised of absolute data, such as per capita GDP, 
relative grade rankings, as for example the degree of 
political stability, or some combination of the two.
One method is to arrange the countries concerned along
(54)
with the selected indicators in matrix form. This
technique has been referred to as the matrix approach. As an 
illustration consider table 9. In the table the countries to 
be ranked are listed in the stub, while the next three 
columns include sample indicator values. For simplicity only 
three indicators have been selected: GNP (XI), exports (X2),
53
and the debt service ratio (X3).
The next step in the matrix approach is to rank the data 
in each indicator column. For example, in this case 
Venezuela is shown to have a gross national product of $8.7 
billion, which out of a total sample of, say, 80 countries is
number 26 from the top. In exports Venezuela ranks 73, and
so on, for a total score of 109 which ranks the country 
twenty fifth out of 80 cases. It will be noted that while 
either actual data (GNP) or ratings (debt service ratio, 
in which case the "rank" must be assigned a weight) may be 
used.
In this particular example it is assumed that as the
overall numerical rank increases so too does risk, i.e. a
country with rank 1 being less risky than a country with rank
2, and so forth. As the country risk increases it is
presummed that exposure will decrease, on the assumption that
reward and other relevant factors such as an established
marketing strategy are not also being considered. Although
the present example is fraught with difficulties, not the
least of which being that it automatically relegates
economically small countries (in absolute terms) to the
(55)
bottom of the heap, it is nonetheless useful in that it 
serves to highlight the simplicity, as well as economy, of 
the technique.
A variant of the matrix approach, and one more commonly 
used, is that of the checklist. Once designed, it offers 
relatively rapid, and sometimes more importantly, an 
economical means of rating a country. Its principal defect,
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and one which it shares with the matrix approach, lies in the
large degree of subjectivity involved, not only in the
selection of the key indicators but in establishing
conformance or performance gradations, assigning weights, and
finally in completing the risk questionaire itself. More
importantly, both the matrix and the checklist systems are
incapaole of providing the analyst with the single most
important piece of statistical information —  the probability
of a rescheduling crisis. In general, when using either the
matrix or checklist approach more, rather than less,
familiarity with a country is required for the best
assessment lest the analyst take the output of either
(56)
approach as the last word. In a somewhat similar vein,
even if it were possible to design a ranking system which was 
able to objectively assign appropriate weights to the chosen 
variables, once the countries are ranked there is no rule to 
guide the analyst as to where the line(s) whould be drawn to 
denote the various degrees of credit worthiness.
For the purpose of illustrating the checklist approach,
and the ease with which it is possible to obtain an overall
country ranking consider the checklist designed by Business 
(57)
International in Appendix III. In the BI checklist the 
country risk index consists of three main types of risk 
categories, each of which includes ten selected indicators.
The first category or subindex includes ten selected 
political, legal, and social factors. The second category 
consists of ten so-called conmercial criteria reflecting the
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size and development of a given market. The final category 
is comprised of ten monetary and financial elements. Each
subindex of ten factors has a maximum score of 100, or a
possible 300 for any given country. Any downward departure 
from a perfect score of 300 suggests increased risk
(political, economic, and financial) which lenders may face 
in a specific country. The scores within each of the sub­
categories suggests wherein specific risks lie.
In order to quantify political, financial, legal, and
economic risk each factor carries with it a pre-established
schedule of scores which attribute a maximum of points to the
most favorable of conditions, downward to a minimum of points
for the least desireable of circumstances. Note that the
point gradations are not the same for each of the ten factors
assessed in each category. The points attributed to each of
the ten factors within each risk category carries with it the
built-in assumption that an informed, careful assessment has
assigned the most appropriate weight to each factor within
the sub-group and that the analyst is qualified to judge
situational gradations. Of course, the subjective nature of
such weighting schemes is, in fact, the Achilles heel of the
checklist approach. As Saini and Bates have noted:
"Although most commercial banks continue to rely upon 
these relatively simple risk evaluation techniques, the 
usefulness of these techniques has been limited by the 
lack of a conceptual framework for selecting individual 
indicators and for assigning them appropriate 
weights."(58)
A second illustration of the checklist approach can be 
found in Appendix IV which was prepared for use by a major
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U.S. commercial bank. In this illustration the checklist is 
composed of fourteen domestic economic factors, eleven 
external economic factors, and nine political-legal factors. 
Scored with a maximum of ten points for each factor, the 
maximum total for the three categories are 140, 110, and 90,
respectively. Again, as in the BI index, any downward 
deviation from the maximum total of 340 indicates an
increasing degree of lending risk.
Again, the subjectivity involved in the selection of
risk indicators and the method of weighting each of the
factors considered lies at the heart of the weakness of both 
the matrix and the checklist approaches. Nevertheless, both 
techniques, especially the checklist, are widely used. As 
will be seen in greater detail in subsequent pages there do 
exist more rigorous econometric techniques which bypass many 
of the inherent deficiencies in these types of approaches.
The Linkage Between Risk Assessment and a Bank's Loan 
Portfolio
Within the microeconomic context of international bank
lending it is necessary that management develop some linkage 
between the country risk assessments and country exposure 
limits. In other words, to develop rough guidelines to 
relate country risk to the dynamic aspects of international 
bank lending. To be effective, risk assessment must be 
linked to one or more specific growth elements of the bank's 
balance sheet, for example, total foreign earning assets, 
foreign deposits, a bank's internal lending limits allocated
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to foreign operations, or its total capital funds, in effect, 
pro-rated to foreign operations. Such formula permits 
exposure guidelines to increase and change as the bank's 
international operations grow. However, since the procedure 
involves rather mechanistic features which cannot reflect 
such aspects as market limitations or marketing goals, it 
cannot be regarded as a substitute for managerial "hands on" 
judgement.
It ought to be noted that any such linkage does not 
answer two basic bank policy considerations: The division
between foreign and dearies tic business and the specific 
allocation of exposure among broad risk categories, i.e. from 
high to low risk countries. Furthermore, as the study of the 
particular formats in Appendices III and IV reveals, the 
selection of risk factors requires extrane care while the 
weighting of these factors is extremely subjective. Thus 
neither the risk evaluation format nor the consequent 
exposure guidelines should be regarded as having been cast in 
bronze. Once country exposure limits or guidelines and 
country inter-relationships are established on the basis of 
the format, they should be reviewed periodically, as should 
the format itself.
Long-Term Risk Assessment
The evaluation of long-term country risk, along with 
international or interregional comparisons, presents even 
more formidable problems and furnishes considerably less
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trustworthy results. After all, consider even the 
difficulties of long-range forecasting for a country like the 
United States with the plethora of data and resources 
available to the economist. Even twelve month forecasts are 
operous in the presence of economic turning points or major 
structural changes. What is more, an experienced 
international banker is very likely to be modest about the 
solidity of his perceptions when considering, say, a ten-year 
term loan. Consider, for example, how a banker's attitudes 
will likely be tempered by an experience in which a country 
enduring economic or political problems suddenly and 
unexpectedly has a turn for the better. Suppose that in the 
depths of the crisis the banker had undertaken vigorous 
measures designed to convert long-term (risky) assets into 
relatively safe self-liquidating short-term credit. When, in 
fact, the turn-around occurs the banker discovers that he has 
acted precipitously to the chagrin of the borrower as well as 
upper management. Consequently, even greater caution is 
expected to prevail when long-term credit decisions are under 
consideration.
When examining possible methods for assessing longer 
term country risk, there seems to be a tendency to project 
current trends with misleading precision excessively far into 
the future. It goes without saying that for countries in 
which the direction of the major economic and political 
elements appear to be linear then the chances are that such 
projections may have some validity so long as the planning 
horizon is not so distant that structural change has an
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impact. On the other hand, predictive reliability becomes 
even more obtuse as one moves from countries with fairly 
regular cycles of economic stability and instability to those 
experiencing generally unsettled conditions with occasional 
bright periods, and where the toss of a coin is almost as 
good a forecasting tool as any. A major difficulty in long­
term, and sometimes short-term, forecasts is the prediction
(59)
of turning points, and then the strength of the new
direction.
A further difficulty, especially with model-building, is 
that because of their simplicity application is sometimes 
limited and while the test elements may prove accurate they 
are far from conclusive, or else the elements are so complex 
that the assessment process is virtually unmanageable, the 
results uncertain, and the costs uneconomic.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the 
problems of, and possible approaches to, long-term country 
risk evaluation. It has merely been raised as a related 
topic along with a few observations which have methodological 
implications.
Minimizing Country Risk
Risks underlying the country exposure profile can be 
reduced by certain common practices developed through 
experience in lending activities. As in domestic lending, 
international lending involves the making of credit decisions 
through the study of performance indicators coupled with an
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element of subjectivity and intuition. In international 
lending, however, the variables are more complex. A banker 
can reduce the risk in international lending in a number of 
ways. This section is devoted to a brief discussion of the 
means by which a banker might reduce the risk associated with 
international lending.
Regardless of the maturity of the loan, risk can be
significantly reduced if the financing is directly related to
self-liquidating transactions. This type of financing is
characteristic of trade transactions such as short-term
export and import financing. In fact, prior to the twentieth
century this was the stuff of international banking. As
Makin observes in connection with the rise of the Bank of
England (which from 1694 until after World War II operated as
a private bank:
"... like those of most other banks of the time, the 
international operations of the Bank of England was 
largely centered on very short-term lending to finance 
the day-to-day turnover of trade; manufacturing 
investment was still the business of individual 
speculators."(60)
Since risk increases with the length of the obligation, 
conscious maturity scheduling is of utmost importance. The 
majority of overseas commercial bank credits to less than 
good credit risks are short-term, i.e. mature in less than 
one year. Longer maturities should be closely controlled and 
limited to strong borrowers and countries of borrowing.
Shorter maturities permit relatively rapid reductions in
exposure as conditions change.
Where loans are guaranteed, the risk is reduced;
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external guarantees reduce both the credit risk and the risk 
involved in country exposure. Such loans may be loans to 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations guaranteed by the 
parent company. Loans to quasi-public entities, or to 
private ones, guaranteed by the government or by the central 
bank of the country may reduce the credit risk but do not 
basically reduce country risk. Another protection against 
country risk, though not a guarantee, can be provided in the 
form of readily marketable foreign collateral.
The lender can also request an assignment of receipts. 
This can take several forms which have effects ranging from 
generating additional bank income and reducing risk to making 
viable what would otherwise be an excessively high risk 
transaction. An example of the former would be a relatively 
common export financing transaction in which the bank 
possesses the documents, makes the collection, and pays 
itself from the assigned receipts. An example of the latter 
would be a balance of payments loan to a high risk country 
which had agreed to process through bank collections relating 
to a principal export, allocating a portion of the receipts 
for maturing interest and amortization obligations. This 
kind of an arrangement has an interesting historical 
parallel. When the Italian city-states of the fourteenth 
century borrowed they often did so from syndicates of 
moneylenders from within their citizenry known as monti 
("piles" [of money]). In exchange, local authorities 
typically pledged the city's future tax revenues and 
empowered the monti to collect such taxes in order to retire
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the loan.
Governments of developing countries which have made 
their names familiar in international private credit markets 
tend to have a lesser risk because they have demonstrated 
that they give a high priority to their international 
creditworthiness and normally will make every effort to meet 
their obligations. They generally realize more profoundly 
that this is particularly important for them since they 
require repeated access to these credit markets in order to 
obtain financing for internal growth and improvement in the 
standard of living of their people. Thus they often possess 
greater opportunity to refinance their debt, fulfilling their 
obligations and maintaining their creditworthiness. It is 
less likely that loss will occur when the borrower is a 
foreign government, but experience has also shown that this 
certainly does not preclude the occurrence of problen loans.
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PART II: THE APPLICATION OF LOGIT ANALYSIS TO THE ASSESSMENT
OF COUNTRY RISK
Chapter 4 
Introduction
Part I of the present discussion had essentially two
objectives: a) to outline the seriousness of the
international debt situation as viewed from a western 
perspective, and b) to review in rather general terms the
techniques commonly anployed by, especially, commercial banks 
in attempting to assess the risk involved in overseas 
lending. In as much as the dramatic rise in LDC debt over 
the past two decades has progressed to the point where the 
fragile nature of the international financial system has 
become a major economic policy issue, it would appear that 
recent attempts to evaluate country risk have not met with 
much success. An alternative, more cynical explanation, is
that country risk analysis has been sound but that their
message has been misinterpreted at best, ignored at worst. 
The LDC debt crisis is, unfortunately, a fact of life, yet 
its genesis has both micro- and macro-economic origins. The 
dilemma of the LDC debt crisis was spavmed in part by 
individual commercial banks seeking to maximize their 
separate utility (read profit) functions in the face of a 
glut of petrodollars. It is a matter of seme debate, 
however, just how significant a role was the risk element in
these functions as typified in the present discussion by
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equation (2.17).
At this juncture there are a number of paths which the 
debt analyst might choose to take. The analyst might decide, 
for example, that the EJDC crisis should be taken as a fait 
accompli and to cast his analytical prowess into the 
resolution of the larger macro-issue of economic salvation in 
the face of possible widespread financial collapse. In 
making the decision to go this route the analyst must believe 
that the present systems for evaluating country risk are 
sound, that the output of these systems are properly 
interpreted and implemented, but that the lending decisions 
made at the micro-level have somehow created unstable 
economic conditions in the aggregate.
The analyst may, on the other hand, take the position 
that country risk analysis still has something to say about 
the dynamics of debt repudiations and that further
investigation and research is in order. To choose this path
still leaves open the possibility that even with refinements
in assessment techniques that there may still exist inherent
flaws which will still lead to instability at the macro­
level .
In choosing to take the latter path, i.e. a closer 
examination into the evaluation of country risk, it ought to 
be emphasized that apart from its usefulness in future 
lending situations, given the tenuous state of the existing 
global situation that any clarification of the elements 
associated with the servicing of international loans already
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on the books will also contirbute to a resolution of the 
larger macro-issues. With this in mind. Part II of the
present discussion has opted to go in the direction of 
country risk evaluation and the forecasting of potential debt 
sevicing problems.
As was noted much earlier in Part I, the primary 
criticism directed toward most of the techniques employed by 
commercial banks to assess country risk is the rather 
arbitrary manner in which various indicators purporting to 
capture the essential elements of potential debt servicing 
problems are selected and weighted. Although there have been 
tremendous strides made in the application of statistical
techniques for identifying which of the most commonly used
indicators are, indeed, statistically significant in 
evaluating the propability of debt rescheduling or debt
repudiation, until recently the selection of these indicators 
has been largely trial and error. Furthermore, in spite of 
the obvious superiority of these techniques in evaluating the 
significance of economic indicators, i.e. of a country's 
ability to service its external debt, they have been unable 
to cope with the larger, and perhaps more important, issue of 
a country's willingness to meet its international 
obligations. This, as was seen, is the rationale behind the 
use of political-social and commercial indicators employed in 
the so-called "checklist" systans. Furthermore, while these 
statistical techniques have many advantages over the more 
subjective methods currently used, they are themselves not 
without criticism.
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(61)
Review of Principal Studies
Concern over the economic problems of less developed
economies and the role of external finance in alleviating
scxne of those problems has its origins well before the events
of the early 1970's. The theoretical nature of these
analyses tended to concentrate on a country's lack of both
physical and human capital, with economic progress being
largely impeded by a scarcity of domestic savings and foreign
exchange to finance internal investment; the so-called "two
gap" model. Within this context, external finance has been
viewed as a partial remedy. Perhaps the most famous of these
(62)
analyses is embodied in the Harrod-Domar model which
describes how debt situations evolve over time. The basic 
elements of such models include a production function with 
fixed input coefficient technology, a target growth rate, a 
fixed capital/output ratio, and a fixed marginal propensity 
to save out of output. To the extent that foreign borrowing 
is required it is to bridge the "gap" between domestic 
savings and the required level of investment.
The growth-cum-debt literature suffers from a variety of 
deficiencies, not the least of which is their narrow 
perspective. For example, while these models do provide 
insights into the investment motive for external borrowing, 
they tend to ignore alternative uses for foreign finance, 
such as smoothing out donestic consumption over time, or 
attempts to postpone domestic economic adjustments in
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response to exogenous shocks. In other words, such models are
silent on the topic of what constitutes decisions rules for
optimal borrowing. Because of limitations in applying such
rigid theoretical models, interest has turned towards trying
to identify the circumstances under which nations are likely
to encounter debt servicing difficulties. The present
discussion is a review of the principal studies in this area.
The seminal article on the use of statistical techniques
to derive an index summarizing the likelihood that a country
will experience debt servicing difficulties was that written
(63)
by Charles R. Frank and William R. Cline just a little
(64)
more than a decade ago. Utilizing discriminant analysis
Frank and Cline examined eight commonly used economic
(65)
indicators as to their ability to identify potential debt 
servicing difficulties. These explanatory variables were 
tested against a binary-valued dependent variable of 
rescheduling and non-rescheduling, i.e. if a country 
reschedules then the dependent variable is assigned a value 
of unity for that year, otherwise it is given a zero value. 
Frank and Cline's data set covered 26 countries for the 
period 1960 to 1968, inclusive. According to the authors the 
resulting indicator should satisfy two criteria. First, the 
indicator should be simple, i.e. easily interpretable. 
Second, the indicator should also have a high degree of 
predictability. The purpose of the Frank and Cline study was 
to determine the predictive performance of same widely used 
debt servicing debt indicators.
Although the usual assumptions underlying regression
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analysis are not appropriate in discriminant analysis, Frank
and Cline nevertheless utilized generated t-values to exclude
sane of the explanatory variables. They found that of the
eight economic indicators tested only three were
statistically significant at the 5 percent level: the debt
service ratio, the ratio of debt amortization of total
external debt, and the ratio of total imports to
international reserves. In the first stage of their analysis
(66)
(see table 10) Frank and Cline assumed a linear
discriminant function with equal covariance matrices. They 
found that in the three variable case that the model through 
the first iteration commited a type I error (when a
rescheduling country is predicted as non-rescheduling) in 23
percent of the cases examined, and a type II error (when a
non-rescheduling country is predicted as rescheduling) 11 
percent. Through the tenth iteration these percentages 
became 8 and 20 percent, respectively. Frank and Cline then 
proceeded to reestimate the linear discriminant function 
excluding the variable imports/international reserves, and to 
repeat the entire process using a quadratic form. Their best 
results came fran the two variable quadratic case in which 
there were zero type I and only 9 percent type II errors.
Apart fran the problem of discarding independent
variables which may have same importance in explaining the 
incidence of debt rescheduling, another important problem 
concerns the selection of the critical discriminant function 
value which distinguishes between rescheduling and non­
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rescheduling cases. In the first experiment of the three
variable linear discriminant function, for example, Frank and
(67)
Cline chose zero as their critical value. For the
quadratic function, however, they found that the best
critical value was -.600 in the three-variable case and .302
in the two-variable case. In this, as well as other,
studies, there appears to be no explicit rationale for the
selection of the critical value other than to minimize the
total number of errors in the sample period. The basic
drawback with this approach is that while it is useful in
correctly classifying past reschedulings, it has not had much
success in predicting future debt servicing difficulties.
Pierre Dhonte in his examination of countries which were
(68)
unable to service their external debt utilized the
(69)
principal component technique. In his study Dhonte
analyzed 13 debt rescheduling cases between 1959 and 1971 and
compared these to 69 non-rescheduling cases in the year 1969.
(70)
Upon examining ten economic indicators Dhonte found four 
(net transfers/imports, debt disbursements/imports, external 
debt/exports, external debt/GNP) to be the most significant 
for the first principal component accounting for 38 percent 
of the variation in the sample. The second principal 
component (of which the indicators debt service payments/debt 
disbursements and debt service payments/external debt were 
the most significant) accounted for an additional 18 percent 
of the sample variation. In all, Dhonte was able to 
summarize a total of 79 percent of the variation in the 
sample data.
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On the basis of his study Dhonte hypothesized the
existence of two equilibria conditions. The first of these
conditions being the existence of a trade-off between a
(71)
country's "involvement" in external debt and the terms of
(72)
that debt. More specifically, a country which has a
heavy external debt burden (say, total external debt two to 
three times average yearly exports) suddenly faced with a 
rapid increase in interest rates, or a sudden decline in 
export earnings, is likely to experience a debt management 
crisis. In other words, countries with large external debt 
burdens that still rely heavily on foreign capital inflows 
can only do so on easy terms which allow for a reasonably 
painless roll-over of its maturing obligations. The second 
of Dhonte's equilibria conditions is that the increase in 
external debt should be more or less in line with the growth 
of exports.
In his study, Dhonte used the first two principal
components as co-ordinates on which to plot his sample
rescheduling observations. In the graph quadrant I 
represented the critical region in which a heavy involvanent 
in external debt is aggravated by unfavorable borrowing 
terms, i.e. the double condition in which a debt rescheduling 
would be expected to occur. In predicting the incidence of 
debt rescheduling on the basis of his sample data Dhonte's 
results are less convincing than those of Frank and Cline in 
which discriminant analysis was used. On this basis Dhonte
committed type I errors in 37 percent of the rescheduling
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cases, and type II errors in 13 percent of the non­
rescheduling cases. Compare these results with those of 
Frank and Cline whose type I and type II errors ranged from 
0.0 percent to 23.1 percent and from 9.0 percent to 19.9 
percent, respectively.
After the important work of Frank and Cline the next
most significant advance in the analysis of debt servicing
(73)
difficulties is the application of logit analysis
(74)
pioneered by Gershon Feder and Richard E. Just. Analyzed
were 21 instances of debt reschedulings (in 11 countries) and
217 non-rescheduling cases for a total of 238 observations
from 41 countries spanning the years 1965 to 1972. Feder and
Just examined nine economic indicators of debt servicing
capacity: seven being the same as in the Frank and Cline
study, along with the additional economic indicators capital
inflows/debt service payments and growth of per capita 
(75)
domestic product.
The argument put forward by Feder and Just for the use
of logit analysis instead of discriminant analysis was that
this method was "specifically developed to deal with the
(76)
binary-valued, dependent-variable case." One advantage
which the use of a logistic distribution function has over
the use of a discriminant function is that the maximum
likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically
(77)
unbiased and efficient and, therefore, more appropriate 
statistical tests are available to determine the relevance of 
various economic indicators of debt servicing capicity. Of
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the nine economic indicators examined, Feder and Just found
six which were significantly related to debt servicing
capicity: the ratio of total imports to international
reserves, the ratio of amortization to total external debt,
the debt service ratio, export growth, per capita income, and
the ratio of capital inflows to debt service. These results
confirmed and expanded upon the conclusions put forward by
Frank and Cline. What is more, the study provided the best
results of any of the previous attempts to to assess country
risk. The results of the Feder and Just analysis for all six
(78)
economic variables tested are replicated in table 11. In
the table for any critical probability value P* there are two 
possible types of errors: Type I errors in which for sane
P<P* a no default is predicted but where one actually occurs, 
and a type II error where P>P* and a default is predicted but 
none occurs. In no case of P* are more than 11 errors made 
out of a total of 238 observations, while at P*=.4 only 6 
errors are made in case (b) and 9 in case (c). In case (b) 
this translates into type I error of about 5 percent and a 
type II error of 2.5 percent, compared with the Frank and 
Cline study of 23 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
Unfortunately, these results are subject to many of the 
same criticisms which have been leveled at the use of 
discriminant analysis. There is still no explicit rationale 
behind the selection of the critical probability value beyond 
minimizing the total of type I and type II errors so while it
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efficiently characterizes past debt servicing problems it was 
of limited usefulness in forecasting such crises. As will be 
discussed later, this may be the result of two factors: a)
that such crises are, under certain cconditions, the result 
of stochastic shocks or, b) that such crises are the result 
of a highly explosive Markov process. Financial conditions 
may, in fact, deteriorate within a matter of weeks and a 
country which may have tested quite capable of servicing its 
debt just a few months earlier may experience severe 
financial spasms almost overnight. The use of annual data, 
therefore, often makes accurate predictions impossible. Be 
that as it may, logit analysis remains the best statistical 
technique available for testing debt servicing crises as a 
binary-valued dependent variable event.
In their study of statistical techniques used for
determining the debt servicing capacity of developing
(79)
countrues, Krishan Saini and Philip Bates addressed a
variety of weaknesses present in earlier studies and then 
compared the results of discriminant analysis and logit 
analysis in order to observe the relative merits of each 
technique in explaining the incidence of past debt servicing 
difficulties. More specifically, Saini and Bates employed a 
modified version of the dependent variable, in addition to
the traditional binary-valued dependent variable, for
rescheduling and non-rescheduling cases, in recognition of
the fact that there may exist options other then a formal 
rescheduling in the face of severe debt servicing problems. 
These options may include debt refinancing and restructuring,
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balance of payments support loans, etc. In other vrords, the
authors have anphasized that the distinction ought to be made
between voluntary and involuntary rescheduling of its
external debt. Furthermore, Saini and Bates argue for the
use of non-debt variables to serve as proxies for the debt
related indicators of earlier studies. The argument here is
that because of the poor quality and paucity of reliable data
on external debt service payments that the use of estimated
(80)
data seriously bias the estimates. Lastly, the authors
divide their sample data into two intervals in order to test
(81)
for structural shifts in the functional parameters. 
Saini and Bates rightly point out that this problem is 
particularly vexing when developing countries are examined.
Saini and Bates performed tests on two types of binary­
valued dependent variables for the period 1960-1977. In the 
first instance, the dependent variable consisted of the usual 
official debt rescheduling and non-rescheduling cases and 
contained 22 rescheduling observations for 12 countries. In 
the second instance, the dependent variable included both
involuntary debt reschedulings and balance of payments 
(82)
support loans, while it excluded voluntary debt
(83)
reschedulings. These were tested against 11 explanatory
(84)
variables which were selected either because they had
been found to be statistically significant in earlier studies
(85)
or as proxies for data on external debt.
Performing discriminant and logit analysis for a variety 
of time intervals, dependent and explanatory variables, Saini
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and Bates concluded: a) that there were no significant
differences observed in error rates and coefficient values
generated by either technique; b) that the modified dependent
variable was more useful in identifying potential debt
servicing problems; c) that the indicator with the greatest
explanatory power of those indicators tested were the
consumer price index, money supply growth, cumulative current
account balance to export ratio, and the growth of
international reserves (this last indicator was also found to
be an effective and stable proxy for selected debt ratios
found in earlier studies); d) that the debt service ratio was
(86)
virtually useless in isolating debt servicing problems;
e) that the explanatory variables performed better in
explaining the period 1971-77 than for the period 1960-
(87)
70; f) and that although the error rates obtained in this
study were higher than those of the other studies examined
that this was attributable to methodological differences in
the selection of data entries. The results of the Saini and
(88)
Bates study are summarized in table 12. For example, the
error rates calculated for the period 1960-77 using 
discriminant and logit techniques were 15.5 and 19.0 percent, 
respectively, compared with 11.5 percent in Frank and Cline
and 2.5 percent in Feder and Just. For the period 1971-77, 
however, these errors were reduced to 9.5 percent for both 
functions estimated.
Each of the studies thus far examined had one thing in 
common; they all related to characteristics of the borrower 
and their impact on debt servicing capacity. However, in
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attempting to justify the sustainability of economic policies
of debtor countries it is not enough to consider only the
demand for foreign credit; supply side factors must also be
taken into consideration. In other words, in order to obtain
a more complete understanding of the rescheduling process it
is essential to consider such factors as the general
availability of credit, the terms of financing, and the
(89)
existance of credit rationing.
In recent years there has been a rise in interest
concerning supply conditions in international credit markets.
One such study appeared in an article written by Gershon
(90)
Feder and Knud Ross. While their study did not attempt
to deal directly with the probability of an external debt
rescheduling, Feder and Ross did attempt to ascertain whether
there existed a systematic relationship between how creditors
perceive the risks associated with debt rescheduling and
interest rates charged. In the authors words:
"One subject which has been debated in the last few years 
is whether risk assessments are reflected (as they 
theoretically should) in the pricing of Euro-loans...
"Such assertions would normally be subjected to 
a formal empirical test. One serious problem, however, 
prevented such a test: in order to relate observed
market prices (i.e., terms of credit) to banker's risk 
assessments, one needs data on default probabilities as 
perceived by banker's."(91)
According to Feder and Ross this proxy for perceived default
probabilities did exist in the form of country credit risk
ratings which were just then being published by
Institutional Investor. The Institutional Investor credit
ratings constituted a survey of major international
77
commercial banks in which bankers are asked to rank a country
(92)
between zero and ten according to their "perception of 
the country's chances of default." In the study, the authors 
began with "the conviction that these weighted scores are a 
reasonable measure of the market's perceived default 
probabilities... a crude hypothesis since the price of credit
in general reflects other factors besides risk, such as
(93)
supply and demand forces." In the jargon of the present 
discussion, these rankings supposedly eschewed a country's 
ability to service its external obligations, concentrating 
instead upon their willingness to do so.
Maximizing the likelihood function over the unknown 
parameters in their model (the expected loss in the grace 
period, the expected loss in the rest of the loan period, and 
the time horizon of the banks), Feder and Ross conclude that 
for the year 1979 that a relationship did indeed exist 
between banker's subjective probability and credit terms in 
the Euromarket. What is more, the authors found that 
expected loss rates were quite low; an observation consistent
with the observation that financial losses following debt
(94)
repudiations have been low.
In another study, utilizing the idea of a disequilibrium
in the market for international credit, William Cline in a 
(95)
forthcoming study makes use of the theory of credit
rationing in order to explain the incidence of external debt
rescheduling. As Cline puts it:
"It is useful to interpret debt reschedulings... as 
the consequence of a disequilibrium that occurs in the 
international credit market when the amount the country
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seeks to borrow... exceeds the amount that foreign banks 
are prepared to supply at the upper ceiling interest 
rate. The international credit market thus fails to
clear. A nonmarket solution must be established, and is
arrived at in a bargaining process: debt rescheduling."
He goes on to say:
"... in the bargaining context of rescheduling the 
borrowers will reach an agreement... if the borrower's 
leverage is high the full amount... will tend to be 
covered by the extension of new, involuntary lending and 
postponement of maturities otherwise due. If the 
lender's leverage is stronger, a snaller portion... will 
be covered and the country will be forced to take 
additional painful (domestic austerity) measures...(96)
Cline specifies his model in probabilistic terms; that 
is, associated with each argument in the supply and demand
functions is the probability that there will occur either a 
right-shift or a left shift in the supply and/or demand
curves for international credit. Formally, Cline specifies 
the probability of demand for debt rescheduling as:
d 2
(4.1) P =f(DSR, RSM, g, y, hCAX )
where DSR is the debt service ratio, RSM the ratio of
international reserves to imports, g the rate of per capita
2
economic growth (GRO), y per capita income (GDP), and hCAX a
quadratic specification of the ratio of the current account
(97)
balance to exports (CAX). The hypothesized first partial
derivatives of the above function are all negative, with the 
exception of the debt service and the current account ratios 
which are assumed to be positively related to the probability 
of a debt rescheduling.
On the supply side Cline distinguishes between two
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forces affecting the "non-supply" of foreign credit. On the 
one hand, there are those variables that serve as screening 
devices whereby the suppliers of credit assess the strength 
of a country's borrowing capacity. These variables are 
country specific over which potential borrowers have sane 
measure of control. On the other hand, there are those 
variables which reflect the general international economic 
environment. These variables are beyond the borrower's 
control. Formally, the probability of supply of debt 
rescheduling may be written as:
s
(4.2) P =g(DSR, £DAf 3/ Yf s, gx, A)
(98,99)
where DSR is, again, the debt service ratio, j!>D/X the
(100)
"inflationary errosion of outstanding debt (INX)," a the
amortization rate on outstanding external debt (AMZ), y per 
(101) (102) 
capita income, s the savings rate (SAV), gx the
rate of export growth (XGR), and A the global supply of 
(103) (104)
credit (EXBOR). The corresponding first partials
are all assumed negative with the exception of the debt
service ratio. Cline also suggested that the ratio of net 
(105)
external debt to exports be used as an alternative to
the debt service ratio as a measure of a country's debt
burden on the grounds that "it is a longer term measure,
examining the 'stock' concept of the country's balance sheet
rather than the 'flow' concept of the current rate of debt
service —  which may be distorted by differences caused by
(106)
bunching of maturities..."
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Cline's reduced form equation thus provides an overall
probability of debt rescheduling from the supply and demand
(107)
sides. The initial results of this model of external
debt rescheduling employing a population of 58 countries
(108)
appear in table 13. The five models represent
alternative specifications of the explanatory variables. In
order to measure the overall predictive performance of the
resultant models Cline employs the standard criteria of
selecting the critical value which minimize the total number
of type I and type II errors. The best overall results are
achieved by "model C" for which only 9.1 percent of the
actual reschedulings are unpredicted (type II error) and 13.0
percent of nonrescheduling cases are falsely predicted as
rescheduling (type I error). These results compare quite
favorably with earlier studies reviewed here. The model
finds that the most important variables in explaining the
incidence of past reschedulings include the debt service
ratio (contrary to the results of Saini and Bates), the ratio
of imports to reserves, the amortization rate, the current
account deficit, the growth of output, and the availability
of global financing.
Next, recognizing the possibility of a systematic
difference between countries with large debt and small debt,
Cline examines 31 countries out of his sample of 58 which
had the heaviest debt burden. Using "model C" the average
c
value of the predicted probability of rescheduling (P ) was 
.32, as against .20 for countries with lighter debt burdens.
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According to Cline:
"...the results appear to indicate that the smaller 
debtors reach rescheduling situations at lower levels of 
underlying debt burden than for larger debtors. This 
conclusion is not surprising when the actual counties in 
question are reviewed... Most of the countries in the 
first group... would be judged on an informal basis by 
international creditors to be able to sustain relatively 
higher levels of debt than in the second group because of 
past debt performance and level of development..."(109)
The results of the Cline analysis ("model L”) of the 31 
largest debtor countries is reproduced in table 14. Overall, 
the results of his investigation are comparable to "model C" 
above. In general, those variables found to be statistically 
significant in the earlier run were also found to be 
statistically significant here, although the critical 
probability threshold had risen from .041 to .240. In this 
instance type I and type II errors are 21.4 and 2.6 percent, 
respectively.
Although Cline's model does appear to overcome seme of 
the conceptual difficulties of earlier models some problems 
remain. For one thing, there still remains a measure of 
arbitrariness in the selection of the arguments for the 
supply and demand functions, i.e. in classifying an influence 
as being on the demand or supply side. For example, the 
international reserve/import ratio could arguably be called a 
credit supply determinant because it may be viewed as a 
screening device by international creditors. What is more, 
there is the problem of the selection of the critical value. 
This was made especially clear in the above "model L" case in 
which there appears to be a strong correlation between a 
country's level of development and the tolerated size of its
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foreign debt by the international financial community, 
problem of structural changes on parameter values is, 
again, of considerable importance.
The
once
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Chapter 5
A Logit Model of Debt Rescheduling: An Empirical
Investigation
There would appear to exist at least five fundamental 
deficiencies associated, at least in part, with each of the 
studies considered above. First among these deficiencies is 
the absence of an adequate conceptual framework necessary for 
the selection of the most appropriate risk indicators to flag 
potential debt servicing difficulties. Most of the early 
work focused upon statistically testing the most commonly 
used economic indicators in use by, especially, commercial 
banks. Later, much of this work concentrated upon an ad hoc 
search for additional, more significant, risk indicators. A 
second deficiency relates to the paucity of a comprehensive 
and reliable data set on both public and private external 
debt, as well as information concerning debt servicing 
requirements. In some cases, most notably African and Middle 
Eastern countries, even balance of payments and national 
income data are unavailable, or only so after a considerable 
delay, sometimes three and four years. In other cases, 
statistical compilation and reporting procedures are so 
erratic as to cast serious doubt on the validity of the data 
which is available. Fortunately, in recent years, there has 
been considerable improvement in the collection and 
presentation of data on external debt which has ameliorated 
many of the problems heretofore present. A third problem has
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been the failure to distinguish between a country's ability 
versus its willingness to meet its external debt obligations. 
This failure has been due, in part, to the difficulties 
involved in quantifying the subjective character of the 
"willingness to pay" component in econometric terms. It has
been argued, quite rightly, that the main advantage of
restricting statistical analyses to economic indicators is
that it purges the evaluation of country risk of its 
problematical subjective element, however, the exclusion of 
the willingness factor may account for the poor predictive 
performance of these models. A fourth, and closely related, 
difficulty is the failure to adequately cope with parametric 
structural changes. These changes may be the result of
international events (as was undoubtedly the case following 
the oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80 or the global 
recessions of 1976-77 and 1980-82), intra-regional 
characteristics (as was demonstrated, for example, by the 
spate of South American repudiations in 1982-83), or country 
specific difficulties. What is more, parametric differences 
across countries or regions might be of a categorical nature, 
as for instance between NOLDC's and oil producing LDC's, 
heavily indebted versus moderately indebted countries, etc. 
A fifth deficiency relates to the failure of these models to 
predict future rescheduling episodes. As Saini and Bates 
have conjectured:
"In the final analysis the major drawback of 
existing statistical debt monitoring systems is their 
inability to adequately predict reschedulings... Perhaps 
the major weakness affecting the predictive ability of
these statistical techniques is their heavy reliance on
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(110)
out-of-date economic information."
The Model
Chapter two presented a simple short-run model of the 
international credit market with a discussion of the 
determinants of market failure and consequent credit 
rationing. Following from that discussion it is inferred 
that the demand for foreign bank credit may be characterized 
as,
D D
(5.1) L =L (T, iD+Q, y, s)
where T=X(Y*)-M(Y) is the trade balance, iD+Q current 
servicing requirements on external debt, y real economic 
growth, and s the domestic savings rate. Likewise, the 
supply of foreign bank credit may be sunmarized as,
S S
(5.2) L =L (D, r (i+k), A)
where D is total external debt, r perceived risk associated 
with the timely servicing of external bank debt as a function 
of the interest rate (i) and the spread (k). Equilibrium in 
this market is characterized by
D S
(5.3) L = L
Where (5.3) is not satisfied then a disequilibrium condition 
in the international credit market exists which gives rise to 
a financial crisis and subsequent debt rescheduling episode.
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It is possible, therefore, to characterize the probability of
a breakdown in this market as
(5.4) P = P(T, iD+Q, Y, s, D, r (i+k), A)
Expression (5.4) might be considered deficient on two
counts. In the first place it is predicated on the 
assumption that exchange rates are fully flexible. A 
flexible-exchange rate system is one in vhich the exchange 
rate is market-determined and in which there can be no 
"deficit" in the balance of payments. In the second place, 
it was assumed that the purchasing-power-par i ty theorem was 
operative. Purchasing-power-parity essentially asserts that 
prices in one country must equal those in another when 
expressed in a common currency. In reality fully flexible 
exchange rate and purchasing-power-parity is unlikely to 
hold. In order to correct for this expression (5.4) will be 
modified by explicitly considering international reserve 
holdings and include, following from the work of Cline, an 
explanatory variable to measure the inflationary erosion of 
external debt. This latter variable will be discussed at 
greater length in subsequent pages. Suffice for the moment 
to say that the inflationary erosion of debt variable is 
included to measure the direct impact of global price changes 
on a country's overall debt burden. Expression (5.4) may, 
therefore, be rewritten as
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(5.4)' P = P(T, iD+Q, y, s, R, pD, D, r(i+k), A)
where R is international reserve holdings and pD the 
inflationary erosion of external debt.
Expression (5.4)' differs from the Cline formulation in 
three noteworthy respects. First, although the reduced form 
expression has essentially all of the explanatory variables 
imployed by Cline, it is the result of decidedly different 
supply side and demand side considerations. Second, unlike 
the Cline model expression (5.4)' explicitly considers the 
risks assumed by banks in the financial intermediation 
process. Finally, since the intermediation process is viewed 
as being the consequence of decisions made with respect to 
current financing requirements emanating from developments in 
the external accounts no a priori allowance has been made for 
lagging selected explanatory variables nor was it deemed 
appropriate to eliminate observations in the year following a 
rescheduling exercise as was done by Cline, Feder and Just, 
and others. The possibility that a Markov process exists in 
the rescheduling process for prediction purposes is, however, 
considered separately in chapter six. Be that as it may, the 
explanatory variables utilized by Cline to explain the 
rescheduling process are, by and large, the same variables 
identified by the model developed in chapter two.
The analysis presented in this chapter will proceed in 
three stages. In the first stage, a version of the Cline 
model will be tested on data restricted to the period 1976-82 
under various data sub-set specifications. The purpose of
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this initial analytical phase is to attempt to identify any 
structural changes which might have occurred in the advent of 
the first oil price shock. That is to say, the question will 
be raised as to whether the regressor variables found to be 
statistically significant by Cline and hypothesized as 
significant in the above model hold up when the data set is 
more narrowly defined. Furthermore, is it possible to 
improve upon these results when selected sub-categories of 
countries are chosen for analysis? The models tested in this 
study include: All debtors, large debtors, small debtors,
large debtors in Latin America, and small debtors in Latin 
America. The selection of the different country categories 
was not meant to be exhaustive; their selection was based 
primarily upon data restrictions, i.e. either there were not 
enough observations in general, or very few or no
rescheduling episodes. For example, an analysis of the Far 
East was impossible since for the period under consideration 
there was only one instance of default out of 38
observations.
For each data specification analyzed two versions of the 
models were tested. The first version utilized the debt 
service ratio as a measure of debt servicing capacity, while 
in the second version the net external debt/export ratio was 
used as a proxy for the debt service ratio. There are two 
reasons for having proceeded in this manner. On the one
hand, the debt service ratio is recognizably the most popular 
measure of debt servicing burden in use today. It has
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traditionally been a pivotal component to the analysis of 
rescheduling crises. On the other hand, however, and in 
anticipation of the results of this study, the debt service 
ratio in all but one case was statistically insignificant. 
What is more, in every instance where both indicators were 
used the debt service ratio was subordinated to the net 
external debt/export ratio, i.e. it was rendered 
statistically insignificant. The a priori relative merits of 
both indicators were discussed earlier (see also Appendix 
II).
In the second stage of the analysis the model modified 
by the addition of two additional explanatory variables. The 
first of these regressors is a memory element designed to 
serve as a proxy for the risk factor, r, which is intended 
capture the "willingness to pay" aspect of external debt 
repudiation discussed earlier. The second of these 
regressors is the ratio of OPEC current account surplusses to 
imports of NOLDC's as a proxy to measure the availability of 
international credit. As will be seen in the discussion to 
follow both additions contribute significantly to an 
understanding of the rescheduling process.
Finally, in the third stage of the analysis, a second
proxy for rescheduling risks, i.e. an index of how lenders
percieve particular country risks will be incorporated into
the model. The variable which is used for this purpose is
the country credit ratings developed by Institutional
(111)
Investor. The reason why this variable is entered
seperately is because these credit ratings were first
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published in 1979, thereby resulting in a smaller data set
(112)
available for analysis. The Institutional Investor
index is used to test the validity of the assertion 
ennunciated in the first chapter that regional debt problems 
were aggravated by "psychological shifts" in the 
international credit market.
Before commenting on the reduced form equation to be
estimated a few observations are in order regarding the
hypothesized influences of some of the regressor variables
anunerated by Cline. In the first place, Cline asserted that
the first partial of the current account ratio would be
positive. This, it is believed, is probably an error since
the probability of a debt rescheduling occurring will be
diminished as the current account surplus enlargens since it
represents a greater inflow of foreign exchange earnings.
Secondly, Cline has asserted that the amortization rate is a
supply side argument in which "a higher amortization rate
means that country A has lower total debt (otherwise its
interest payments relative to exports would be the same as
those for country B and its total debt service ratio would be
higher), giving it a more favorable balance sheet
(113)
position." For this reason Cline has asserted that a
greater supply of credit will be forthcoming and therefore 
the probability of a debt rescheduling will be lower. This 
line of reasoning may, of course, be correct, unfortunately 
this does not follow from the model developed in chapter 2. 
A high amortization rate is an indication of "bunching" of
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maturities which implies a greater strain on a country's 
current earnings. For this reason the amortization ratio is 
likely to be a demand side determinant with a positive first 
partial; this is the line of reasoning which will be adopted 
here. Finally, the inflationary erosion of debt indicator is 
also asserted by Cline to be a supply side argument with a 
negative influence upon the probability of a debt 
rescheduling. As in the case of the amortization ratio, 
however, this line of reasoning is far from conclusive. 
While it is certainly true that the higher the global 
inflation rate the lower will be a country's real debt 
burden, it is also true that the higher will be the nominal 
interest rate and therefore a greater current debt servicing 
obligation. This additional effect is clearly a demand side 
argument with an hypothesized positive first partial. In 
other words, the inflationary errosion of external debt is a 
priori sign indeterminant; the sign of this regressor will 
depend upon the net effect of these two competing influences.
With the above reservations accounted for, the reduced 
form equation providing the overall probability of debt
rescheduling to be tested initially may be written as:
(5.1) ln{p/(l-p)} = b + b (DSR or NDX) + b RSM +
0 1 2 
b GDP + b GRO + b SQCA + b INX 
3 4 5 6
+ b AMZ + b SAV + b XGR +
7 8 9
b EXBOR 
10
or alternatively as:
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BX BX -1
(5.2) P = e (1-e )
where P is the probability of a debt rescheduling, the 
seperate regressors as earlier defined, and BX the right hand 
side of equation (5.1). In stage two, the memory element 
(MEMi) will be added while EXBOR is replaced with OPECM (the 
ratio of OPEC current account surplusses to imports of 
NOLDC's). In the final stage, the regressor III (the 
Institutional investor index) is added to the reduced form 
equation of stage two.
Data
The debt service ratio (DSR) is defined as the ratio of
total interest payments on all debt and amortization on that
(114)
debt (short-, medium, and long-term) divided by exports
of goods and services. Total amortization payments are
(115)
derived from the Balance of Payments Yearbook (BOPY),
while total interest payments are estimated from the World
(116)
Debt Tables (WDT), and The Maturity Distribution of
(117)
International Bank Lending (MDIBL). Exports of goods
and services were obtained from the International Financial
(118)
Statistics (IFS).
The ratio of gross international reserves to imports of 
goods and services (RSM) is calculated from data available in
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the IFS. International reserves exclude gold holdings for 
two reasons: a) the volitility of gold values on world
markets, and b) diverse national practices on gold valuation. 
Consequently, parameter estimates may be somewhat downward 
biased. It should also be mentioned that imports of goods 
and services exclude interest payments on external debt since 
this has already been accounted for in the DSR.
Until 1977, data on total external debt was largely 
unavailable. With the publication of MDIBL, however,
more precise estimates of total external debt became 
possible. In this study total external debt was calculated 
as follows. Data on total public and publicly guaranteed 
external debt is available from WDT. The WDT also provides 
information on the amount of this debt which has been
provided by private financial institutions. The MDIBL 
provides information on total outstanding obligations, both 
public and private, that is provided by manber nations of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In order to
calculate total external debt, therefore, it is a simple 
matter to deduct from total public and publicly guaranteed 
external debt the amount provided by private financial
institutions, and then to add the resultant figure to total 
outstanding obligations provided by reporting nations of the 
BIS. Although these countries do not represent all potential 
and actual lenders to LDC's, they do represent all of the 
OECD nations, and therefore the vast bulk of all external 
private financing. It is worth noting that this is
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essentially the same technique used by Cline, however in 
order to get data going back to 1962 Cline inflated public 
debt, which was available before 1976, by the average of 
private debt as a percentage of total debt after 1976. This 
was clearly a mistake since prior to the first oil price 
shock private external debt was a lower percentage of the 
total. As a result, Cline's figures have an inherent upward
bias. What is more, by following this procedure Cline
glossed over major structural changes which were bound to 
affect his predicted probabilities.
Having calculated total external debt in the manner 
described, net debt relative to exports (NDX) is simply total 
external debt minus international reserves (less gold), with 
the net result divided by exports of goods and services.
The amortization ratio (AMZ) is calculated as the sum of 
amortization on medium- and long-term debt divided by total 
external debt in the previous year. Data on amortization was 
obtained from BOPY and MDIBL.
Unlike the method employed by Cline in which per capita
income (GDP) is calculated on the basis of data in the IFS
applied to international purchasing power comparisons
conducted by the United Nations, per capita income in the
present study is simply 1975 real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) normalized by the population size. Although a broader
(119)
measure than the one utilized by Cline this statistic, 
as well as real per capita income growth, has merit on two 
counts. As a practical matter, these measures of per capita 
income are not only easier to calculate and rationalize, but
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constitute the measures most often used by commercial bank 
analysts. In addition, in spite of the fact that this 
procedure results in an understatement of real per capita 
purchasing power, and therefore serves as a poorer measure of 
import compressibility, it does have the advantage of more 
accurately reflecting overall real economic performance.
The ratio of the current account surplus or deficit to 
exports of goods and services (SQCA) is calculated from data 
available in the IFS. As described earlier, once this value 
is squared it is then multiplied by negative unity in the 
case of deficits in order to maintain sign integrity.
The savings rate (SAV) is also obtained from data 
available in the IFS and is calculated as follows. From the 
national accounts, data on private and government consumption 
are added. This value is then divided by the Gross Domestic 
Product, and the result is subtracted from unity.
The real growth rate in exports (XGR) is calculated as 
the ratio of real exports in years t and t-1 divided by real 
exports in years t-2 and t-3. Real exports are calculated as 
the ratio of the dollar value of exports to the unit value 
index of exports for all countries and is found in the IFS. 
A four year period has been deemed sufficiently long enough 
to average out extreme fluctuations in export earnings, while 
short enough to be considered relevant by creditors in 
evaluating recent export performance. Data for these 
calculations was obtained from the IFS.
The inflationary erosion of debt (INX) was calculated
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using the following expression:
-1 -1
(5.3) INX » (100DW )X
where D is total external debt, X exports of goods and
services, and W the world consumer price index. External
debt is calculated as above, while X was obtained from BOPY,
and W from IFS.
Cline measures the availability of global credit (EXBOR)
as total net external borrowing from private and official
sources by non-oil developing countries divided by total
merchandise imports for these countries. Data on total net
(120)
borrowing was obtained from the World Economic Outlook
and exports from the IFS. Although as a first step this same
procedure for estimating the availability of the supply of 
foreign credit is used here (EXBOR being a supply side 
argument), there are a priori reasons to question its 
appropriateness. First, and foremost, of these doubts 
revolves around the recognition that this variable does not 
represent the availability of lendable funds per se but 
rather equilibrium in international financial markets. That 
is to say, the two concepts are equivilent only if borrowers 
face a perfectly elastic supply of credit. Since lendable 
funds have alternative uses this is certainly not likely to 
be the case, consequently there is a potential identification 
problem.
An alternative specification to EXBOR is the ratio of 
OPEC current account surplusses to imports of NOLDC's. OPEC
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current account surplusses are available in the IFS. The 
rationale for the use of this variable steins from the 
petrodollar recycling episode discussed in Chapter 1. More 
will be said about this variable, as vrell as the regressor 
MEMi (the memory element) and the variable III (the
Institutional Investor index) later in the discussion.
Debt reschedulings, the dependent variable, assume
values of unity in the case of a rescheduling episode, and
zero if no rescheduling occurred. Table 15 lists the
countries and years in which reschedulings occurred. In some
(121)
instances, however, reschedulings were recorded as
having occurred even though formal agreements had not been 
concluded until 1983.
The logit model is estimated using data for 33 countries 
covering the period 1976-82 (see table 16). Although the 
number of countries examined is smaller than in the Cline
study,, the sample nonetheless represents over 80 percent of
total external debt in 1982.
A Note on the Selection of the "Critical Value."
Before proceeding to the results of the logit analyses 
on debt rescheduling a few coirments are in order regarding 
the selection of the so-called "critical value" for 
determining the predictive accuracy of the estimated model. 
The critical value, it will be recalled, is that a priori 
selected probability such that if the predicted probability 
of default is greater, then one would expect a debtor country
98
to repudiate the terms of its external indebtedness. If the 
predicted probability is less than the critical value then a 
continuation of nominal debt servicing (i.e. no default) is 
expected. Denoting the critical value as P* and the 
predicted probability value as Pf this may be written 
symbolically as:
1 if P>P*
(5.4) Y =
0 if P<P*
where y indicates the incidence of default.
The selection of P* has been subject to some discussion. 
There are, however, two standard optimal decision rules to be 
found in the literature on the prediction of external debt 
rescheduling. The first of these rules, which draws upon the 
well-established tradition of binary data analysis, is that 
of selecting a critical value such that the sum of the type I 
and type II errors be minimized subject to a relatively equal 
percentage error rate in the two classes of observations. 
This standard is used principally in descriminant analysis 
where the expected cost of making type I and type II errors 
is
(5.5) C = q C(I)P(I) + q C(II)P(II)
1 2
where C(I) and C(II) are the costs associated with committing
errors of either type, P(I) and P(II) the probability of
making those errors, and q and q the £  priori probabilities
1 2
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that the particular country comes from the p o p ulation of 
rescheduling or no rescheduling countries. If q-^  and q 2 are 
unknown then P=f(x) and P* is selected so as to minimize the 
m ax i m u m  of C(I)P(I) and C(II)P(II), i.e. a minimax solution. 
W e l c h  nas d e m o n s t r a t e d ^ ^ )  t h a t  m i n i m i z i n g  the total 
probability of misclassification is equivilent to assuming 
that C(I)=C(II), i.e. that the costs associated with type I 
and type II errors are identical. This decision rule is 
i l l u s t r a t e d  in figure 2. This par t i c u l a r  decision rule, 
however, presents a number of problems. The first of these 
p r o b l e m s  relates to the rea s o n a b l e n e s s  of assuming that 
C(I)=C(II). For one thing, the particular cost structure of 
the decision maker, be he the borrower or be he the lender, 
ought to be e x p l i c i t l y  considered. For another thing, the 
r e s p e c t i v e  error costs are not l i k e l y  to remain constant 
through time. Consequently, w h i l e  this rule might be 
adequate for explaining the model's efficiency in describing 
p a s t  r e s c h e d u l i n g s ,  it is of l i m i t e d  u s e f u l n e s s  in 
forecasting future events. What is more, even if it could be 
assumed that costs were equal and constant the p r oblems 
u s u a l l y  arises as to the precise determ ination of the 
critical v a l u e  from a r e l a t i v e l y  small data set. In the 
Feder and Just study, (123) for example, in one instance all 
that could be said about the critical value when both error 
types were minimized was that it was somewhere inthe range
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of .18 to .50. This imprecision is, in fact, the rule rather 
than the exception as w i l l  be seen in the results of the 
present study.
An a l t e r n a t i v e  to the error m i n i mization rule is the 
common practice in logit analysis to arbitrarily select .5 as 
t he c r i t i c a l  va l u e .  In o t h e r  w o r d s ,  for P>.5 then an 
external debt resc heduling wo u l d  be expected to occur, 
otherwise not, i.e.
(5.6) P* = prob(Y=l;X=Xi) > .5
This specification f o l l o w s  from the fact that since the 
proportion of reschedulings is low, and where Y assumes 
values of zero or unity for the regressor variables (X), and 
if that series of binary events is random with independently 
the same probability of occuring, then the observed e v e n t s 
approximate a Poisson distribution.(124) jn particular, as 
P* approaches zero a c o m p l e t e l y  random series tends to 
Poisson process such that the c u m u l a t i v e  distribution 
function may be written as
(5.7) F(X) = prob(Y=l;X=Xi) = l-e"BX
where
(5.8) BX = ln{p/(l-P)}
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This specification of the critical values is, of course, 
arbitrary since it assumes that the rescheduling process is 
completely described by the regressor variables included in 
the model. Nevertheless, the ru l e  is independent of any a 
priori assumptions regarding the costs associated with the 
errors involved.(125) in the pages to follow both error rules 
will be presented in the tables.
Results
As mentioned earlier, there are, generally speaking, at 
least five recognizeable dificiencies that may be associated 
to some degree with each of the m o d e l s  examined in this 
study. This first e s t imation confronts in part three of 
these dificiencies: a) the absence of a conceptual framework, 
b) the paucity of r e l i a b l e  economic data on, especially, 
external debt, and c) the failure to a d e quately account for 
p a r a m e t r i c  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e s .  The f i r s t  of t h e s e  
inadequacies is addressed by the use of the model developed 
in chapter two, while the second and third of these problems 
is p a r t i a l l y  addressed by restricting the data set to the 
period 1976-82. As previously mentioned, not only has there 
been considerable improvement in the availability of data on 
total external debt during this period, but by restricting 
the a n alysis to the period 1976-82 a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  has been 
made for the historic shock to the international econo mic 
system which resulted from the first oil price hike of 1975.
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All Debtors
The initial results of the model, in which the complete
data set was used, are presented in table 17; for the sake
of convenience the same alphabetic abreviations discussed
earlier are used here. The value in the parentheses below
each parameter estimate is the chi-square statistic for
testing the statistical significance of each of the
(126)
independent variables at one degree of freedom. The
(127)
model chi-square and the "D" statistics are also
(128)
presented.
In the table model IA refers to the parameter estimates 
in which the explanatory variable DSR was used to measure 
debt servicing capicity. Model IB refers to the parameter 
estimates in which the debt burden is measured by NDX. As is 
apparent from the table, the estimated results broadly 
confirm the influences on debt rescheduling. In the case of 
model IA, however, only the ratio of international reserves 
to imports (RSM), real per capita economic growth (GRO), the 
ratio of global external borrowing to imports (EXBOR), and 
the inflationary erosion of debt (INX), were shown to be 
statistically significant. In model IB, on the other hand, 
the statistically significant variables included the 
amortization ratio (AMZ), per capita income growth, and the 
net external debt/exports ratio (NDX). Of some interest is 
the apparent insignificance of the debt service ratio (DSR) 
in explaining the incidence of debt rescheduling during this 
period. Also of some significance is the fact that 
preliminary reservations concerning the hypothesized sign of
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the regressor AMZ were vindicated, in addition to the fact 
that the regressor INX has a positive impact on debt 
rescheduling. This, of course, suggests (as mentioned 
earlier) that the positive inflationary impact upon the debt 
servicing burden probably outweighs its negative effect upon 
the inflationary erosion of the overall debt burden, i.e. a 
higher inflation rate suggests an increased likelihood of 
external repudiation. These initial results are confirmed by 
the final parameter estimates presented in table 20. In 
addition, an examination of the correlation matrix of the 
estimates presented in table 18 suggest why the debt service 
ratio was shown to be statistically insignificant. In the 
table the degree of association between DSR and INX is strong 
at -.55. In table 19 the degree of association between NDX 
and INX is -.81, although in the case of model IB NDX 
survived the estimation procedure while INX did not. Both 
models IA and IB are highly significant exhibiting chi-square 
values at four and three degrees of freedom of 37.61 and 
38.52, respectively, while the value of the D-statistic in 
the two models is .442 and .463, an improvement in both cases 
over the initial estimates.
Finally, in order to ascertain the overall predictive 
accuracy of the models, consider tables 21 and 22 which 
indicate the number of type I and type II errors conmitted at 
various a priori critical values. In terms of the minimum 
number of total errors decision rule it was found that in 
model IA at a critical value between .71 and .83 the total
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number of type I and type II errors was 25 out of a total of 
190 predictions, or an overall predictive accuracy of .87. 
More specifically, there ware 25 type I errors, or an error 
rate of 13.8 percent, and zero type II errors, or an error 
rate of 0.0 percent. These results compare favorable with 
Cline's findings in which he reported type I and type II 
errors of 9.1 and 13.0 percent, respectively. These results 
seem to lend credence to the efficacy of restricting the 
analysis to the post-oi 1-embargo period in order to take 
advantage of improvements in data, as well as to account for 
basic structural changes.
If, on the other hand, we invoke the P*=.5 decision rule 
then the total number of type I and type II errors committed 
in model IA is slightly higher at 29 (a predictive accuracy 
of .85). There were 24 type I and 5 type II errors cormnitted 
with a percentage distribution of 13.1 and 71.4, 
respectively.
With respect to model IB, using the minimun errors rule 
it was found that at ,39<P*<.42 the total number of errors 
was 20, or an overall predictive accuracy of .90. There were 
16 type I errors (9.1 percent) and 4 type II errors (28.6 
percent). In terms of P*=.5 there ware 18 type I errors (10.1 
percent) and 3 type II errors (27.3 percent) for an overall 
predictive accuracy of .89.
It would appear that on the basis of these initial 
results that there is sane advantage to be gained by 
restricting our attention to the period after 1976. What is 
more, it would seem that, at least initially, the use of the
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variable NDX is the superior regressor in explaining the 
influence of the burden of current debt servicing upon the 
incidence of external debt rescheduling.
Next, in an attempt to improve upon the overall 
performance of the model two additional explanatory variables 
were introduced. On the supply side the variable OPECM, the 
ratio of OPEC current account surplusses to imports of goods 
and services of NOLDC's, was introduced as an indicator of 
the total availability of credit in international financial 
markets. The reason for the introduction of this variable is 
twofold. First, as was mentioned earlier, the variable 
EXBOR, which was used by Cline, is suspect due to the 
possibility of an identification problem, i.e. whether this 
variable indeed represents the availability of lendable funds 
per se or whether it is merely an equilibrium value. Second, 
the use of OPECM highlights the petrodollar recycling issue 
which was at the forefront of the economic debates of the 
mid-1970's and which was, in fact, the genesis of the present 
LDC debt crisis.
On the demand side of the model the regressor variable 
MEMi is introduced which is essentially a non-economic 
explanatory variable designed specifically to take into 
account a country's willingness to meet its external debt 
obligations. MEMi is a memory element spanning i years. It 
is introduced under the assumption that a country which has 
rescheduled its external debt in the past is more likely to 
do so again in the future than a country which has never
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rescheduled. It is, if you will, an attempt to incorporate 
into the model a country's credit history as a proxy for its 
committment to meet its future overseas obligations.
In this study, the model has been tested for memories of 
one, three, five, seven, and ten years. In other words, the 
model has explicitly accounted for the fact that a country 
may have rescheduled its external debt up to i years 
subsequent to the episode, i.e define the variable MEMi such 
that
1, if Y(t-l)=l or Y(t-2)=l ... or Y(t-i)=l
(5.9) MEMi(t) =
0, otherwise.
Table 23 presents the results of the reestimated models 
IA and IB using the memory element, as well as OPECM in 
place of EXBOR. The new models have been labled IAA and IBB. 
In the case of model IAA all of the regressors which proved 
statistically significant in model IA are also thus here. In 
fact, OPECM is a significantly stronger explanatory variable. 
What is more, MEM5, the five year memory element, is also 
highly significant. The model is significant exhibiting a 
chi-square value of 41.88 at 5 degrees of freedom, while the 
D-statistic rose from .44 to .46. Furthermore, there was 
also been an improvement in the overall predictive capacity 
of the model. In the case of model IA using the minimum 
error and the P*=.5 decision rules the predictive accuracy of 
the model was .86 and .85, respectively. In model IAA, 
however, these values rose to .87 and .86, respectively. 
These improvements were due no doubt to the improved measure
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of credit availability as well as the model's enhanced 
ability to identify those countries with a seemingly "good" 
credit history from those with a seemingly "bad” credit 
history.
Focusing attention on model IBB the results are no less 
encourageing. As in the case of model IAA, all variables 
present in model IB are represented in model IBB. In 
addition, the liquidity ratio, RSM, has appeared as 
statistically significant, as well as the ten year memory 
element, MEM10. The fact that OPEOI has not appeared in the 
final estimates is also not suprising since its predeccesor 
EXBOR was also not significant in model IB. As in the case 
of model IAA the overall model is significant with a chi- 
square of 48.04 at 5 degrees of freedom and an improvement in 
the D-statistic to .50 (.46 previously). Likewise, as in the 
case of model IAA, there has been an improvement in the 
overall predictive accuracy of the mosel. Using the minimum 
errors and P*=.5 decisions rules, the predictive accuracy of 
the model increased from .90 and .89 to .91 and .90, 
respectively.
Finally, consider the impact of lenders attitudes on 
the rescheduling process. In other words, while an attempt 
has been made to explicitly consider a borrower's 
"willingness to pay," might it not also be possible to 
introduce on the supply side a creditor's "willingness to 
lend"? This consideration harkens back to the discussion in 
chapter 1 in which it was suggested that "psychological
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shifts" in the international credit market resulting from a
debt servicing breakdown by a major country might restrict
capital flows to the entire region. For this purpose the
(129)
country ratings developed by Institutional Investor were
incorporated into the estimation procedure. As was mentioned
previously, since these ratings were only available since
1979, thereby abbreviating the basic data set, it was decided
to introduce these indices at a separate stage of the
procedure. The Institutional Investor credit ratings are
based on evaluations provided by leading international banks.
In the evaluation process, bankers were asked to grade a
number of countries on a scale of zero to 100, with zero
being the least, and 100 being the most, credit worthy (the
ones with the least likelihood of default). According to
Institutional Investor;
"The individual responses are weighted, using an 
Institutional Investor formula that properly gives more 
weight to responses from banks with the largest worldwide 
exposure and the most sophisticated country analysis 
systan."(130)
Table 24 presents the final parameter estimates using 
the variable III. The new models have been labled I AAA and 
IBBB. As is apparent by these results the regressor III is 
not significant in either model. Two possible reasons for 
this suggests themselves. On the one hand, the hypothesis of 
"psychological shifts" is incorrect or, if it is correct, 
that the regressor III is incapable of capturing that effect. 
On the other hand, however, if III is, indeed, the product of 
"sophisticated country analysis systems" then this variable 
may, in fact, be redundant information. This would be
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especially true if models IAA and IBB were successful in 
capturing the essential default elements. In other words, 
the regressor III may be a somewhat less than effective proxy 
for the predicted probabilities of the present model. 
Subsequent discussion on alternative specifications of the 
basic model may shed sane light on this possibility.
Large Debtors versus Small Debtors
In this, and in subsequent, sections of the present 
discussion attention is directed towards the further 
improvement of the predictive accuracy of the model by sub­
dividing the original data set into the classes of "large"
(131)
debtors and "small" debtors. The rationale underlying
this procedure is the recognition of possible parametric 
differences between the two classes of borrower countries. 
As will be argued again later in this study the ideal 
situation would be to construct a logit model for each and 
every country under the supposition that only in this way 
will the exclusive use of economic indicators capture the 
willingness to pay aspect of debt reschedulings cited 
earlier. Unfortunately, however, adequate and sufficient 
country specific data is largely unavailable. The next best 
step, therefore, would appear to be a sub-division of the 
panel data set into alternative categories of countries which 
broadly share similar characterists. The final estimates of 
the class of large debtor countries utilizing DSR and NDX in 
a manner similar to that outlined for the complete data set
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are summarized in table 25. In the case of DSR the model is 
referred to as IIA while for NDX the model is referred to as 
I IB .
In the case of model IIA it is significant that the 
regressor RSM is absent from the list of statistically 
significant variables. In spite of this the model exhibits a 
fairly high degree of significance along with an improvement 
in the D-statistic from .44 in model IA to .57 here. 
Furthermore, by employing the minimum total errors decision 
rule, at .37<P*<.41 the predictive accuracy of the model 
improves to .90 (up from .86 in model IA), while at P*=.5 the 
predictive accuracy of the model is .89 (compared with .85 
previously). In the case of model IIB, while the variable 
AMZ is no longer included in the array of statistically 
significant regressors, the model itself remains highly 
significant while the corresponding D-statistic has ballooned 
to .66 (from .46 in model IB). What is more, the predictive
accuracy of the model at .54<P*<.57 stands at .92 (from .90
in model IB), while at P*=.5 the predictive accuracy of the 
model is .90 (from .89 earlier).
Turning our attention to the class of small debtors
(table 26) it is interesting to note that in both models I IIA 
and IIIB the explanatory variable GRO is no longer present, 
although the liquidity ratio, RSM, has reemerged. 
Furthermore, the variable EXBOR which appeared in models IA 
and IIA is no longer statistically significant. Also of some 
interest is the emergence of the debt service ratio, albeit 
with the wrong sign.
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In order to get a clearer insight into the economic
forces underlying these results consider the breakdown of 
total external debt of both groups of countries in 1982 into 
its public and private components. Of the 17 largest debtor 
countries in the sample total external debt amounted to about 
$456 billion, of which approximately 60 percent, or $274
billion, was comprised of public debt on concessional terms, 
and about 40 percent, or about $182 billion in private debt 
on "harder" terms. Compare these figures with those of the 
16 smallest debtor countries in which total external debt 
amounted to approximately $39 billion, of which more than 90 
percent, or $35 billon, was made up of "soft" public loans, 
and less than 10 percent, or about $4 billion, in private 
financing. The fact that the regressor is significant in the 
large debtor case highlights the greater reliance of this 
class of borrower on the availability of private financing 
and mo valient s in the international credit market. In
addition, the presence of GRO in models IIA and IIB attest,
perhaps, to the increased significance of domestic economic 
performance in the acquisition of additional financing from 
private sources. What is more, in recognizing the 
significance of the liquidity ratio in the snail debtor case, 
as opposed to its absence in the large debtor model, a number 
of alternative explanations come to mind. For one, it has 
been suggested that countries with a diversified export base 
and stable foreign exchange earnings are less subject to 
financial crises and are, therefore, better able to tolerate
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higher debt servicing requirements than those countries with
a much narrower export base. A cursory examination of the
small debtor and large debtor samples suggests that the
former relies to a greater extent on the export of primary
commodities which are more sensitive to price fluctuations
while a significantly higher percentage of exports of the
later category is made up of manufacturers and a more
(132)
diversified export base. June Flanders, for example,
points out that among the most important reasons why 
countries demand i liternational reserves are such 
considerations as the systematic or random fluctuations in 
current account receipts due to shifts in demand for exports 
which affect prices, quantities, or both, or sudden 
unexpected declines in exports earnings due to such factors 
as war, crop failures, precipitous changes in capital 
movements, etc. Clearly each of these factors tends to 
impact those countries which rely to a greater extend on 
exports of primary goods. What is more, these countries also 
tend to be the poorest of the LDC's and as such do not have 
quick access to private capital. It is, therefore, 
significant that when considering a variety of economic 
indicators in order to flag potential debt servicing 
difficulties that the class of borrower be considered as 
well. Clearly, those factors which have the greatest impact 
on a country's decision to repudiate its external debt will 
be closely linked to the stage of that country's economic 
development, especially in so far as the variegation of its 
export base is concerned.
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Finally, the fact that the amortization ratio, AMZ, is 
significant in the small debtor case seems to suggest a 
higher level of concern with the "bunching" of maturities 
than in the case of large debtors. This result is at once 
suprising and reassuring. Reassuring since it highlights the 
fact that the primary component of debt service payments of 
these countries are principal repayments; suprising since 
public debt usually carries with it relatively long payout 
periods. These two facts together may help to explain why 
the debt service ratio, while significant, has the wrong 
sign. In other words, longer payout periods in fact improve 
a country's debt profile. It should be pointed out that in 
the case of model IIIA although the chi-square values for AMZ 
and RSM are not impressive, this is due in large measure to 
the relatively high degree of correlation between AMZ and DSR 
(-.42), between DSR and INX (-.66), and between RSM and AMZ 
(.28). The point is that the best overall results were 
obtained when all four regressors were included than when any 
one or two were eliminated.
Although models IIIA and HIB are statistically 
significant there was a deterioration in the explanatory 
power of both models as is demonstrated by the relatively 
large reduction in the D-statistic. Be that as it may, the 
predictive accuracy of the models is still good. In the 
case of model IIIA at .41<P*<.56 (and at P*=.5) the 
predictive accuracy of the model is .88, while for model IIIB 
at ,41<P*<.45 the predictive accuracy of the model is .89,
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while at p*=.5 it is .87. These results are roughly 
equivilent to the results obtained in models IA and IB.
Next, examine the final results of the reestimated large 
debtor model incorporating the variable OPECM and alternative 
specifications of the memory element as presented in table 
27. The first thing to consider is that in neither case did 
any of the memory specifications prove statistically 
significant. There are any of a number of possible 
explanations for this result but the three most reasonable 
explanations appear to be, a) in the case of the large debtor 
sub-sample there are no sufficient differences between 
individual cases insofar as past repayment history is 
concerned to distinguish "good" risks from "bad" risks, b) 
that individual credit histories for this class of borrowers 
was irrelevant in international credit markets, i.e. it is 
not past performance which is of importance but future
prospects, or c) that because of the amounts owed to private
lenders that any interruption in the flow of new credit might 
seriously threaten global financial stability; in other 
words, private lenders are "locked in." To paraphrase J.M. 
Keynes on this last point; if a borrower defaults on a
million dollar loan then he is in trouble, but if the 
borrower defaults on a billion dollar loan then the bank is 
in trouble.
Although it is not possible to say a priori which of 
the above represents the most likely explanation since there 
are valid grounds in support of all three, nevertheless, in 
many quarters the second of these possiblities rings truest.
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As John Makin observed in his excellent study of the global 
debt crisis:
"It was a deep-seated feeling of unease that somehow all 
was not well in their own countries, that they (the 
conroercial bankers) were running out of the things they 
would need to keep the machinery running and furnishing 
the life style they had cxxne to expect. They wanted a 
piece of the part of the world that was desned still to 
hold tremendous premise for the future, rich in raw 
resources that could be fed into the machinery. Brazil 
held that premise. Its growth had averaged 6 percent 
between 1920 and 1967. The 'Brazilian miricle' of 1968 
to 1973 saw growth pound along at 11 percent a year - 
more than twice the average rate in industrial countries 
and closer to three times the rate in many, including the 
United States. Other countries besides Brazil held 
similar promise, especially after the first oil shock 
jolted even the less imaginitive bankers into the 
realization that the era of plentiful raw materials at 
low cost was over. The quest was for 'energy', both 
literally and figuratively, and it was sought with an 
intensity akin to that of the aging seeking the fountain 
of youth."(133)
All of the countries in this class of borrower 
experienced, especially in recent years, a rash of financial 
difficulties necessitating, at times, draconian corrective 
measures. On the other hand, many of these countries, 
notably Mexico and Brazil, abounded with latent potential for 
tremendous economic growth. Either way, using the memory 
element seems not to have enhanced the logit model's ability 
to explain the rescheduling process.
On the brighter side, however, is the fact that OPECM 
proved to be statistically significant in both models IIAA 
and I IBB. In the case of model IIAA OPECM supplanted EXBOR 
in rather impressive fashion, while in the case of model IIBB 
OPECM sallied forth as a significant regressor even though 
the variable EXBOR proved to be an impotent explanatory
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variable. As a result, both models IIAA and IIBB performed 
noticable better. in the case of model IIAA both the model 
chi-square (35.71 (3)) and the D-statistic (.60) are
impressive compared with the results of model IIA (33.28 (3) 
and .57, respectively). The same can be said for model IIBB 
(43.87 (3) and .67, respectively) in spite of the already
impressive results (40.19 (2) and .66) of model IIB.
These assuring results are also mirrored in the 
predictive performance of both models. In model IIAA the 
predictive accuracy of the model using the minimum errors 
rule is .91, as against .90 in model IIA, while at P*=.5 this 
figure is .88, only slightly lower than the .89 in model IIA. 
As for model IIBB, using the minimum errors rule the 
predictive accuracy of the model is .94 (.92 in model IIB), 
while at P*=.5 it is also .94 (.90 previously).
In short, both models IIA and IIB benefited from the 
redefinition of the credity supply variable, and although 
there were no improvements forthcoming through the use of the 
memory element this fact in and of itself suggests additional 
insights into the dynamics of the international credit market 
mechanism. Clearly, additional research needs to be devoted 
in this particular direction, i.e. the credit worthiness 
trade-off, if any, between past debt servicing difficulties 
and future economic prospects.
117
Finally, neither the inclusion of OPECM or the memory 
element was shown to be significant in the small debtor case. 
Again, this is not suprising since, as was already discussed, 
these countries do not, by and large, have access to foreign 
sources of private funding. Certainly, neither OPECM or 
EXBOR were statistically significant underscores the fact 
that these variables are primarily indicators of financial 
movanents in private credit markets; markets which this 
group of borrowers is largely excluded. Furthermore, the 
fact that the memory elements proved also not to be 
significant suggests that a country's inability to promptly 
service its external debt arises, as Dhonte has pointed out, 
from an inability to roll-over maturing obligations at 
relatively easy terms. Since the bulk of these countries 
external debt is on concessional terms then clearly this is 
not an issue. By and large, it might be concluded that past 
incidences of debt repudiation have not affected these 
countries credit ratings in private credit markets since 
these countries do not have access to these markets in any 
case. Consequently, the fact that these countries 
rescheduled at all may not be the result of any systematic 
sequence of events but the results of random shocks —  
social, economic, or political.
Lastly, in order to ascertain the effect of the 
inclusion of the regressor III into the analysis, consider, 
first, table 28 which presents the correlation matrices of 
this variable with those found statistically significant in
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the large debtor models (IIAA and IIBB). What is truly
striking about these results is the incredibly high degree of
correlation among nearly all of the explanatory variables.
In fact, because of the high degree of association it was
impossible to calculate parameter estimates in most 
(134)
cases. Consequently, in order to estimate the logit
model one explanatory variable each from models IIAA and IIBB 
had to be elimated. The final results are presented in table 
29 while table 30 presents the corresponding correlation 
matrices.
On the surface, at least, the results presented in table
29 are most impressive. Both models are strongly significant
while the predictive accuracy under either of the decision
rules is quite impressive. Unfortunately, these results must
be rejected out of hand since, as table 30 illustrates, there
remains an unacceptably high degree of association between
III and the remaining explanatory variables. These results
seem to suggest that the variable III is not a good proxy for
(135)
"bankers subjective probabilities" of default as argued
by Feder and Ross. Indeed, the variable III seems to be
merely a proxy for the predicted probabilities of default
based upon the economic indicators included in the model.
This, of course, should not be suprising since even the
compiler of the rankings admit that the greatest weight was
assigned to those rankings "from banks with the largest
worldwide exposure and the most sophisticated country
(136)
analysis systems (my emphasis)." What is suprising,
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however, is that Feder and Ross should have concluded
otherwise, i.e. that these rankings represented "a reasonable
measure of the markets perceived (read subjective) default
probabilities," when, in fact, they appear to be the result
of objective evaluation systems based largely upon economic
factors. If this conslusion is correct then it would, of
course, cast serious doubt upon the validity of the Feder and
Ross study. The authors conclude with this observation:
"As the results indicate that credit pricing in the 
market is generally consistent with lender's risk 
perceptions, judgement regarding the appropriateness of 
credit pricing will need to focus on the quality of 
country risk analyses performed by the lenders." (137)
Indeed, since risk perceptions and the quality of an
objective country risk analysis appear to be one and the
same, this admonition seans inappropriate.
These observations are supported somewhat by an
examination of the final parameter estimates of the small
debtor sample following the inclusion of the parameter III.
These results are presented in table 31. Notice that in
model IIIAAA all of the variables found significant in model
IIIA have been supplanted by III, while in model IIIBBB only
(138)
the regressor NDX remains. While the overall
preformance of the model was improved somewhat indicating the 
embodied within III are statistically significant variables 
not included here, there was in fact a decline in the 
predictive accuracy of the models. This result should not be 
taken too seriously, however, due to the differences in the 
time periods tested. It would appear, therefore, that on the 
basis of these results that a continued effort to identify
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additional economic variables in the anall debtor case would 
in all likelihood be most fruitful.
Large Debtors/Small Debtors - Latin America
In the previous sections it was observed that by 
restricting the analysis to the 1976-82 period that the 
predictive accuracy of the model was rather good. In the 
case of the "large debtor" sub-sample in particular the 
overall improvement in the model's predictive performance was 
quite encouraging, although less could be claimed for the 
"small debtor" case. Furthermore, as was also shown, 
although some improvement in the predictive accuracy of both 
models could be accomplished by redefining the variable for 
the availability of credit, the inclusion of the memory 
element was of no consequence. In fact, the only 
accomplishment of the regressor seams to have been to 
distinguish between large debtors and small debtors, 
although, as was recognized, the small debtors are generally 
those countries which are precluded from private financing.
It is clear from the above that while those economic 
variables which were included in the analysis were of 
consequence in explaining the incidence of default that there 
is every indication to suspect that significant variables may 
have been emitted. These findings suggest three possible 
alternatives: a) that the excluded variables are economic in
nature, b) that there is some other aspect of the 
rescheduling process that cannot be captured by the inclusion
121
of just economic indicators, or c) unexplained random shocks. 
While alternative c) threatens no quick solution to the 
dilemma of improving the predictive ability of the model, 
alternatives a) and b) appear to lie at the hear of the 
"ability versus willingness" to meet external servicing
obligations discussion above.
Ideally, if analyses of debt rescheduling is to be 
restricted to economic indicators alone then the best of all 
possible worlds would be to estimate the logit model on a 
country by country basis. The reason for this being that 
while specific non-economic variables are not considered,
different attitudes towards default may nonetheless be
captured in the variability of threshold levels of the
regressor variables prior to default. In other words, in
those cases where there is a rather high propensity to
default in the event of financial or economic crises then the 
regressor values are likely to be lower. Conversely, when
there is a low propensity to default the regressor values 
would be high. For example, if it were found that the 
variable DSR was significant in explaining default occurances 
at relatively low values then we might conclude a reluctance 
to meet external financing requirements. If, on the other
hand, the value of the regressor DSR attained relatively high 
levels prior to debt rescheduling then this would indicate a 
greater willingness on the part of that country to meet its 
foreign obligations. Unfortunately, due to the paucity of 
data on an individual country by country basis this procedure 
does not hold much promise.
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It is well known that most major commercial banks,
official government and international agencies, as well as
research institutions, who are actively engaged in country
risk analysis are organized along regional lines, i.e. Latin
America, sub-Saharan Africa, Bast Asia, South Asia, etc. The
primary reason for such geographic subdivisions is the
perception that these regions share certain common ethnic,
religious, cultural, social, political, and economic
simialrities, not to mention the fact that many international
events tend to be regional rather than country specific.
Following from this, therefore, it might be assumed that
should this supposition of commonality have any validity that
this might also be extended towards attitudes concerning
default. Following this line of reasoning, and having
established that there are basic structural differences
between large and small debtor countries, consider the
results of the reestimated logit model in which the sample is
(139)
restricted to large debtors in Latin America. As
before, separate analyses are performed using the regressors 
DSR and NDX (models IVA and IVB), the results of which are 
presented in table 32.
The first most striking result to consider is the fact
that neither the regressors DSR or NDX are statistically 
significant. Consequently, both analyses are one and the 
same. Little else can be said regarding these results except 
to note with some suprise the emergence of the liquidity 
ratio, RSM, as statistically significant; suprising since it
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was absent in the large debtor model and had appeared only 
one time before (in the small debtor model). At ,64<P*<.65 
the overall predictive accuracy is .88, while at P*=.5 it is 
.83. In either case it is outperformed by the large debtor 
models in spite of the fact that the model itself is
statistically significant.
Next, consider the sub-set of snail debtors in Latin
(140)
America. These results are presented in table 33 (and
are appropriately labeled VA and VB).
In the case of model VA only INX is statistically
significant. What is more, the model does not perform
particularly well. Although the model is statistically
significant, the D-statistic is disappointing (.20). As for 
the predictive accuracy of the model, using the minumum total 
errors criterion at ,43<P*<1.00 the predictive accuracy of 
the model is .90, as it is for P*=.5. While these results 
are better than for model IIIA, they are not impressively so.
In the case of model VB it is to be noted that this
mode], shares all the same explanatory variables with model
11 IB. In fact, model VB is an improvement over model II IB. 
At .49<P*<.87 the predictive accuracy of the model is .92 (as 
it is for P*=.5). Only model IIB, i.e. the large debtor
model using NDX, performed as well.
There were no changes in the final parameter estimates 
of models IV or V with the inclusion of OPECM and alternative 
specifications of the memory element. This is not suprising 
since the variable EXBOR did not perform well initially,
while it has become clear that the memory elenent is only
124
useful in identifying the class of debtor, i.e. large or
small. Once the data is subdivided between these classes of
debtors then its usefulness evaporates. In addition, the 
fact that these two variables were incapable of improving the 
model was to be expected on the grounds that as attempts are 
made to further homogenize the sample groupings that 
additional variables designed to isolate distinguishing
characteristics are bound to become increasingly more 
difficult to locate and quantify. In other words, at
increasingly more specialized sample specifications it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to identify individual 
rescheduling characteristics. In the extreme case of an 
individual country such attempts are, of course, no longer 
necessary, and as has been stated before only then does the 
exclusive use of economic indicators suffice in the modeling 
process. Be that as it may, while the use of the logit model 
is an important tool in isolating many of the determinants of 
debt rescheduling it cannot substitute for an in-depth case 
by case economic, social, and political analysis.
Finally, in the case of the Large Debtor - Latin America 
sub-sample there were no changes in models IVA and rVB. In 
other words, neither the introduction of the variable MEMi, 
OPECM, or III had any impact on the descriptive or predictive 
accuracy of the model. It is interesting to note, however, 
that as in the case of the large debtor model above the 
variable III was highly correlated with each of the 
statistically significant variables (see table 34). Of
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additional interest is that, as before, at least one variable 
had to be dropped from the estimation procedure, only this 
time that variable was III. This would seem to suggest that 
at least insofar as the underlying models of the 
Institutional Investor index is concerned the large debtor 
model presented appears to have performed, on average, 
better.
Similarly, in the Small Debtor - Latin America case the 
regressor III was unable to improve significantly upon 
earlier results. Unlike the earlier models, however. III did 
not demonstrate the pervasive degree of correlation that was 
evidenced in the Large Debtor - Latin America case.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
The results of the estimated logit model of debt 
rescheduling are briefly summarized in table 35. First, in 
every case examined the variable net external debt/exports 
ratio (NDX) outperformed the debt service ratio (DSR). In 
other words, using Dhonte's terminology, a countries 
"involvement" in external debt is, by and large, a better 
summary indicator of potential debt servicing problems than 
is a country's ability to meet its current debt servicing 
requirements as embodied in the debt service ratio. The fact 
that the ratio of net debt to exports was shown to be a 
consistently significant regressor suggests that in the 
decade following the initial oil price shock a country's debt 
servicing requirements represent a source of potential 
financial instability only in those instances where the 
country in question had already assumed considerable overseas 
debt obligations. Sudden increases in interest rates or 
drops in export earnings which create momentary debt 
servicing difficulties is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for a rescheduling crisis. Where a country is 
already heavily indebted (say two or three times export 
earnings) then unanticipated short-term difficulties in 
servicing that debt will likely lead to a disequilibrium 
condition resulting in a formal rescheduling package. The 
reason for this is ostensibly explained as follows. 
Countries with a relatively light overseas debt burden and
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reasonably bright economic prospects tend to have little 
difficulty in attracting new capital in times of foreign- 
exchange short-falls. This is obviously less so for 
countries already heavily indebted and where the net placed 
at risk by private lenders is already considerable. What is 
more, this situation is likely to be further aggrevated by 
adverse developments in the supply of lendable funds as was 
the case in the early 1980's when a drop in OPEC current 
account surplusses coincided with a rash of debt rescheduling 
episodes. It is not suprising, therefore, that the variable 
OPECM should also have proved to be highly significant for 
large debtors while insignificant in the case of small
debtors which were either well below the external debt
threshold or were simply not deemed by private lenders as 
credit worthy in the first place due to dismal economic
and political prospects.
These results also endorse the conclusions of Saini and
(141)
Bates in which it was found that "the debt service
ratio, without adjustment, is virtually useless in isolating 
debt service problems." This is not to suggest that the debt 
service ratio is not a significant explanatory variable in 
isolation, only that when combined with more direct measures 
of debt servicing capacity such as the amortization ratio, 
the inflationary erosion of debt, the availability of foreign 
credit, the real economic growth rate, and the liquidity 
ratio, the variable DSR is a second best substitute. This is 
also not to suggest that for casual analytical purposes that 
the DSR as a "rule of thumb" indicator of debt servicing
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difficulty be abandoned altogether, only that an in-depth 
analysis of debt servicing capacity should eschew such 
summary indicators not only in favor of more direct measures 
of debt servicing requirements but also that they be 
considered within the context of the country's overall debt 
profile and general international financial conditions. To 
the extent that some analysts feel compelled to continue to 
use the debt service ratio as a "flag" for impending 
financial crises they should do so within the general 
context as outlined above.
To be sure, one important conclusion to be drawn from 
the present study is the apparent and continued impact of the 
oil price shocks of the 1970's on the global debt structure. 
Furthermore, that the direct influence of the OPEC nations 
upon the economic development of non-oil-producing less 
developing countries, and indirectly upon the future 
prospects of the economically advanced nations of the world 
vis-a-vis the superstructure of international credit, 
continues to be significant and pervasive. In contrast to 
earlier studies, therefore, the analysis of country risk in 
the post-oil-enbargo era can no longer be confined to 
financial developments within specific countries (if, indeed, 
it ever could) but must be expanded to explicitly account for 
major shifts in international trade and payments imbalances.
Another aspect of the results to consider is the fact 
that when the complete panel data set is examined that, for 
the most part, the descriptive and predictive accuracy of the
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logit models is not as powerful as when the data is sub­
divided into smaller categorical sub-sets, as for example 
with large debtor and small debtor countries. This weakness 
is rectified somewhat however through the use of a memory 
element to further segregate different classes of borrower 
countries. This could be of considerable importance in those 
instances where a paucity of data does not permit the 
researcher to estimate the logit model for particularly small 
categories of debtors. In this study the model performed 
best using the memory element only in the complete sample 
case. At smaller data specifications the manory element was 
not able to contribute anything to either the descriptive or 
predictive performance of the model. It was suggested 
earlier that one possible reason for this was that for 
rapidly developing economies, such as Brazil in the 1970's, 
the overriding consideration from the point of view of 
private lenders was the perceived prospects for future 
economic growth and not past credit histories. However, as 
the above discussion suggests, the memory element may simply 
be isolating those countries which are already heavily 
indebted and are, therefore, good candidates for a 
rescheduling crisis. Of course, these two considerations are 
not independent since countries with bright economic 
prospects are likely to be those countries with the greatest 
relative external debt.
It ought to be reemphasized that this study was not an 
ad hoc search for more meaningful economic indicators of 
external debt repudiation. Nor, for that matter, did the
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study represent any significant theoretical advance over 
earlier attempts. it was, instead, designed to overcome 
inherent difficiencies in the logit approach by (1) using 
improved alternative data specifications and (2) by 
restricting the data set to the post-oil embargo period using 
the Cline (1982) model as a backdrop. To see if this 
procedure was successful compare the percentage of type I and 
type II errors committed by models IA, IB, and IIA with 
Cline's models C, D, and L (table 36). In terms of the 
number of type I errors committed the models outperformed 
those of Cline in two out of three cases. On the other hand, 
however, Cline's models did better with respect to the number 
of type II errors committed in two out of three cases. These 
results are not, however, very meaningful in so far as the 
overall predictive accuracy of the model is concerned by 
virtue of the fact that since this logit model attempts to 
predict the probability that a rescheduling occurs then as 
these values approach unity the failure rate becomes 
distorted by the particular distribution of the observations. 
For example, in the case of model IIA, the model was 
incorrect in predicting that no rescheduling would occur at 
.37<P*<.41 7 out of 99 cases, or 7.1 percent of the cases
observed. On the other side, the model was incorrect in 
predicting that a rescheduling would occur 4 out of 11 times. 
If the critical value had been established at, say, P*=.81, 
then the percentage of type I and type II errors committed 
would have been 11.1 and 0.0 percent, respectively. In terms
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of percentages model IIA outperformed model L on both counts,
even though the total number of errors would have risen from
only 11 to 12! In other words, the particular percentage
distribution of errors depends crucially upon the critical
value chosen and need not be consistent with the minumum
total number of errors committed. For this reason it is
perhaps best to consider the total number of successes at a
given P* as a percentage of the total number of trials, i.e.
the overall predictive accuracy of the model. Unfortunately,
Cline does not give these figures so a comparison of the
models is not possible. Nevertheless, in examining taole 35,
one is struck by the consistently accurate predictive ability
of all the models estimated. The success rate ranges from
.863 in model IA using the minimum errors rule all the way up
to .936, while at P*=.5 the success rate ranges from .847 to
.936. These results are impressive by almost any standard.
In addition, as a review of the separate results will
testify, it is comforting to recognize just how close was the
probability interval associated with the minumum errors rule
with the expected probability of rescheduling of .5 which is
(142)
suggested by the assumption of normality. These
probaoility intervals are presented in table 37. In fact, 
out of the thirteen final models estimated, the probability 
interval included the value .5 in five cases, while it was 
within 10 percentage points on either side of the interval in 
nine cases. This is significant since it seems to suggest 
that the bulk of the rescheduling process is explainable by 
the regressor (essentially economic) variables.
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Finally, consider the actual predictions generated as 
presented in table 38. The second column indicates the 
particular country considered while the first column 
indicates which model was used to generate the predicted 
value. The remaining columns indicate the particular year 
for which the prediction was made. Those values accompanied 
by an asterisk indicate that a debt rescheduling actually 
occured in that year.
A few observations regarding these results are in order. 
Firstly, if we employ the critical value of P*=.5, we find 
that of the 190 cases represented here that there were 15 
type I errors (an error rate of 8.6 percent) and 2 type II 
errors (an error rate of 23.1 percent) committed, for an 
overall predictive accuracy of 91.1 percent. Yet, in spite 
of these impressive results an examination of the data in 
table 37 suggests why such models have performed so badly in 
predicting future rescheduling episodes. Consider, for 
example, the case of Mexico. In 1979, with the benefit of 
hindsight, model IIBB predicted a default probability of .006 
percent. In 1980 and 1981, these predictions rose to .7 and 
1.8 percent, respectively, while in 1982, the year in which 
the rescheduling actually occurred, the predicted probability 
skyrocketed to 78.1 percent. This story is replicated in the 
case of Nicaragua. From 1978 to 1981 the predicted 
probabilities were 2.3, 2.6, 18.8, and 30.0 percent,
respectively. In 1982, the default year, the predicted value 
vaulted to 86.8 percent. Once again, in Chile from 1978
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until 1981 the predicted probabilities rose 2.2 percent to 
3.5 percent, yet in 1982 this value exploded to 99.9 percent. 
This scenario is repeated again and again. In short, in 
spite of the descriptive accuracy of the logit approach, many 
of these rescheduling episodes are perhaps better described 
as financial ruptures, occurring with little or no advanced 
warning. It is not suprising, therefore, that the predictive 
accuracy of these models has been so poor.
In order to examine this admittedly casual observation 
consider the following alternative specification of the 
international credit market:
d
(6.1) L = f(X) = aP
t t
s e
(6.2) L = g(X) = bP + u
t t t
d s
(6.3) L = L
t t
d s
where L and L represent the demand and supply of 
t t
international credit, X a vector of relevant explanatory
variables, and p an index summarizing the effect of X upon 
t
the dependent variable. Equation (6.1) states that the
demand for credit is a deterministic function of P , the
t
known probability of debt rescheduling. Equation (6.2), on 
the other hand, indicates that the supply of international 
credit is a function of the expected probability of debt 
rescheduling. This formulation is predicated on the notion 
that only the borrower knows the true desperateness of his
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financial situation while the lender is subject to 
uncertainty due to the lack of reliable information regarding 
the financial condition of the lender as well as the general 
uncertainty associated with the supply of credit in the 
global credit market. Equation (6.3) is the equilibrium 
condition.
If we assume that E(u )/Q, i.e. serial correlation, and
t
that u follows a first order autoregressive scheme, then 
t
(6.4) u = pu + e
t t-1 t
where
(6 .5 )
and
E(e )=0 
t
(6.6) E(eiej) =
<7* r i=3  
0, & 3
(143)
It can be shown that
e v— ' j-1
(6.7) P = [b/(a+b)] >  [a/(a+b)] P
t Jrl t-j
If we assume a two period lag, i.e. j=l,2, then (6.7) 
becomes
e
(6.8) P = lb/ (a+b) ] P + [b/ (a+b) ] [a/ (a+b) ] P
t t-1 t-2
This formulation, however, is tantamount to a linear 
probability model in which the predicted probability of debt 
rescheduling may assume values which are greater than unity 
or less than zero. In order to preserve the character of P
t
as belonging to the interval [0,1] it is assumed that the 
predicted probability of debt rescheduling is functionally 
related to past values as,
z z -1
(6.9) P = e [1+e ]
t
where
(6.10) z = b + b p + b p
0 1 t-1 2 t-2
A nonlinear optimization technique is used to derive the
maximun likelihood estimates of equation (6.9). Utilizing
the logit models enumerated in table 37 to estimate values of
(144)
P , table 39 contains the parameter estimates of
t (145)
equation (6.9) using the Gauss-Newton procedure with
(146)
accompanying asymptotic "t" statistics for the sixteen
largest debtor countries in 1982.
Since it is assumed that rescheduling crises are
stochastic events the null hypothesis to be bested is that
the parameter estimates are zero, i.e. that they are
statistically insignificant. In other words, the test is
whether P is a Markov process. As can be seen by the 
t
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parameter estimates in table 39, of the sixteen countries 
examined, only five (Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, the 
Philippines, and Colombia) exhibited any dynamic tendencies 
with regards to the development of an external debt crisis, 
and of these only two (Brazil and the Philippines) had 
actually experienced a rescheduling during the trial period. 
These results appear to broadly confirm the earlier
observation that rescheduling crises are largely
unpredictable on the basis of observed annual data. In other 
words, given that the sufficient condition for a debt
repudiation exists, i.e. a heavy external debt burden, then 
unanticipated shocks to the system which cause a sudden
increase in a country's debt servicing requirements or a 
foreign-exchange shortfall will result in a rescheduling 
crisis. This is not to say that an overt recognition of the 
development of the conditions conducive to such episodes is 
not possible, only that the event itself is not predictable. 
That is to say such crises are not per se predictable from 
observed past values of the explanatory variables. Of those 
countries in which past predicted probabilities are useful in 
explaining future rescheduling episodes, i.e. which exhibit a 
Markov process, the final parameter estimates in table 40 
indicate explosive behavior. This suggests, once again, that 
rescheduling crises occur quite rapidly and with little 
advanced warning, especially considering the paucity of 
timely economic data.
Of course, these results should be taken with the usual 
grain of salt since the small sample size renders the
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statistical estimates unreliable. Be that as it may, the 
above does provide a clearer understanding of why econometric 
techniques in general have performed so poorly in predicting 
rescheduling crises. On the one hand, the use of cross 
sectional time series data is very likely to mask any Markov 
process specific to individual countries necessary for 
reasonable predictions of future rescheduling episodes based 
solely on prior data. On the other hand, even where it is 
possible to isolate individual countries for the mast part no 
such process is evident, and where it is the behavior appears 
to be highly explosive which, by itself, makes timely 
predictions for policy purposes quite suspect given the lack 
of current economic data.
The above observations tend to reinforce the basic 
notion that the first best use of econometric techinques is 
as part of an ongoing conprehensive risk evaluation system, 
and not as a single means to an end. In other words, 
econometric techniques are best employed as but a single tool 
in the researchers analytical kit. The area economist must 
keep up to date with developments as they occur and not be 
bridled by the periodicity of the data. Clearly, therefore, 
the main advantage of the logit, or for that matter any 
econometric, technique is that it helps to identify which, 
perhaps minor, financial disruptions are likely to explode 
into a full-blown debt crisis.
In brief, the results of the qualitative and 
quantitative investigations of this study may be summarized
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as follows. First, it has been demonstrated that changes in 
OPEC trade and payments surplusses since the oi1-embargo 
continue to be a significant element in explaining the 
incidence of debt rescheduling as late as 1982, and very 
likely beyond; certainly, at least, for the foreseeable 
future. Second, that the mere fact of temporary foreign- 
exchange short-falls and current servicing difficulties is 
not enough to throw a country into a full-blown debt crisis. 
The evidence seems to suggest that while such conditions are 
necessary for formal reschedulings to occur, they are not 
sufficient. Sufficiency requires that a country be already 
heavily laden with foreign debt which stifles its ability to 
attract short-term emergency financing. Third, that by 
limiting the time frame under consideration to the post-oil- 
embargo decade in order to account for structural parametric 
changes resulting from the dramatic increases in oil prices, 
by sub-dividing the available data set as much as is 
statistically feasible in order to account for the individual 
characteristics of borrower and lender, and by explicitly 
taking into account past credit histories, that there is a 
significant improvement in the overall descriptive ability of 
the model. Fourth, that the predictive ability of the model 
continues to be problematical and is not dependent upon the 
selection of the critical value per se. By and large, this 
is explained by the apparent random nature of adverse 
economic developments which push already heavily indebted 
countries over the brink. To the extent that a portion of 
the rescheduling process is predictable in certain instances
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it tends to exhibit highly explosive behavior and is 
therefore of litle policy value given the paucity of timely 
data. Consequently, it must be anphasized that the use of 
logit analysis, or for that matter any econometric technique, 
ought not to be viewed as the last word. Such methods should 
be used only as a research tool designed to augment a 
thorough and in-depth analysis of each situation. In the 
hands of an expert, such techniques can provide powerful 
insights into the rescheduling process thereby suggesting 
reasonable and effective solutions.
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Applied Multivariate Analysis, (New York, 1972) chapter 9.
70. Dhonte's list of ten economic indicators:
1. International reserves to total external debt ratio.
2. Debt service to disbursements ratio.
3. Debt service to total external debt ratio.
4. Debt service ratio for 1970.
5. Total external debt to exports for 1970.
6. Total external debt to GNP.
7. Growth rate of total external debt.
8. Growth rate of exports.
9. Net transfers to total imports ratio.
10. Disbrusements to total imports ratio.
In renegotiation cases the values of the indicators were 
those of the year prior to renegotiation.
71. Dhonte defines "involvanent" in debt as the ratio of 
total external debt (disbursed) to imports. It is a concept 
which, according to Dhonte, covers both the measure of a 
country's debt outstanding and that of the related flows.
72. This is measured as the ratio of debt service payments 
to total external debt. This indicator represents the extent 
to which debt obligations may "bunch" over time, i.e. a 
summary measure of the time distribution of debt service 
obligations.
73. Logit analysis assumes that the probability that a 
country will reschedule its external debt is related to a 
vector of economic indicators (X) logistically as:
-1
P(X) = (exp(B'X))(l+exp(B'X))
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As in the case of discriminant analysis, the dependent 
variable is binary; y=l for countries which reschedule in a 
given year, and y=0 otherwise. It must therefore hold that
-1
Pr(y=0|x=X ) = (l+exp(B'X )} 
i i
-1
Pr(y=l|x=X ) = (exp(B'X ))(l+exp(B'X )) 
i i i
where Xi is the vector of economic indicators for observation 
i, where i=l, 2, ..., n. The likelihood function L is thus
m  exp(B'Xiyi)
b  n
ii (l+exp(B'X )) 
i
Maximizing the likelihood function with respect to B yields a 
set of non-linear equations which can be solved using 
iterative procedures. The maximum likelihood estimators can 
be shown to be consistent and asymptotically unbiased and 
efficient. For a detailed discussion of this technique see 
Madalla, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables...
74. Gershon Feder and Richard E. Just, "A Study of Debt 
Servicing Capacity Applying Logit Analysis," Journal of 
Development Economics, 4 (1977), pp. 25-38.
75. The ratio of "non-compressible imports" to total imports 
is not used by Feder and Just since available data for all 
countries in the study were not comparable. In addition, 
this ratio was omitted because "theoretical arguments have 
been developed which qualify this indicator" (p. 26).
76. Unlike discriminant analysis which assumes that there 
exists two completely different populations (rescheduling and 
non-rescheduling), logit analysis assumes that "discrete" 
events occur after the combined effect of certain economic 
variables reach some critical threshold. As Feder and Just 
point out: "...it makes more sense to claim that, in a 
specific period, the country was pushed beyond sane critical 
level, leading to rescheduling, than to claim that the 
country suddenly became a member of a different population" 
(p. 26).
77. Logistic distributions are virtually indistinguishable 
fron normal distributions except at the extreme ends. As a 
result, asymptotic tests are available for considering the 
exclusion of potential independent variables. If the 
independent variables are normally distributed, the
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discriminant-analysis estimator is the true maximum 
likelihood estimator and therefore is asymptotically more 
efficient than the logit maximum likelihood estimator. 
However, if the independent variables are not normal (see 
Eisenbeis) then the discriminant-analysis estimator is not 
even consistent, while the logit maximum likelihood estimator 
is. It should also be pointed out that in spite of the 
assumption of normality the logistic distribution is 
preferred over the normal distribution because of 
computational efficiency. This does not, in general, pose 
much of a problem unless the sample size is large so that 
there are sufficient observations at the tails. For a fuller 
discription on this and the comparison with discriminant 
analysis see Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative 
Variables..., chapters 2 and 4, and G.S. Maddala, 
Econometrics, (New York, 1977) chapter 9.
78. Feder and Just, p. 35.
79. Saini and Bates.
80. For an example of this see Alice L. Mayo and Anthony G. 
Barret, "An Early Warning Model for Assessing Developing 
Country Risk," Proceedings of a Symposium on Developing 
Countries' Debt, ed. Stephen H. Goodman, sponsored by the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States (August, 1977).
81. One study which explicitly considers structural 
parametric changes by export price fluctuations and domestic 
inflationary pressures is Nicholas Sargen's "Optimum Foreign 
Borrowing, Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Pacific Basin 
Countries," paper presented at the Western Economic 
Association Meetings, Anaheim, California (June, 1977).
82. These are foreign loans without which rescheduling per 
se would have been necessary.
83. Voluntary debt reschedulings are those in vtfiich there 
existed no apparent balance of payments problems.
84. The eleven economic indicators uxamined by Saini and 
Bates include:
1. Total imports to international reserves ratio.
2. Per capita GDP.
3. Consumer price index.
4. Total imports to GDP ratio.
5. Money supply growth.
6. Export growth rate, averaged over three years.
7. Current account balance minus (plus) increase (decrease) 
in international reserves to total exports ratio.
8. 5-year cumulative current account balance minus (plus) 
increase (decrease) in international reserves to total 
exports-in-the-latest-year.
9. Net foreign assets of the banking system to money supply.
10. Growth rate of international reserves.
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11. Debt service payments to total exports.
85. According to Saini and Bates the debt service ratio in 
some studies was adjusted upwards of 25 percent in 
rescheduling cases. This, they say, not only biased the 
results but also appears to have been unnecessary since the 
explanatory variables were lagged by one year.
86. This is not suprising given the events of the early
1970's. Following the OPEC price hikes and subsequent 
petrodollar recycling episode there was a dramatic shift in 
the nature of overseas financing by many LDC's. 
Substantially greater amounts of foreign capital inflows ware 
beginning to take the form of unguaranteed private commercial 
loans. Saini and Bates, however, obtained their data on debt 
service payments from the World Debt Tables which include 
only information on public and publically guaranteed debt.
It is not suprising, therefore, that the debt service ratio 
should have performed so poorly especially since data for the 
study included fully four years of the post-embargo era. 
Later studies, especially those by Cline, confirm the 
importance of the debt service ratio in explaining the 
incidence of debt rescheduling.
87. Given the fact that Saini and Bates used a proxy 
variable for recognizably poor data on debt service payments 
it is not too suprising that their results should have been 
better in the latter period investigated (see previous 
footnote). Although not denying the fact that there were, 
indeed, structural shifts during this time it seems at least 
equally plausible that these results ware the consequence of 
deficiencies in available and accurate data.
88. Saini and Bates, pp. 23-24.
89. For a more detailed account of the supply side 
literature see McDonald, pp. 627-637.
90. Gershon Feder and Knud Ross, "Risk Assessments and Risk 
Premiums in the Eurodollar Market," Journal of Finance, 37 
(June, 1982), pp. 679-691.
91. Ibid., pp. 679-680.
92. In subsequent surveys the rankings ranged from 0 to 100.
93. Ibid., p. 680.
94. This is believed so because the adjusted terms at the 
time of rescheduling seem to have compensated lenders for the 
postponement of debt servicing.
95. Cline, "A Logit Model...”
96. Ibid., p. 7,9.
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97. The variable hCAX broadly defined equals the full 
amount of new financing required. Cline has defined the 
variable as quadratic in order to take account of the fact 
that the demand for foreign credit may be non-linear. In 
other vrords, as the current account deficit nears the credit 
rationing ceiling the probability of an induced demand for 
rescheduling is expected to rise rapidly. Further, if the 
current account is in deficit, h=-l, while if it is in 
surplus, h=l. This device is used to preserve the integrity 
of the influence of the current account since squaring 
necessarily make all signs positive.
98. Note that the debt service ratio appears as an argument 
in both the supply and demand functions. Certain factors 
tend to shift the demand curve for foreign credit to the 
right and the supply curve to the left. This implies, 
accordding to Cline, that private capital markets become 
especially unstable as countries near rescheduling 
situations. In other words, when a credit market gap 
develops from both the supply and demand sides then 
rescheduling situations tend to develop "abruptly and 
dramatically."
99. Cline suggests that an alternative to the debt service 
ratio might be the ratio of net debt (total external debt 
less international reserves) to exports. It is a longer term 
measure which examines the "stock" concept of the country's 
balance sheet rather than the "flow" concept of the current 
rate of debt service (which may be distorted by "bunching").
100. Here p is a measure of world inflation, D is total 
outstanding debt, and x exports of goods and services. The 
term pD is the measure of inflationary erosion of external 
debt which has been normalized by exports. Cline points out 
that although inflation does provide some debt relief, it is 
also accompanied by higher nominal interest rates. The net 
effect was a cash flow pressure in which loans were forced to 
be repaid ahead of schedule in real terms because the higher 
interest payments were insnediate but the inflationary erosion 
of debt would not be realized until seme future time. In 
general, however, the real long-term burden of debt was 
overstated as long as real interest rates remained unchanged 
while the nominal interest rate and observed debt service 
ratios ware rising.
101. Because of the lack of economic information regarding 
debt certain basic economic measures serve as proxy measures 
of creditworthiness. Per capita income, according to Cline, 
serves as a screen on creditor supply.
102. Another proxy of creditworthiness, the presence of a 
high savings rate provides some measure of assurance that 
funds borrowed from abroad will not be used simply to replace 
domestic savings thereby permitting high rates of
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consumption.
103. In the Cline study L is defined as the ratio of total
net external borrowing by all NOLDC's as a fraction of total
imports of these countries: L=B/M.
104. The existence of DSR and y in both the supply and 
demand functions is a source of "simultaneous equation bias." 
According to Cline, however, since the purpose of the study 
is the prediction of future debt rescheduling and policy 
prescription that this difficiency is not deemed as 
debilitating.
105. Net external debt is defined as total external debt 
less international reserves (less gold). The first partial 
of this variable is also assumed to be positive.
106. Cline, op. cit., p. 19.
107. Once this equation is estimated (using maximum
likelihood techniques) the resulting dependent variable Z is 
transformed into an indicator of the probability of 
rescheduling by
-Z -1 
P = (1+e )
C
where PC is the composite indicator of the probability of 
rescheduling. This indicator of the probability of 
rescheduling varies from zero (as Z approaches negative 
infinity) to unity (as Z approaches positive infinity).
108. The alphabetic abbreviations employed by Cline are as 
follows: DSR (debt service ratio), RSM (international 
reserves to imports), INX (the inflationary erosion of debt), 
AMZ (the amortization ratio), SQCA (the current account 
ratio), SAV (the savings rate), GRO (real economic growth 
rate), GDP (per capita GDP), EXBOR (the global supply of 
credit), NDX (net external debt to exports) , and XGR (real 
export gorwth). In those cases where the regressor is 
preceeded by an "L" this indicates that the variable has been 
lagged by one period.
109. Cline, op. cit., p. 42.
110. Saini and Bates, p. 12.
111. See Feder and Ross.
112. There were 114 observations using the Institutional 
Investor index, and 193 observations without.
113. Cline, op. cit., p. 21.
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114. Note that this definition differs slightly from that 
used by Cline where only amortization on medium- and long­
term debt is included. This, it is believed, is an 
inappropriate procedure since short-term payments on external 
debt represent a significant drain on a country's export 
earnings and ought, therefore, to be explicitly accounted 
for.
115. International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Yearbook, (Washington: various issues).
116. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developiong Countries,
(Washington: various issues).
117. Bank for International Settlements, The Maturity 
Distribution of International Bank Lending, (Basle: various 
issues).
118. International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, (Washington: various issues).
119. International evidence shows a systematic tendency for 
the exchange rate to understate the real value of domestic 
income in lower-income countries due to the fact that labor 
intensive goods and services in which they have a lower-cost 
production tend not to be traded goods.
120. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 
(Washington: various issues).
121. These countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Philippines, and Peru.
122. See T.W. Anderson and R.R. Bakadur, "Classification 
into Two Multivariate Normal Distributions with Different 
Covariance Matrices," Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 
33,2, pp. 420-431. This article also discusses the Bayesian 
and minimax approach to the selection of the critical value. 
See also B.L. Welch, "Notes on Discriminant Functions," 
Biometrica, 31, pp. 218-220.
123. Feder and Just, p. 36.
124. See D.R. Cox, The Analysis of Binary Data, (London: 
1970), chapter 7.
125. In practice, of course, the selection of the critical 
value depends crucially upon the costs involved in making 
type I and type II errors. For example, if C(I) is very high 
relative to C(II) then P* will be set "low," and vice versa.
126. The chi-square statistic for testing the hypothesis 
that a parameter is zero is calculated by computing the 
square of the parameter estimate divided by its standard
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error, which is estimated toy calculating the square root of 
the appropriate diagonal element of the estimated covariance 
matrix. The hypothesis test assumes the estimates are 
asymptotically normally distributed. For example, for one 
degree of freedom at the 80, 90, 95, and 99 percent
confidence intervals the chi-square values are 1.64, 2.71,
3.84, and 6.64, respectively.
127. The model chi-square is twice the difference in the log 
likelihood of the current model from the likelihood based on 
the intercept only.
2
128. The D statistic is R in the normal setting. It is the 
value such that
D(n-p)/(l-D) = model chi-square
where p is the number of variaoles in the model including the 
intercept, and n is the number of observations.
129. See Institutional Investor, March, 1980-1982 issues.
130. Institutional Investor, (March, 1984), p. 291.
131. For this analysis the large debtors included Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Venezeula, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Egypt, Nigeria, South Korea, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The small debtors 
included Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, Paraguay, Dominical Repuolic, Panama, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Nicaragua, Togo, Sierra Leone, Gabon, Ghana, Zaire, 
and Burma.
132. M. June Flanders, The Demand for International 
Reserves, Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 27 
(Princeton: 1971).
133. Makin, p. 5.
134. This was because the standard errors of the explanatory 
variables were virtually zero thus resulting in an assumed 
infinite coefficient value.
135. Feder and Ross, p. 688.
136. Institutional Investor, op. cit. As one who has been a 
participant in similar exercises, the following scenario 
seems most probable. A questionaire is received from, say, 
Institutional Investor requesting that he, a lender, 
"subjectively" rank a spectrum of countries according to 
"perceived credit risks." This questionaire is forwarded to 
the bank's economic research department for completion. 
Recognizing it for what it is, the resident bank economist 
completes the questionaire on the basis of a country by 
country rating system developed oy the bank, whereupon it is
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returned. As noted earlier perceptions regarding the 
character of country exposure is likely to vary quite 
considerably between that of the lending officer and that of 
the economist. In short, it is most probable that the 
Institutional Investor rankings represent not the lender's 
perception, but rather the perception of the bank economist 
which will, in all likelihood, be based upon a "mechanical" 
country evaluation system.
137. Feder and Ross, p. 689.
138. It should oe pointed out that while the variable NDX 
and III are both significant at between the 80 and 90 percent 
confidence interval, when NDX was removed models IIIAAA and 
IIIBBB became identical, i.e. Ill was significant at roughly 
the 98 percent level.
139. These countries include Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Venexuela, Peru, Colombia, Mexico.
140. These countries include Bolivia, Uruguay, El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Panama, 
Trinidad & Tobago, and Nicargua.
141. Saini and Bates, p. 15.
142. See the discussion of the selection of the "critical 
value" above.
143. See, for example, John F. Muth, "Rational Expectations 
and the Theory of Price Movements," Econometrica, Vol. 29, 
No. 3 (July, 1961), pp. 315-335.
144. Predicted probabilities covered the period 1970-82. 
Data on external debt prior to 1976 was calculated on the 
basis of the average percentage of total external debt that 
was from private sources from 1976-82 for each country 
examined. This was made necessary by the fact that while 
public and publically guaranteed debt is available prior to 
1976, private debt is not.
145. The Gauss-Newton iterative method involves regressing 
the residuals on the partial derivatives of the model with 
respect to the parameters until the iterations converge.
146. Unfortunately, in small samples the maximum liklihood 
(ML) estimator of the variance is biased, whereas the OLS 
estimator is not. However, as the sample size increases 
indefinitely, the ML and OLS estimators tend to be equal.,
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Appendix X: Structured Qualitative Country Evaluation
I
COUNTRY ECONOMIC REPORT: THAILAND
In brief November 27,1979
• Buoyed by favorable world market demand, the Thai economy grew 8.72 in real 
terms in 1978, compared with 8.42 in 1977, although continued difficulties
in the agricultural sector are expected to reduce real growth in 1979 to 62-72.
# Rising energy and labor costs, and overheating in certain sectors of the 
economy, caused an acceleration in the inflation rate in 1978 to 7.51 from 
6.52 in 1977. Increased oil prices and the lifting of price controls domes­
tically are expected to push the Inflation rate in 1979 into the 152-202 range.
s Thailand's trade account posted a $1.4 billion deficit in 1978, compared with 
$1.3 billion in 1977, reflecting continued weakness in agricultural exports. 
Continued short-falls in rice production and higher priced oil Imports are ex­
pected to widen the trade gap to $2 billion by the end of 1979. Although net 
invisible earnings exhibited mode6t Improvement, the current account deficit 
grew to $1.13 billion, as against $1.09 billion in 1977. These trends have 
continued into 1979 with the year-end current account deficit projected at 
around $1.6 billion.
e Thailand's balance of payments deficit in 1978 was $652 million, comapred with 
$369 million in 1977. Net capital inflows in 1976 of $780 million were in­
sufficient to offset a widened trade gap largely because of a marked deceleration 
in direct foreign Investment which has been traced to continued political 
difficulties in the region. Long-term capital inflows did accelerate, however, 
due to a worsening trade deficit resulting in a sharp rise in external debt. 
Investor confidence is on the upswing, however, and a relative improvement in 
Thailand’s overall payments position in 1979 can be expected.
a In spite of the increased payments deficit in 1978, international reserves rose 
to $2.1 billion, compared with $1.9 billion in 1977, largely as a result of 
extraordinary financing by the IMF. This level of reserves remained unchanged 
through October, 1979. External debt rose $700 million to $1.8 billion 
reflecting continued weakness in the current account. The debt service ratio 
remained under 42. Through the first four months of 1979, total public 
external Indebtedness had grown to $1.97 billion.
s The outlook for 1980 is based upon three factors: an economic slowdown in
OECD, higher priced OPEC oil, and a return to "normalcy" in agriculture. The 
first two factors are certainly to be detrimental to Thailand's economic health, 
although these developments could be overshadowed by an Increase in rice 
exports. In brief, assuming rebounded agricultural production, real growth in 
1980 is likely to be roughly that of 1979, with moderately higher rates of 
inflation.
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COUNTRY ECONOMIC REPORT: THAILAND
In spite of the fact that rice production was seriously impeded for 
the second consecutive year by a combination of floods and droughts, the 
Thai economy managed to grow 8.72 in real term6 in 1978, as against 8.4% 
and 6.9% in 1976 and 1977, respectively. This generally upbeat performance 
was due to a surge in exports of tapioca root, as well as renewed strength 
in tin mining operations resulting from higher world prices. Unfortunately, 
this higher level of economic activity, coupled with the short-fall in 
the production of food grains, conjoined to accelerate the rate of 
inflation. Overall, prices rose by roughly 7.5% on the year, compared 
with 6.5% in 1977.
I. Domestic Developments
1. Gross Domestic Product
The Thai economy grew 8.7% in real terms to $21.8 billion in 1978.
This performance was paced by a 14.7% rate of real growth in the mining 
sector, followed by construction at 13.5%, manufacturing at 12.2% and 
agriculture at 9.4%. As a percentage of total GDP in current prices, 
these sectors accounted for roughly 2.2%, 5.6%, 19.1% and 27.1%, respec­
tively. Of the remaining 46%, nearly a third was accounted for by the 
wholesale and retail trade sectors, while another fifth was derived from 
services.
Even though agriculture has made impressive contributions to 
I Thailand’s economic growth process in terms of income, employment and
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export earnings, its relative importance has been declining because of 
significant changes in the structure of the economy. In 1965, for 
example, the ratio of agricultural output to GDP was a larger 35%, while 
Industrial production accounted for a modest 15.5%. By 1978, these 
figures had changed to 27.1% and 19.2%, respectively.
On the expenditure side of the national accounts, spending on 
consumer goods accounted for nearly 76% of GDP in 1978, and about 84% of 
that was derived from the private sector. Investment expenditures 
accounted for about 27%, nearly a third of which came in the form of 
government spending for development purposes.
Total government expenditures amounted to nearly a fifth of GDP, 
and of that amount 39% was devoted to internal capital development, a 
total of about $1.7 billion.
Although Thailand's net export position for 1977 exhibited a deficit 
equivalent to about 5.3% of GDP, gross exports amounted nearly 22% of 
GDP, up from 21% in 1976. In 1978, Thailand's trade gap was roughly 
$900 million (up from $800 million in 1977), while the deficit in the 
current account reached approximately $1.3 billion, or 5.5% of GDP.
Gross exports declined to 19% of GDP, however, largely because of short­
falls in rice production.
As to more recent significant sectoral developments, rebounding 
from the flooding which seriously hampered output in 1977, agricultural 
recovery has spearheaded Thai economic growth to its highest rate since 
1973. In 1978, with the exception of rice production, which suffered a 
serious set-back in October due to further flooding caused by unusually 
heavy monsoon rains, significant advances were made in the output of 
other products, particularly rubber and tapioca.
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A decade ago, Thailand's preeminent foreign exchange earners Inclu­
ded rice, rubber and tin. In 1978, for the first time, rice was surpassed 
as the country’s leading foreign exchange earner by tapioca root, used 
principally In Europe as animal feed, bringing in nearly $533 million.
Still, in spite of the fact that net exports of Thai rice declined 
by over a fifth In 1978 to a level of $508 million, Thailand remains the 
only net exporter of food grains in Asia, and only one of five in the 
world. Export receipts from tapioca, on the other hand, grew by 40% in 
1978, largely as a result of increased volume. Prior to World War II,
Thailand was the world's largest exporter of tapioca. In addition, 
exports of rubber products rose by nearly 35% to $406 million. In 1978, 
total exports amounted to nearly a fifth of Thailand’s GDP with agri­
cultural products accounting for about three quarters of total exports. 
Increased government efforts to expand and diversify Thailand’s agricul­
tural base, upgrading its technological level to take advantage of a 
rapidly expanding world market for it's traditional commodities.
Industrial production increased significantly in 1978. The output 
of machinery and metal products led the way with an estimated 15% to 18% 
growth rate. Textiles, the country's single largest industrial export 
industry, also displayed renewed strength in the latter part of 
1978 (following a slump in production the previous year due to the 
imposition of import quota restrictions by major overseas customers) 
due to an increase in the U.S. textile import quota for Thailand. An 
increase of 11.0% in textile production, to about 1.8 billion square yards, 
at about 90% of capacity, was achieved in 1978. Overall manufacturing output 
increased by about 9%, and there is every indication that this level of growth
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in industrial production has continued through at least the first half 
of 1979.
Another sector that showed considerable strength in 1978 was the 
construction industry which grew nearly 24% in current prices. Prompted 
by significant increases in government investment expenditure for infra­
structure development, the building boom was in the forefront of the 
overall buoyant trend in investment for 1978. Cement and construction 
materials industries were, by year-end, running at full capacity, with 
government housing, highway, and waterworks projects pacing construc­
tion activity. This trend is likely to slacken somewhat in 1979 as the 
government is expected to decelerate government investment expenditure 
in an attempt to retard the nation's inflation rate.
Because of favorable prices on the international market for Thailand's 
major mineral resources (including tin, tungsten ores and fluorite), 
mining activity for 1978 continued at high levels growing nearly 21% 
over 1977. Tin exports were estimated at 29,000 tons, up 35% on the 
previous year, resulting in total export receipts of roughly $350 million 
(up from $225 million in 1977). For the year, tin ranked as Thailand 's 
fourth major foreign exchange earner after tapioca, rice and rubber.
Official sources are predicting that real growth in the Thai economy 
will slacken somewhat in 1979 to around 7.5%, although some private esti­
mates put the real GDP growth rate at around 5.5%. Our estimates 
that real growth will be closer to 6% on the year. Nonetheless, the 
Inevitable decline is attributed to another off year in agricultural 
production, despite the fact that industrial growth appears brisk. It 
has been estimated on the basis of available data through the first three
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quarters of the year that agricultural production will expand by only 
6.5Z In real terms in 1979, substantially less than the 9.4% recorded 
last year. This decline was due to late rains which seriously impeded 
output for most major cash crops. Industrial production is forecast to 
expand by about 9% in 1979, although this situation is not expected to 
continue due to additional oil price hikes, as well as the economic 
slowdown in OECD. Tin production has also increased as world prices 
continued to remain firm.
As for 1980, although it is impossible to know with any certainty 
what the future may have in store for agricultural production, the price 
of crude oil and tin prices, based upon a predicted real rate of economic 
growth in OECD of 1.5%, an average increase in petroleum prices of 35% and 
a return to "normalcy" in food production, real growth on the year can 
be expected to rebound slightly to around 7%.
2. Prices
As was indicated indicated in an earlier report (April 27, 1979), 
inflation in Thailand in recent years has been the result of a variety 
of factors. On the cost side, the most notable of these factors has 
been the steady increase in the price of OPEC oil which, in 1973, 
almost slnglehandedly ended a decade of virtual price stability. Other 
cost-push elements included higher prices for basic materials for a 
rapidly expanding construction industry, as well as increased labor cost 
due to an increase in the minimum wage rate. On the demand side, acceler­
ated rates of government and private expenditures were instrumental in 
bidding up prices, although, as was indicated, monetary and fiscal policies 
have lately begun to address themselves to this problem.
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Through the first eight months of 1979, consumer prices soared by 
over 122, or an annualized rate of 18-202. During this time, the price 
of Imported oil products rose an average of 562. Statistical analysis 
indicates that for every 52 increase in price of Imported oil, consumer 
prices Increase by roughly 12. In addition to recent oil price hikes, 
price controls were lifted on a variety of restricted products last 
June, followed by a 402-602 boost in domestic oil prices in July. As a 
result, in those two months alone, consumer prices soared nearly 52, or 
an annualized rate of over 302. Other factors also responsible for the 
recent Burge in prices, although to a considerably leaser degree, were 
Increases in transportation and utility rates.
Given the variety of factors which come into play in determining 
the country's inflation rate, it is, Indeed, difficult to formulate con­
fident prognoses. Nevertheless, it would appear that barring additional 
exogenous price shocks for the balance of the year, inflation should 
register around 152 for 1979. Obviously, projecting rates of price 
increase for 1980 is at least geometrically more difficult, nevertheless, 
in spite of the slowdown in world economic activity, especially in the 
OECD countries, and an average yearly price increase in OPEC oil of 
352, we expect inflation on the year to be roughly 252.
II. External Developments
I. Merchandise Trade
The Thai current account has traditionally been plagued with a deterior­
ation in its International terms of trade. This situation became its worst 
when in the period 1973-1975, for example, when the country's overall terms of
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trade deteriorated almost 30%. This occurred primarily as a result of 
the oil price hike of 1973-1974, and resulted in a trade deficit in 1975 
of $989 millioh, i.e. 412 higher than in 1974.
In 1978, a marked deterioration in rice exports contributed substan­
tially to a further increase in Thailand's trade deficit. The monsoon 
rains which caused widespread flooding in October resulted in a 46% 
decline in the volume of rice exports, although high prices limited the 
decline in revenues to just over 22%, or a total of $510 million. 
Fortunately, soaring prices for tapioca root helped salvage an otherwise 
dismal export performance with a 41% increase to $534 million. In 
addition, a 59% Increase in the value of tin exports, and a 28% increase 
in the value of manufactured exports, especially textiles, resulted in 
an estimated $4 billion in total exports for 1978.
On the import side, payments for petroleum products continued to 
pace all other items, although the increase of about 9%, to $1.1 billion, 
was considerably off the 1977 rate of 25%. This outcome was the result 
of rationing through higher prices imposed by the government, as well as 
possibly attesting to the government's success at developing its rather 
substantial natural gas reserves. In terms of importance, petroleum 
Imports are closely followed by non-electrical machinery and spare parts 
which grew by 26% to $780 million.
As a result of an estimated 17% overall increase in Thailand's 
export position, as against a 14% increase in Imports, the resulting 
trade deficit in 1978 was slightly under $1.4 billion, up about $142 
million from 1977. While this figure is substantial in its own right, it 
represents an Increase of only 11% over the 1977 figure which was itself
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I1302 higher than In 1976.
In the first five months of 1979, total exports exhibited a 352 
Increase over a comparable period in 197B, as against a 312 rise in 
Imports. Consequently, the total trade gap through May was roughly 
$600 million, as against $500 million in the first five months of 1978.
If this trend persists, the trade short-fall is expected to go to around 
$2.2 billion by year end. Interestingly, tapioca exports during thiseriod 
period fell to third place in foreign exchange earnings at $260 million, 
a 212 increase over 1978, while exports of rice regained the number one 
position at $270 million, a 332 increase over the same period a year 
earlier. Petroleum products continued to lead the import pack, however, 
expanding roughly 172 to $550 million over the same period in 1978.
2. Current account
The net deficit on exports of goods and services remained virtually 
unchanged in 1978, rising a scant 32 to $1.17 billion, as against an 
Increase of 1452 registered in 1977. The modest increase in the net 
deficit reflects a 902 overall improvement in the services portion of 
the current account which all but wiped out a $142 million Increase in 
the trade deficit. In 1978, the net balance on services was $223 million, 
as against a surplus $118 million recorded in 1977.
This overall improvement in the services accounts was paced by 662 
Increase in net tourist earnings to $320 million, while net disbursements 
on investment Income, the largest debit item, rose 1102 to $153 million.
Net receipts on freight and Insurance associated with Increased merchandise 
trade declined by 42, however, to $22 million. Coupled with a virtually 
unchanged net inflow of unrequited transfers, most notably foreign country 
grants, Thailand's overall current account deficit rose 3.32 to $1.13 billion,
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from $1.1 billion in 1977. This alow rate of lncreaae compare# quite 
favorably, however, with 1977 flgurea which showed a 150% deterioration In 
the current account balance as a result alow export growth in connection 
with low crop yields.
In the first quarter of 1979, net service receipts advanced by 14% 
over the couparable quarter In 1978 to $96 million. Unfortunately, however, 
a poor performance In the trade accounts limited overall improvement 
in the current account just over a percent to a deficit of $180 million, 
compared with a deficit of $178 million in the first quarter of 1977.
2. Capital Accounts
The chronically unstable political situation within and without Thailand 
in recent years had given rise to much uncertainty and unwillingness to incur 
risks on the part of both foreign and domestic companies. As a result, from 
1974 to 1976, direct long-term investment declined by about 42% to $79 million 
while during 1976 alone inflows of private and public, long- and ahort-term 
loans and credits declined 13% to $260 million.
Following the rise to power of Kriangsak Chamanand in October 1977, and 
the promulgation of his administration's economic priorities on December 1, 1977, 
business confidence took a decided turn for the better. Following an outline 
for rapid economic development as aet forth in the Fourth Plan, domestic and 
foreign investment was actively solicited. As a result, net capital inflows 
grew by 51% in 1977 to $684 million, and in the first half of 1978, these 
inflows amounted to about $581 million, almost double the rate of the same 
period in 1977. The 1977 figure was led by a 122% increase in long-term 
private and public loans and credits, followed by an 84% increase in short­
term financing.
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Unfortunately, in many respects, Thailand's capital accounts took it on 
the chin in 1978. Following a promising first half of the year when the net 
capital inflows exhibited year on quarter increases of 81Z and 135Z, respec­
tively, the second half of 1978 recorded declines of 39Z and 76Z. Although 
this trend took a turn for the better in the first quarter of 1979, up 
nearly 22Z over the fourth quarter of 1978, net capital Inflows still dis­
played a year on quarter decline of almost 65Z. For all of 1978, net capital 
Inflows registered a 6Z increase to $730 million, compared with a 51Z Increase 
in 1977.
The rapid slowdown in net capital inflows is primarily the result of a 
heightened sense of investor insecurity surrounding Thailand's continuing 
border problems, viz. the conflict between Vietnamese forces and the 
Khmer Rouge, as well at the latent fear among many within the business 
community of Vietnamese adventurism into Thailand itself. Nowhere are these 
fears more amply demonstrated than in the capital accounts. On the 
year, total direct foreign investment declined by over SOZ to around $50 
million, compared with 1977 when foreign investment rose by 34% to 
$106 million. In fact, by the fourth quarter of 1978, direct foreign 
Investment actually recorded a net outflow of $13 million. Although 
there has been some improvement in the first quarter of 1979, the year 
on quarter results show an 112 decline over the same period last year.
The slowdown in direct foreign Investment was, however, in part offset by 
an 8% net increase in long term credits to official enterprises to $250 
million, compared with 160Z rise in 1977. Not surprisingly, however, net 
inflows of private long-term credit declined by nearly 21Z to $34 million, as 
against a 26% increase in 1977 when net long-term private credits totalled
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$43 million. The single largest Increase, however, was a whopping 6852 
rise In net long-term government loans totalling nearly $300 million. This 
rather large Increase was, for the most part, necessitated by the slow­
down in agricultural output which seriously retarded the growth In export 
receipts.
In all, Thailand exhibited an overall balance of payments deficit 
of $652 million— a 762 deterioration over 1977. This situation appears to 
have improved somewhat In the first quarter of 1979, however, as before, 
this Improvement is still considerably below performance levels of a year 
earlier.
4. International Reserves
Not withstanding the recent deterioration in Thailand's overall balance 
of payments and chronic trade deficits, the country's total International 
reserve position totalled $2.1 billion by year end, i.e. 4.6 months import 
cover, and an increase of $200 million over the end-1977 figure. This 
Improvement is surprising especially In light of the fact that the balance 
of payments deficit for 197B was around $650 million. To some extent, the 
discrepancy is accounted for by continued drawings on various IMF facilities 
to finance its balance of payments deficit. In October, 1979, total inter­
national reserves stood at around $2.1 billion.
The current situation viz. the country's International reserves 
situation, highlights a deteriorating trend which began in 1972. In 
that year, monthly Import cover stood at 8.6. Since that time, this 
relationship has eroded by nearly 502 to its current 4.6, which, nonetheless, 
can be regarded as adequate import coverage. Although this trend is likely 
to continue certainly through 1979, and possibly into the early 1980's, 
government efforts to develop its natural gas reserves as an energy offset
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to the country’s oil imports, as well as Thailand’s continued excellent 
International credit rating, would seem to Indicate that this downward 
trend is on the verge of a significant reversal.
5. External Debt
From the point of view of economic performance, as well as an 
exceptional credit record, recent Increases in Thailand's external debt 
position have prompted little concern, either privately or officially. 
Although the recent upward trend in total external Indebtedness (public 
and private) has exhibited considerable growth in recent years (up 23% 
annually since 1973). By as late as 1978, this figure was still less 
than 10% of GDP. Between 1973 and 1978, Thailand's external debt rose by 
about 200% to $2.8 billion, with the public portion increasing by 300% 
to $1.8 billion. Prior to 1977, privately held external debt comprised 
the bulk of the country's total external indebtedness.
There are basically three underlying factors which account for 
these comparative and absolute changes in Thailand’s external indebtedness 
since 1973. In the first place, the four-fold increase in the price of 
petroleum impoTts in 1973 placed severe strains on Thailand's current 
account situation. Larger deficits had to be financed largely by foreign 
capital inflows and, as a result, total external debt Increased in 1974 grew 
by 28%, from $906 million to $1.2 billion. Of this additional $255 million 
in debt, approximately 31% was accounted for by official borrowings, the 
rest being assumed by the private sector. From 1975 on this percentage 
did a complete turnaround and by 1977, largely as a result of an increase 
in government expenditures for economic development, nearly 85%, or $275 
million, was accounted for by public borrowings. Since 1977, however, much 
of the increase in new foreign debt was the result of poor crop yields and a
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relative decline in export earnings. Largely as a result of the continued 
poor performance in agricultural sector, which resulted in a $1.4 billion 
trade deficit, Thailand’s external public debt grew by over 56Z in 1978 to 
$1.8 billion. This figure, amounted to roughly 8Z of GDP, compared with 
5.6Z in 1977.
III. Outlook
Economic development in Thailand seems critically dependent upon 
four factors: a) recovery and growth in the agricultural sector; b) fav­
orable world economic conditions; c) the development of natural resources, 
particularly natural gas; d) a stable investment climate.
As is abundantly clear by the foregoing discussion, agricultural growth 
has been an essential element of overall national economic growth. In one 
respect, this was a natural consequence of agriculture's preeminent position 
in the domestic economy, but more importantly, as the country's historically 
dominant source of foreign exchange earnings. Failure in this sector places 
clear restrictions on the government's ability to meet its development 
financing objectives.
Despite being one of the top three exporters of rice in the world, as 
well as the world's leading exporter of tin, Thailand has surprisingly 
little influence over movements in commodities prices. It is, perhaps, 
for this reason that government planning officials have deemed it necessary 
to broaden the country's industrial base. Be that as it may, favorable 
world prices for Thailand's major export commodities is essential if the 
country is to achieve adequate levels of growth and development for the fore­
seeable future.
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There is little doubt that the development of Thailand’s natural gas 
reserves will have a considerably beneficial impact upon economic growth.
The Natural Gas Orgnalzatlon estimates, for example, that known reserves 
in the Gulf of Thailand are approximately 7.6 trillion cubic feet; about 
20 years' reserves, as estimates are presently made. Once the gas is 
used commercially in power plants and Industries, Thailand should by able 
to reduce its Imports of crude oil by, perhaps, as much as 25%. However, 
the avoidance of sectoral Imbalance arising therefrom is an issue which 
rightly is a concern of the country's development planners. To this end, 
there appears to be little doubt that, correctly, the government does not 
consider natural gas as a panacea for all its economic and social problems.
In economic terms Thailand's economic future is bright, however if 
success is to be achieved within a reasonably short period of time, it 
will be essential that a stable climate for foreign and domestic invest­
ment prevail. The present administration has shown that it is not only 
amenable to the concerns of busineas, but also that it has the political 
and economic acumen to successfully achieve what appear to be equitable and 
stable growth objectives. It is, therefore, essential that political 
developments both within and without Thailand's borders be monitored closely.
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ROYAL KINGDOM OF THAILAND 
ECONOMIC DATA SHEET
Area. Population. Income per Capita 
. Area
. Population!./
Total (1977)
Growth (1975-1977)
. GDP/GNP per capita
Gross Domestic Product!/
. Current prices ($ billions)
. Constant 1975 prices 
($ billions)
. Constant prices (Z change)
Inflation!/
. Consumer prices (Z change) 
Government Finance ($ millions).!/
. Deficit (-) or Surplus
1975
14.539
14.539 
7.7
1975
4.1
1975 
-367 
1,914— Revenues
— Expenditures (recurrent
and capital) -2,2B1
Balance of Payments ($ millions)!/
. Merchandise Trade Balance
— Exports, f.o.b. 
— Imports, f.o.b.
. Current account balance
. Overall balance
1975
-989.3
2,177.0
-3,166.3
-606.9
-140.4
198,500 square miles
44.16 millions 
2.7 percent
483 dollars
1976 1977 1978
16,283 18,159 21,785
15,737 16,707 18,358
8.2 6.2 8.7
1976
5.0
1976
-791
2,133
-2,925
1977
7.2
1977
-598
2,638
-3,286
1976 1977
-543.4 -1,255.2
2,958.9 3.454.1
-3,502.3 -4,706.6
-440.1 -1,097.9
-4.1 -369.3
1978
7.9
1978
-660
3,190
3,850
1978
-1,356.6
4,033.8
-5,390.4
-1,134.0
-652.2
ROYAL KINGDOM OF THAILAND 
ECONOMIC DATA SHEET
5. Balance of Payments (continued)
1975 1976 1977 1978^ /
. Int'l. Reserves 1,775 1,893 1,915 2,121
. Monthly Import Cover 7.5 7.2 5.4 4.6
6. International Reserves!/
. Total ($ millions; March 1979) 2,250
. Import cover (in months) 4.6
7. External Debt!./ 2/
19781975 1976 1977
. Total, disbursed public 
only ($ millions) 615.5 821.7 1,050.6 1,777.1
. Debt service (principal 
and interest) 73.2 87.7 126.5 186.3
. Debt service ratio (%) 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.3
1/Source: International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics,
November, 1979.
2/Source: Bank of Thailand. Monthly Bulletin, Mnvr1979.
3/Source: World Bank. World Debt Tables-Supplements. October 15.1979.
4/All dollar figures for 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 were obtained using
the exchange rates were Baht 20.379, 20.400, 20.400 and 20.390, respectively.
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Appendix II: selected Economic indicators
Because of the fact that economic indicators continue to 
comprise tue focal point of most risk analysis, the following 
is a Brief uiscussiun of tne most coumonly chosen indicators 
used to examine tne health anu vigor of a country's economy.
Tne Deot aervice Ratio
The deot service ratio is tne most commonly used 
indicator of a country's anility to service its external Ueot 
ooligations. it is defined as tne ratio of annual interest 
payments and principal repayments on external deot to the 
annual earnings from exports of goods ana services. As a 
practical matter, the value of tne ratio is likely to vary, 
even widely, from year to year.
The underlying rationale for the use of this ratio is 
that an increase in the oeot service ratio suggests an 
increased vulneraoility to foreign exchange crises. This is 
so oecause declines in a country's udiiity to generate tne 
hard currency needed to service foreign uebt must oe 
compensated for ay a reduction in international reserve 
noloings, a rise in capital imports, a reduction in imports, 
or sane combination of these. Since in any given year ueot 
servicing represents a fixeu obligation then the higher the 
ratio the greater is the relative ourden on import reduction, 
etc.
174
it is often taken as a rule of thumb among, especially, 
commercial oankers cliat a deot service ratio oelow, say, 10 
percent is considered favorable. Should the ratio rise aoove 
20 percent then the situation is taken to oe of a potentially 
serious nature. Unfortunately, taken by itself the debt 
service ratio is not a particularly goou indicator of a 
country's ability, and certainly not of its willingness, to 
meet its external ueot obligations. in tne first place, the 
debt service ratio is simply an indicator of tne proportion 
of foreign exchange earnings relative to tne particular 
demand on those earnings. If excnange earnings are high 
relative to import demand then a high uebt service ratio can 
be maintained. For some countries a uign deot service ratio 
may indicatre a better chan average ability to attract 
foreign capital ana manage its external deot. Countries with 
a goou credit stanuing in international credit markets may oe 
abre to finance a high ueot service througn increased 
borrowing. Moreover, a suuuen drop in the ratio may indicate 
an inability to meet deot servicing ability. Inueed, in 
looking at performance, technically the ueot service ratio is 
computed on tne basis of disbursed deot service payments and 
not on payments due; therefore, if a country has been unable 
to meet its obligations then tne ratio will crop. If the 
debt service ratio is nigh, then one might look at the uegree 
of compressibility of imports. A reduction in imports can 
perhaps facilitate resolution of an immediate uebt repayment 
problem. Finally, the level of reserves that a country can
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draw upon during a perxoo of low exchange earnings can ,jg a 
mitigating factor.
The several shortcomings of looking at the oeot service 
ratio as an analytical tool nave been commented upon widely. 
It is, nonetheless, a fact that although the ratio is not 
meaningful for all countries in all circumstances, it remains 
a significant inuicator of future debt servicing ability for 
the more or less hundreo or so countries in the income range 
of $200 to $2,UGU per capita using 1575 as the oase year.
The following groups of countries illustrate examples 
wnere the use of the ratio can oe misleading. first, the 
developed market economies (lb or so countries with per 
capita income of $5,000 or more) unlike developing countries, 
can usually resort to large short-term credit lines availaole 
from the international Monetary funu, the Group of Ten, or, 
as in the case of tne memoers or rue European Economic 
Community, tneir fellow memoers. On the other hand, a large 
proportion of tnese countries' external debts is snort-term 
and they are rolled over every year. Repayments of principal 
are tnus relatively small, and so is the debt service ratio 
despite tne size of tne deot. finally, major sorrowers m  
tne developed countries —  the government, banks, large 
corporations —  are often important lenders on world 
financial markets. Consequently, they can draw on tneir 
foreign assets when the need arises. in the case of 
developed countries, tne debt service ratio may appear to oe 
high in scxne cases while at the same time they are net 
lenders aoroad.
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Secondly, some of tne oil exporting countries are net 
lenders and can draw on tneir foreign assets relatively 
easily.
Thirdly, tne communist countries within the Soviet sphere, 
menders of die Council of !;utual Economic Assistance, and the 
People's Republic of China, can and do compress imports with 
greater ease, or more drastically, to the extent desired by 
the state, than can countries more directly responsive to an 
electorate and marxet allocation of resources.
Finally, some twenty-nine or so developing countries 
(less than $20U per capita income in li/75) usually have a low 
deot service ratio, not merely Decause they 'nave small 
foreign ueuc out oecause tney are so poor tiiat tney have no 
access to private external capital. in their case, in spite 
of tne low ueot service ratio, the risk is very high.
Thus tne uebt service ratio .nay oe misleading as an 
indicator of country risk for developed market economies, oil 
exporting countries, the communist oloc countries, and tne 
poorest, least oevelopeu countries. Tne ratio is more 
meaningful wnen applieu to the hundred or so remaining 
developing countries with per capita incomes of Detween $20u 
ana $2,0UU using 1975 as a oenchmark.
Exports of goous and services (in the denominator) are 
the main source of foreign exchange. It is important to 
determine tne pattern, staoility, and growth of the country's 
exports. Here again it is uesiraole to collect figures for, 
say, a five year period, ana real yrowtn shoulu oe
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distinguished from possibly transitory price effects. A good 
track record on export growth is a key factor when looking at 
country risk.
In general, it is important to look at tne composition 
of exports and to know wnether tne country has a diversified 
range, or an increasingly diversified range, of export 
products wnich makes it less dependent on adverse trends in 
tne aei idiio or price of a singe principal export or any one of 
its exports. If a country depends on one product for export, 
any cnange in tiie world oemanu or price of that commodity can 
severely affect the foreign exchange earnings of the country.
It is also important to xnow wnat portion of total 
exports is made up of manufactured goods. This is a goou 
indication of the country's level of development, as well as 
an indication of diversity of export earnings. A nigh share 
of manufactured goods tends to assure greater stability and 
sustained! growth of export revenues, unless international 
economic conditions became widely unfavorable. Generally 
speaking a growing manufacturing industry backed oy a good 
agricultural sector is an indication of potential growth and 
economic strength.
One of the snorteamings in attempting to use the debt 
service ratio is tnat published data on deot often include 
only government ana government guaranteed deot. Significant 
private external deot service ourden .nay exist aoout which 
information is not readily available, and there is wide 
variation among countries as to the ratio of private and 
public deot to the total.
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Tne Katio of Total External Debt to Exports
The shortcomings of the debt service ratio have led to
the use of additional ratios eitner to compliment it or, in
seme instances, to substitute for it. One such ratio is 
total external deot (public and private) outstanding at the 
enu of a given year as a percentage of total export earnings
for the same year. This indicator attempts to capture the
importance of foreign debt in relation to the size of an 
economy's external sector thus suggesting a country's aoility 
to service its ooliyations. From a statistical point of 
view, however, this indicator has been criticized since it 
relates a stocr; concept (debt) to a flow concept (exports) . 
Clearly the smaller the percentage of total external debt to 
total exports the oetter.
The Katio of Total external beat to GbP
A third indicator is tne ratio of total external debt 
outstanding at tne end of a given year to the total output of 
an economy during tne same year. Gross national Product 
(CUP) is tne total output of yooas and services of a goven 
country. Wmle not a direct measure of repayment capacity, 
it is a measure of a country's economic status because 
standard of living, investment, consumption, and aggregate 
growth depend upon real output that it generates. Tne GtiP 
can tnerefore be used as a yardstick to measure the size of 
the local market anu thus the diversity of investment or 
lending opportunities offeree oy the country.
The underlying rationale for the use of this indicator
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is similar to that for tne oeot/export ratio. The ratio has 
been criticized, however, since it relates the external deot 
of a country to a variaole which itself is only indirectly 
connected to a country's aoility to generate the requisite 
foreign exchange. wnat is more, in so far as this indicator 
does nave something to say aoout the likelihood of a debt 
servicing crisis tne question inevitaoly arises as to wnetner 
the Gross domestic Product in the denominator is not 
preferaole to the GtiP.
The hatio of international deserves to imports
Sometimes referred to as the "liquidity ratio" this 
indicator is meant to illustrate a country's aoility to 
withstand temoorty fluctuations in foreign exchange earnings. 
The total international reserves of a country include its 
gold nolamys, special drawing rights, reserve position in 
the Ific, and foreign exchange holdings. As a general rule, 
countries with large international reserve levels will also 
oe founa to oe practicing good economic management in otner 
respects as well. As one wouio expect, tne higner the ratio 
of international reserves to imports the greater is a 
country’s capacity to service its external ueot. Reserves 
adequate to cover three months of imports are generally 
considered satisfactory.
It should oe cautioned, and it represents a practical 
assessment proolem, tnat most sources of data on reserves 
yield gross rather than net figures, that is, the short-term 
liabilities of the exchange authority are not taken into 
account. Such liabilities could represent a significant lien
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against the country's liquid foreign assets.
The Growth Kate of Exports
A fifth indicator, the rate of growth of exports, is 
almost self explanatory. As was alreauy mentioned, exports 
represent a country's principal source of hath currency from 
abroau. If foreign exchange earnings do not expand at a rate 
sufficient to meet not only its external deot servicing 
requirements out also to satisfy import requirements 
associateo with growth in domestic income and savinys, then 
tne country will almost certainly experience growth spasms 
ana deot crises. Of course, the severity of these
possibilities rests in larye part with the degree of import 
compressionity attainable within a particular country,
although it should oe oovious that as a general rule the 
higher the growth rate of exports the less likely will be the 
prooaoility of a country experiencing difficulties in 
servicing its external deot.
Tne Katio of i;njx>rts to GAP
a sixth coauioniy used indicator is the ratio of imports 
to GhP. imports are, of course, the principal cause of 
foraiyn excnange expenditure. It is, therefore, essential to 
determine now large they are, wnat die trend is, anu what
Kinas of goods comprise the imports. imports of a large
voiume of capital goods, particularly over a period of time, 
would indicate emphasis on ana prospects for future 
development. if imports are made up of significant amounts 
of consumer and luxury goods, it would be useful to estimate
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tne "compressibility" of imports, i.e. to what extent coulu 
imports be curtailed if necessary in order to permit 
repayment of foreign debt during periods of adverse 
circumstances in tne external sector.
Because of tne fact that in many LDb's a large 
proportion of imports is comprised of capital and 
intermediate goods, tnis ratio tends to reflect a aeyree of 
rigidity since import reductions imply lower real growth and 
nigner unemployment. dmce unemployment is a cost not 
readily tolerateu it is likely that the nigher tne import/GhP 
ratio tne greater will oe the probability of shore-run deot 
servicing difficulties.
Ber Capita GLB
Another commonly used indicator is GhP per capita. This 
measure is utilized under tne presumption that the lower is 
per capita income in a country the less flexibility for 
reducing comsurnption in times of crises, and tne more likely 
tne possibility of repayment problems.
An interesting snortcominy of this measure is that it 
gives no indication of the distribution of income. It is 
often tne case tnat countries with nigh per capita income .nay 
have a narrow distribution of wealth and thus be more subject 
to class tensions and potential conflict while countries with 
lower out more evenly distributed per capita income posess a 
more stable social environment. on tne other nanu, as an 
economic indicator, high per capita income suggests a greater 
ability to service external debt obligations.
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Ai'i Index of Export Fluctuation
Another useful indicator is an index of export 
fluctuation. The idea here is that stable export earnings 
are less vulneraole to foreign exchange crises and can 
therefore tolerate nigher debt service ratios.
The Ratio of "hon-Compress iole Imports" to Total Imports
As was mentioneu aoove, it is useful to have some
estimate of import coi.ipressioility, i.e. tne extent to which
it is possible to contract imports with a minimum of 
sacrifice in economic growth. Compressiole imports are 
usually identified with luxury consumer goous, while non­
cat press iole imports relate to capital goods, intermediate 
goous, ana fooa stuffs. The ratio of non-compressible 
imports to total imports is .meant to capture the degree to 
which iiaj-xjrts .nay oe reduced in time of oalance of payments 
crises. Clearly, the ni-ner is tnis ratio the less aole is a 
country to reduce its consumption in oruer to service its 
external ueot obligations.
Tne natio of Ueot Amortization to Total External Deot
Another important ratio is that of deot amortization to 
totai. outstanding uebt, i.e. the inverse of the "average"
maturity of outstanding loans. A low value for this ratio
suggests a predominance of long-term liabilities wnich may 
suggest tnat there is little short-run fiexioility in 
reducing deot commitments oy temporarily reducing overseas 
borrowing. This ratio is useful in helping to identify 
potential difficulties associateu with the bunching of
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maturities. But it does not follow, of course, that because 
maturities are bunched that deot servicing difficulties are 
inevitable or probable. The bunching of debt maturities may 
cause not deot servicing problems if the country is able to 
earn relatively substantial amounts of foreign excnange from 
exports of goods and services, attract large amounts of
capital in the form of direct investments or new, perhaps
refinanced, loans, or if it has large foreign exchange
reserves. hnat is more, tne absence of short-term
liabilities may in fact suggest that a country does not have
access to short-term capital markets, suggesting that a 
particular country is not deemed "credit worthy." Tne lack 
of a good reputation maxes it more difficult for a country to 
Obtain capital on snort notice in the event of short-fails in 
foreign earnings, in which case rescheduling is likely to 
follow.
additional Considerations
In some economies significant real growth nas been 
accompanied oy what would normally be regarded as high rates 
of inflation. in such cases, the record of other economic 
variables may overcome the usual inverences about high 
inflation rates. as a general rule, low rates of inflation 
are a more favorable indicator because they reflect prudent 
monetary and fiscal policy and are an indication of economic 
stability.
The consumer price index is one good yardstick of 
inflation within a country that can be applied generally for 
inter-country comparison. .another measure is the wholesale
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price index which tends to point to future price developments 
and may be revealiny with respect to the competitiveness of 
exports as well.
A country witn high rates of inflation, among other 
things, is lively to oe much more prone to currency
devaluations, thus increasing the local cost of repaying and 
servicing loans denominated in dollars or other currencies, 
not to mention tne possiole social implications of higher 
prices for essential imports. haturaliy, it is important to 
determine wnetner the hiya rates of inflation are in an 
increasing or a decreasing phase.
In addition, there is tne aoded consideration of deot 
relief througn inflation worldwide. It has oeen argued, for 
example, that the rise, in export prices of the higher- anu 
middle-income KOLDC's provided substantial reductions in the 
buruen of external oeot servicing. it would appear,
therefore, tnat a consioeration of relative price changes 
does indeed constitute a relevant aspect of the rescheduling
OEOCGSS •
/mother indicator, called tne investment ratio, is the 
country's investment as a percentage of Gl.P. This ratio, 
depending upon tne uiarginai efficiency of capital, can 
daaonstrafe the stimulus tnat exists for economic uevelopment 
and prospective growth. It is adviseaole to use net
investment, however, ana not gross investment in order to
eliminate replacement investment. When gross investment is 
equal to replacement investment tnen the state of an economy
coulu ix; considered stagnant, although the replacements are 
probably technologically superior and inay tnerefore stimulate 
economic growth.
Generally speaking, tne larger tne share of investment 
in GhP the greater the proportion of total activity that is 
devoted to expanding plane ana equipment, thus assuring 
future growth. Individual countries sometimes have displayed 
nigh investment ratios without showing the usual accompanying 
dynamism. ordinarily there are special pricing or taxing 
reasons for this. Investment goods may bear a heavily 
unfavoraole exchange rate for imports and/or they may bear 
inordinately iiign, protected domestic producer prices.
If a country channels a significant protion of its 
activity into capital formation, prospects for the servicing 
and repayment of ueuts are likely to oe oetter over time. A 
rise in the new investment ratio from under 12 percent to 20 
percent within a five-year period woulo oe an unusually good 
inuication of a country's efforts towards development. In 
rapidly expanding economies, investment ratios of between 20 
percent ana 30 percent are not unusual.
It is very useful to examine the history of a currency's 
exchange rate fluctuations, particularly the number and 
magnitude of devaluations over, say, a ten year period. 
During the system of fixed exchange rates the infrequent 
cases of a borrower's currency appreciating was an especially 
positive indicator of the financial quality of the country 
and reuuceo the burden of generating the local currency 
needed for conversion to make foreign payments. Under a
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managed float where greater attention is given to baskets of 
key trading partner currencies, it is necessary to take an 
even closer look at tne underlying economic forces affecting 
exchange rate fluctuations. It may oe the consequence of 
weakness in the partner's currency rather than general 
strength in the country that is involved.
By examining the frequency and the magnitude of 
devaluations tne analyst can draw inferences about tne 
country's economic management, future trends in the rate for 
the currency, anu, after looking at one domestic situation as 
well, the degree of difficulty for the oorrower in amassing 
the larger amounts of local funds to convert for foreign 
payment.
Ouservation of the exchange rate behavior illustrates 
the oovious inadequacy of looking at a single variaole ana 
tne necessity of looking behind the raw data. A steadily 
depreuiating rate witn relatively modest immediate impact, 
what is sometimes referred to as a "crawling peg," may well 
represent efficient economic management and the rnaintainance 
of appropriate relationships between domestic and 
international price levels. By contrast, an exchange rate 
with a prolonged record of stability may, in fact, Decome 
increasingly overvalued, with internal and external prices 
increasingly our of line with tne probabilities of a sharp 
devaluation imminent.
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Appendix III: Business International Checklist
Country Ratedi
Political-Legal-Social Factors
1) Political Stability
a. Long-term stability guaranteed
b. Strong government but vulnerable institutions
c. Active internal factions
d. Strong probability of Overthrow (external
and internal)
2) Probability of Nationalization
a. No threat
b. State participation in selected firms
c. Full takeover of specific firms
d. Nationalization of key sectors
e. Large-scale nationalization
3) Restrictions on Capital Movements 
No restrictions on any transfersa.
b.
c.
d.
Minimum controls
Limits on certain inflows and/or outflows 
Strict resteictions on remittances and 
repatriation 
e. No transfers permitted
h) Desire for Foreign Investment
a> No restriction on any type of foreign 
investment
b. Favorable climate with incentives
c. Selective investment policy
d. Lukewarm climate for foreign capital
e. Hostile foreign investment climate
5) Limits on Foreign Ownership
a. No ceiling on foreign equity percentage
b. Desire but no requirements for local equity
c. Local majority required in many or key
industries
d. Strict joint venture requirements
e. Only foreign minority position tolerated
Score
( ) 15 
( ) 10
( ) 
( )
5
2
( ) 15
( ) 12
( ) 9
( ) 6
( ) 3
( ) 15
( ) 12
( ) 9
( ) 6
( )
( ) 10
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( )
8
6
4
2
( ) 10
( ) 8
( ) 6
( ) 
( )
continued
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Political-Legal-Social Factors (cont'd.)
6) Limits on Expansion of Foreien-Owned Firms
a. No government restrictions on expansion
b. Obstacles to expansion, e.g. antitrust,
environment
c. Limits on specific industrial sectors
7) Government Intervention in Business
a. Free enterprise system
b. Limited government controls, e.g. price
controls
c. Strong but selective government intervention
d. Tightly controlled economy
8) Likelihood of Internal Disorder and Vandalism
a. No threat of disorder
b. Isolated cases of unrest
c. Strong possibility of vandalism, kidnappings
d. Probability of social revolution or civil war
9) Delays in Getting Approval
a. No red tape
b. Occasional delays
c. Exasperating red tape
10) Cultural Interaction
a. Easy to grasp cultural and business concepts
b. Difficult to establish confident rapport
c. Impossible to assimilate country's culture
Totali
Commercial Factors Score
1) Present Market Size as Indicated by GNP
a. Above $500 billion ( ) 12
b. $l00-$500 billion ( ) 9
c. $50-$100 billion ( ) 6
d. $10-$50 billion ( ) 3
e. Less than $10 billion ( ) 1
2) Annual Average Real GNP Growth (last five years)
a. High growth (above Q%) ( ) 6
b. Good (5^-8^) ( ) 4
c. Moderate (3$-5$) ( ) 2
d. Poor (less than J?°) ( ) 1
3) Annual Average Real GNP Growth (next five years)
a. High growth (above 8£) ( ) 8
b. Good (5%-8f») ( ) 6
c. Moderate (3#-5$) ( ) *■
d. Poor (less than 35») ( ) 2
4) Present Market Sophistication as Indicated bv 
Income per capita
a. Above $5,000 ( ) 12
b. $3,000-$5,000 ( ) 9
c. ! >2,000-$3•000 ( ) 6
d. $1j 000-$2,000 ( ) 3
e. Less than $1,000 ( ) 1
5) Restrictions on Foreign Trade (next three years)
a. No restrictions ( ) 12
b. Minor restrictions ( ) 9
c. Substantial restrictions ( ) 6
d. Stiff restrictions ( ) 3
6) Availability of Local Capital (next three years)
a. Abundant and inexpensive ( ) 12
b. Available but costly ( ) 8
c. Difficult to get and costly ( ) 4
7) Availability of Labor (next five years)
a. Plentiful skilled and unskilled ( ) 12
b. Shortage of skilled labor ( ) 9
c. Tight and costly ( ) 6
d. Very tight ( ) 3
continued
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Commercial Factors (cont'd.)
8) Stability of Labor (next five years)
a. Very stable
b. Active unions but reliable labor
c. Frequent labor unrest
d. Continuous politically motivated strikes
9) Corporate Tax Level (next five years)
a. Low (income tax less than 35#)
b. Fair (income tax 35# to 50#)
c. High (income tax at least 50#)
10) Quality of Infrastructure (next five years)
a. Good services readily available
b. Adequate but specific shortcomings
c. Inadequate infrastructure
Total•
Monetary-Financial Factors
1) Annual Inflation (last three years)
a. Low (less than 4#)
b. Acceptable (4#-8#)
c. High (8#-15#)
d. Rapid (over 15#)
2) Annual Inflation (next three years)
a. Low (less than 4#)
b. Acceptable (4#-8#)
c. High (8#-15#)
d. Rapid (over 15#)
3) Number of Devaluations (past 10 years)
a. No devaluations
b. One to two devaluations
c. Three devaluations
d. Frequent, erratic devaluations
4) # of Devaluation (oast 10 years)
a. Zero
b. Up to 5#
c. 5# to 10#
d. 10# to 20#
e. Over 20#
5) Currency Forecast (next three years)
a. Continuously strong currency
b. Occasional weakening
c. Weak with predictable manipulations
d. Continuous depreciation expected
6) Overall Balance of Payments (past 10 years)
a. No deficit
b. One to three deficit years
c. Three to six
d. Over six
7) Overall Balance of Payments (next three years)
a. Strong with continuous surplusses
b. One to two expected deficits
c. Continuous deficit position
8) Reserves/import Ratio (past 12 months)
a. Highly favorable (three months or more)
b. Satisfactory (two to three months)
c. Unsatisfactory (less than two months)
Score
8
6
4
2
) 16 
) 10 
) 5 
) 2
5
4
3
1
5
4
3
2
1
) 16 
) 12 
) 8 
) 4
) 8 
) 6 
) 4 
) 2
) 12 
! I
6
4
2
continued
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Monetary-Financial Factors (cont'd.)
9) Reserves/imports Ratio (next 12 months)
a. Highly favorable (three months or over)
b. Satisfactory (two to three months)
c. Unsatisfactory (less than two months)
10) Convertibility in Foreign Currencies (next 
three years)
a. Freely convertible
b. Minor restrictions
c. Strict controls on specific transfers
d. Prior approval for all transfers
Total>
Appendix IV: Commercial Bank Checklist
Country Ratedi
Economic Factors
Internal Economic Factors Score
1) GNP as an Indicator of Market Size
a. Above $500 billion ( ) 10
b. $100-$500 billion ( ) 8
c. {!50-$100 billion ( ) 6
d. $10-$50 billion ( ) 4
e. Less than $10 billion ( ) 2
2) GNP per Capita as an Indicator of Market 
Sophistication
a. Above $5*000 ( ) 10
b. $3,000-$5,000 ( ) 8
c. $2* 000-$3* 000 ( ) 6
d. $500-$2,000 ( ) 4
e. Less than $500 ( ) 2
3) Annual Average Real GNP Growth (last 5 years)
a. High growth (above 8$) ( ) 10
b. Good (5$-8$) ( ) 8
c. Moderate (3#-5$) ( )- 6
d. Poor (less than 3$) ( ) 3
e. Negative ( ) 0
4) Annual Average Real GNP Growth (next 3 years)
a. High (above Q%) ( ) 10
b. Good (5$-8$) ( ) 8
c. Moderate (3$-5$) ( ) 6
d. Poor (less than % )  ( ) 3
e. Negative ( ) 0
5) Annual Inflation Rate (last 3 years)
a. Low (less than 4#) ( ) 10
b. Acceptable (4^-8$) ( ) 8
c. High (8$-20$) ( ) 6
d. Rapid (over 20$) ( ) 3
6) Annual Inflation Rate (next 3 years)
a. Low (less than 4$) ( ) 10
b. Medium (4#-8$) ( j 8
c High (8$-20$) ( ) 6
d. Rapid (over 20$) ( )
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Economic Factors (cont'd.)
7) Government Budget (last 5 years)
a. Surplus ( ) 10
b. Rough balance ( ) 8
c. Two to three deficits ( ) 6
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
8) Government Budget (next 5 years)
a. Surplus ( ) 10
b. Rough balance ( ) 8
c. Two to three deficits ( ) 6
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
9) Annual Average Gross Investment (last 5 years)
a. High (more than 20$) ( ) 10
b. Acceptable (12$ to 20$) ( ) 7
c. Low (less than 12$) ( ) ^
d. Negative ( ) 0
10) Annual Average Gross Investment (next 5 years)
a. High (more (more than 20$) ( ) 10
b- Acceptable (l2$-20$) ( ) 7
c. Low (less than 12$) ( ) 4
d. Negative ( ) 0
11) Number of Devaluations (past 10 years)
a> No devaluations ( ) 10
b. Predictable continuous "creeping peg" ( ) 8
devaluations
c. One to two devaluations ( ) 6
d. Three devaluations ( ) b
e. Frequent, erratic devaluations ( ) 2
12) Percentage of Total Devaluation (past 10 years)
a. Zero ( ) 10
b. Up to 10$ ( ) 8
c. 10$ to 20$ ( ) 6
d. 20$ to 30$ ( ) ^
e. Over 30$ ( ) 2
13) Currency Forecast (next 3 years)
a. Continuously strong currency ( ) 10
b. Occasional weakening in rate but no ( ) 8
significant change
c. Weak with predictable "creepint peg" ( ) 6
devaluations
d. Repeated depreciations expected ( ) **
e. Overvaluation due to governmental control ( ) 2
195
Economic Factors (cont'd.) Score
1*0 Convertibility in Foreign Currencies (next 
3 yearsT
a. Freely convertible ( ) 10
b. Minor restrictions ( ) 8
c. Strict controls on specific transfers ( ) 6
d. Prior find restrictive approval for all ( ) 3
transfers
e. Inconvertible ( ) 0
External Economic Factors
1) Annual Trade Balance (past 5 years)
a. Surplus ( ) 10
b. One or two deficits ( ) 6
c. Three or four deficits ( ) 4
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
2) Annual Trade Balance (next 5 years)
a. Surplus ( ) 10
b. One or two deficits ( ) 6
c. Three or four deficits ( ) 4
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
3) Import Compressibility
a. High compressibility ( ) 10
b. Moderate ( ) 6
c. Modest ( ) 4
d. Little or none ( ) 0
4) Current Account Balance (past 5 years)
a. Surplus in every year ( ) 10
b. One or two deficits ( ) 6
c. Three or four deficits ( ) 4
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
5) Current Account Balance (next 5 years)
a. Surplus in every year ( ) 10
b. One or two deficits ( ) 6
c. Three or four deficits ( ) 4
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
6) Overall Balance of Payments (past 5 years)
a. Surplus ( ) 10
b. One or two deficits ( ) 6
c. Three or four deficits ( ) 4
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
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External Economic Factors (cont'd.) Score
7) Overall Balance of Payments (next 5 years)
a. Surplus in every year ( ) 10
b. One or two deficits ( ) 6
c. Three or four deficits ( ) 4
d. Continuous deficits ( ) 2
8) Reserves/import Ratio (past 12 months)
a. Highly favorable (5 months or more) ( ) 10
b. Satisfactory (3 to 5 months) ( ) 8
c. Unsatisfactory (less than 3 months) ( ) 3
9) Reserves/import Ratio (next 12 months)
a. Highly favorable (5 months or more) ( ) 10
b. Satisfactory (3 "to 5 months) ( ) 8
c. Unsatisfactory (less than 3 months) ( ) 3
10) Debt Service Ratio (past 10 years)
a. Low (less than 10$) ( ) 10
b. Acceptable (10$-15$) ( ) 8
c. High (l5$-25$) ( ) 4
d. Alarming (more than 25$) ( ) 2
11) Debt Service Ratio (next 5 years)
a. Low (less than 10$) ( ) 10
b. Acceptable (10$-15$) ( ) 8
c. High (15/’—25$) ( )
d. Alarming (more than 25$) ( ) 2
Political-Legal Factors
1) Political Stability
a. Long-term stability probable ( ) 10
b. Strong government but vulnerable institutions ( ) 6
c. Activist internal opposition factions ( ) 4
d. Strong probability of overthrow ( ) 2
2) Likelihood of Internal Disorder
a. Little or no threat of civil unrest or ( ) 10
disorder
b. Isolated cases of unrest or disorder ( ) 8
c. Frequent cases of unrest or disorder ( ) 6
d. Probability of social revolution or civil war ( ) 2
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Political-Legal Factors (cont'd.)
3) government Intervention in Business Activity
Score
a. Basically a market economy or free ( ) 10 
enterprise system
b. Moderate government restrictive controls ( ) 8
c. Strong but selective government intervention ( ) 6
d. Tightly restricted economyf virtually ( ) 2
to operate
b) Climate for Foreign Investment
a. Favorable climate with promotional incentives ( ) 10
b. No restrictions on foreign investment ( ) 8
c. Selective investment policy ( ) 6
d. Lukewarm climate for foreign investment ( ) b
e. Hostile foreign investment climate ( ) 2
5) Limits on Foreign Ownership
a. No ceiling on foreign equity percentage ( ) 10
b. Local majority required in many or ( ) 6
key industries
c. Strict joint venture requirements ( ) b
d. No foreign minority position tolerated ( ) 2
6) Restrictions on Capital Movements
a. No restrictions on any transfers ( ) 10
b. Minimum controls ( ) 8
c. Limits on specific inflows or outflows ( ) 6
d. Strict restrictions ( ) b
e. No transfers permitted ( ) 2
7) Probability of Nationalization
a. No threat, or already nationally-owned ( ) 10
b. State participation in selected firms ( ) 6
or industries
c. Nationalization of key firms or industries ( ) b
probable
d. Large scale nationalization probable ( ) 2
8) Restrictions on Foreign Trade (next 3 years)
a. No restrictions ( ) 10
b. Minor restrictions ( ) 8
c. Significant restrictions ( ) b
d. Tight and pervasive restrictions ( ) 2
9) Corporate Tax Level
a. Low (income tax less than 35$) ( ) 10
b. Fair (income tax 35^-50^) 1 ) 8
c. High (income tax above 5°!«) ( ) b
Totali
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Appendix VI: Tables
Table 1. Exposure of U.S. Banks in Eastern Europe and Non- 
Oil Developing Countries, Relative to Capital 
(percentages, end year)
All Banks 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Value, 1! 
($millioi
Eastern Europe 16.7 15.8 16.1 13.9 12.9 8.9 6,278
Non-Oil LDS's 114.9 114.4 124.2 132.3 148.3 146.1 103,181
Sum 131.6 130.2 140.3 146.2 163.5 155.0 109,459
Mexico 27.4 23.4 23.0 27.6 34.3 '34.5 24,377
Brazil 29.4 28.6 27.3 25.4 26.9 28.9 20,438
Nine Largest Banks
Eastern Europe 25.0 23.5 23.9 21.8 19.5 13.9 4,045
Non-Oil LDC's 163.2 166.8 182.1 199.3 220.6 221.2 64,149
Sum 188.2 190.3 206.0 221.1 240.1 235.2 68,194
Mexico 32.9 30.4 29.6 37.8 44.4 44.4 12,262
Brazil 41.9 42.4 40.3 39.3 40.8 45.8 13,296
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Country Exposure
Lending Survey
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Table 2. Exposure as a Percentage of Capital, 
Major Banks, end-1982
Capital
Argn Braz Mexo Vnez Chil Total ($millions)
Citibank 18.2 73.5 54.6 18.2 10.0 174.5 5,989
BankAmerica 10.2 47.9 52.1 41.7 6.3 158.2 4,799
Chase Manhattan 21.3 56.9 40.0 24.0 11.8 154.0 4,221
Morgan Guaranty 24.4 54.3 34.8 17.5 9.7 140.7 3,107
Manufact. Hanover 47.5 77.7 66.7 42.4 28.4 262.8 2,592
Chemical 14.9 52.0 60.0 28.0 14.8 169.7 2,499
Conti. Illinois 17.8 22.9 32.4 21.6 12.8 107.5 2,143
Bankers Trust 13.2 46.2 46.2 25.1 10.6 141.2 1,895
First Natl. Chicago 14.5 40.6 50.1 17.4 11.6 134.2 1,725
Security Pacific 10.4 29.1 51.2 4.5 7.4 82.5 1,684
Wells Fargo 8.3 40.7 51.0 20.4 6.2 126.6 1,201
Crocker National 38.1 57.3 51.2 22.8 26.5 196.0 1,151
First Interstate 6.9 43.9 63.0 18.5 3.7 136.0 1,080
Marine Midland n.a. 47.8 28.3 29.2 n.a. n.a. 1,074
Mellon n.a. 35.3 41.1 17.6 n.a. n.a. 1,024
Irving Trust 21.6 38.7 34.1 50.2 n.a. n.a. 996
First Natl. Boston n.a. 23.1 28.1 n.a. n.a. 800
Interfirst Dallas 5.1 10.2 30.1 1.3 2.5 49.2 787
n.a. Not Available
a. Bank capital includes shareholders equity, subordinated notes, and 
reserves against possible loan losses.
b. Argn (Argentina), Braz (Brazil), Mexo (Mexico), Vnez (Venezuela), 
Chil (Chile).
Source: William R. Cline, International Debt and the Stability
of the World Economy, Institute for International Economics 
(September 1983).
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Table 3. Debt Ratios for all Developing Countries and
Ten Largest Debtors
Ten Largest Debtors
Exports Debt Debt/Exports 
($billions) (Times)
All Developing Countries 
Year Exports Debt Debt/Exports
($billions) (Times)
1973 $ 98.8 $135 1.37
1975 150.6 202 1.34
1977 211.0 305 1.45
1978 236.7 377 1.59
1979 311.3 442 1.42
1980 398.6 535 1.34
1981 410.0 624 1.52
1982 385.0 689 1.79
1983 380.0 730 1.92
1984e 400.0 790 1.97
83/73 14.4% 18.4% 3.5%
(% change per year)
28.3 $ 49 1.73
45.4 83 1.83
63.9 126 1.98
65.4 165 2.52
94.0 205 2.18
128.7 251 1.95
129.5 299 2.31
114.3 346 3.03
111.5 377 3.38
112.0 405 3.62
14.7% 22.6% 6.9%
Source: Nicocles L. Michas and Henry Wojtyla, "The Incredible
Growing EDC Debt Crisis," Rosenkrantz, Ehrenkrantz, Lyon & Ross 
Investment Strategy Special Report (March 9, 1984).
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Table 4. Total External Debt Ten Largest Debtors
Avg. Yr.
Country 1973 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983e 1984e % change
Mexico 8.6 16.9 27.1 33.6 40.8 53.8 67.0 84.6 90.0 90.0 26.0
Brazil 13.8 23.3 35.2 48.4 57.4 66.1 75.7 82.2 93.0 100.0 21.0
Argentina 6.4 7.9 9.7 12.5 19.0 27.2 35.7 38.0 40.0 42.0 20.0
Chile 3.2 5.4 5.6 7.9 9.5 11.4 15.6 17.2 18.0 19.0 18.9
Venezeula 4.6 5.7 12.3 16.3 23.7 27.5 29.3 31.3 31.0 32.0 21.0
Peru 1.4 4.0 5.7 6.4 7.9 9.2 10.0 11.2 13.0 14.0 25.0
Indonesia 5.7 8.9 12.8 14.5 14.9 17.0 18.0 21.9 26.0 30.0 16.4
Philippines 1.9 3.8 7.1 9.3 11.2 13.9 17.3 20.7 26.0 32.0 30.0
Egypt 2.2 5.9 10.0 12.9 15.4 17.8 20.3 21.8 24.0 26.0 27.0
Nigeria 1.2 1.1 0.9 3.3 5.2 7.1 9.9 11.2 16.0 20.0 30.0
TOTAL 49 83 126 165 205 251 299 346 377 405 22
% change 69.2 52.5 30.6 24.2 22.4 19.0 15.8 8.9 7.4
Source: Nicocles L. Michas and Henry Wbjtyla, "The Incredible Growing
LDC Debt Crisis," Rosenkrantz, Ehrenkrantz, Lyon & Ross Investment 
Strategy Special Report (March 9, 1984).
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Table 5. Indicators of External Debt, Non-Oil 
Developing Countries, 1973-82 
($billions and percentages)
1973 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982
External Debt
Total 130.1 228.0 396.9 474.0 550.0 612.4
Long-Term 118.8 194.9 338.1 388.5 452.8 499.6
Total, 1975 prices a. 169.0 218.0 294.7 308.6 331.3 357.8
Exports b. 112.7 181.7 333.0 419.8 444.4 427.4
Debt/Exports (%) 115.4 125.5 119.2 121.9 124.9 143.3
Debt Service c./Exports (%)
Reported 15.9 15.3 19.0 17.6 20.4 23.9
Adjusted d. n.a. 10.5 6.9 4.9 11.7 22.3
Debt/GDP (%) 22.4 25.7 27.5 27.6 31.0 34.7
Oil as % of Imports e. 5.9 15.6 16.2 20.4 21.0 19.0
n.a. Not Available
a. Deflating by U.S. wholesale prices.
b. Goods and Services.
c. Includes interest (but not anortization) on short-term debt.
d. Deducting the inflationary erosion of debt.
e. Net oil importers only.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1982 and 1983.
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Table 6. Impact of Higher Oil Prices on Debt of 
Non-Oil Developing Countries a. 
($billions)
Year
Oil Imports 
Actual(A) Hypothetical(B)
Additional Cost 
(C = A-B)
1973 4.8 4.8 0.0
1974 16.1 5.3 10.8
1975 17.3 5.7 11.6
1976 21.3 6.8 14.5
1977 23.8 7.5 16.3
1978 26.0 8.6 17.4
1979 39.0 10.9 28.1
1980 63.2 11.9 51.3
1981 66.7 12.1 54.6
1982 66.7 11.9 54.8
Total, 1974-82 344.9 85.5 259.5
a. Net oil importers only.
b. If oil prices had risen no more than the U.S. wholesale 
price index from 1973.
Source: William R. Cline, International Debt and the
Stability of the Wbrld Economy, Institute for International 
Economics, (September, 1983).
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Table 7. Impact of Exogenous Shocks on External Debt 
of Non-Oil Developing Countries 
($billions)
Effect Amount
Oil price increase in excess of U.S. inflation,
1974-82 cumulative a. $260
Real interest rate in excess of 1961-80 average:
1981 and 1982 41
Terms-of-trade loss, 1981-82 79
Export volume loss caused by world recession, 1981-82 21
Total $401
Memorandum items
Total debt: 1973 130
1982 612
Increase: 1973-82 482
a. Net oil exporters only.
Source: William R. Cline, International Debt and the
Stability of the Vforld Economy, Institute for international 
Economics (September, 1983).
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Table 8. Financial Rescue Packages for Argentina/ 
Brazil/ Mexico, and Yugoslavia 
($billions)
Argentina Brazil Mexico Yugoslavia
Financial Support 
IMF
Stand-by 
Extended Fund
1.7 - - 0.6
facility 
Compensatory finance
4.6 3.7 —
and other 0.5 1.3 0.22 -
World Bank
Bank for International
- - 0.3
Settlements 0.5 1.2 0.925 0.5
United States
Oil Payments - - 1.0 -
Commodity Credit - - 1.0 0.2
Federal Reserve - 0.4 0.925 -
Treasury — 1.53 - -
Private Banks,
new loans 
Government Trade
1.5 4.4 5.0 3.81
Credits - - 2.0 1.1
Total 4.25 13.4 14.7 6.5
Debt Rescheduling
Amount 5.5 4.9 19.5 n.a.
Originally Due 1982-83 long-term
1983
8/1982 to 
12/1984
n.a.
Coverage public public public n.a.
Pending negotiation all
private
n.a. 15.0
private
n.a.
- Zero or negligible, 
n.a. Not applicable.
a. Pressures on banks to maintain short-term credit lines.
b. New loans, $600 million; $1.4 billion to repay matured 
debt; $1.8 billion stretch-out of short-term loans.
Source: William R. Cline, International Debt and the
Stability of the World Economy, Institute for International 
Economics (September, 1983).
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Table 9. Matrix for Establishing Country 
Exposure Guidelines a.
Total of Overall
Country Indicator Indicator Indicator Ranks Rank
XI Rank X2 Rank X3 Rank1 1
1. Argentina 18,733 15 818 23 B 30 68 14
2. Australia 26,692 9 2,260 6 A 10 25 6
3. Austria 11,350 22 1,452 16 A 10 48 12
4.
•
Belgium 19,686 14 2,039 8 A 10 32 9
•
77. Venezeula 8,709 26 94 73 A 10 109 25
78. Vietnam 2,709 42 98 71 D 70 183 74
79. Yugoslavia 9,135 24 468 32 C 50 106 23
80. Zambia 1,175 57 298 41 B 30 128 50
a. All data hypothetical.
b. XI (GNP), X2 (exports), X3 (DSR).
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Table 10. Frank and Cline; Type 1^ and Type II Errors
Based Upon Discriminant Analysis Estimates a.
Type I Type II
3-Variable Case-Linear
Iteration 1 3 (23.1) 14 (10.6)
Iteration 10 1 ( 7.7) 25 (19.9)
2-Variable Case-Linear
Iteration 1 1 ( 7.7) 17 (12.8)
Iteration 10 0 ( 0.0) 26 (19.7)
3-Variable Case-Quadratic 1 ( 7.7) 21 (15.8)
2-Variable Case-Quadratic 0 ( 0.0) 12 ( 9.0)
a. Numbers in parenthesis are percentages.
b. Variables included: debt service ratio, real growth rate
of exports, an index of export fluctuation, "non-compressible 
imports"/total imports ratio, real per capita income, debt 
amortization/total external debt ratio, total imports/GNP 
ratio, and total imports/international reserves ratio.
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Table 11. Feder and Just: Type I_ and Type II Errors
Based Upon Logit Analysis Estimates
a b
Case (b) Case (c)
# Type I # Type II # Type I # Type II
P* Errors Errors Errors Errors
.10 0 10 0 11
.20 0 6 1 8
.30 1 6 2 7
.40 1 5 3 6
.50 2 4 4 6
.60 3 4 4 2
.70 5 1 5 1
.80 5 1 6 1
.90 7 1 8 1
a. Variables included: debt service ratio,
imports/reserves, income per capita, capital inflow/debt
service, and export growth.
b. Variables included: debt service ratio,
imports/reserves, income per capita, capital inflow/debt
service, GDP growth, and export growth.
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Table 12. Saini and Bates; Type I_and Type II Errors
Based Upon Discriminant and Logit Analysis Estimates
Discriminant Analysis:
Dependent Variable 1, 1960-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Logit Analysis;
Dependent Variable 1, 1960-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Discriminant Analysis;
Dependent Variable 2, 1960-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Logit Analysis:
Dependent Variable 2, 1960-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Discriminant Analysis;
Dependent Variable 2, 1960-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Logit Analysis;
Dependent Variable 2, 1960-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Type I Type II Total 
Errors Errors Errors
4 50 54
22 270 292
18% 18.5% 18.5%
7 49 56
22 270 292
32% 18% 19%
4 42 46
23 275 298
17% 15% 15.5%
4 53 57
23 275 298
17% 19% 19%
5 5 10
11 162 173
45% 3% 6%
5 8 13
11 162 173
45% 5% 7.5%
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Discriminant Analysis: 
Dependent Variable 2, 1971-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Logit Analysis:
Dependent Variable 2, 1971-77 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Discriminant Analysis: 
Dependent Variable 2, 1960-77 
Modified Procedure 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
Logit Analysis:
Dependent Variable 2, 1960-77 
Modified Procedure 
Number of Errors 
Number of Observations 
Error Rate
2 10 12
12 112 124
17% 9% 9.5%
1 11 12
12 112 124
8% 10% 9.5%
3 10 13
23 136 159
13% 7% 8%
2 14 16
23 136 159
9% 10% 10%
a. Dependent Variable 1 = debt rescheduling/nonrescheduling 
cases. Dependent Variable 2 = balance of payments support 
loans and involuntary debt reschedulings/voluntary 
rescheduling and nonrescheduling cases.
b. The modefied procedure replicates the procedure used by 
Feder and Just.
c. Error rates calculated by evaluating type I and type II 
errors with 5 to 1 weights, respectively.
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Table 13. Estimates of Cline's Logit Model 
of Debt Rescheduling a.
Model: A B C D E
Variable:
LDSR 10.000
(3.45)
o • • 11.029
(5.45)
• • • 12.405
(5.24)
LRSM -15.523
(3.85)
-12.148
(3.38)
-15.063
(4.18)
-10.189
(3.12)
-16.554
(4.19)
LINX -2.102
(0.43)
9.450
(2.41)
• • • • • • • • •
LAMZ -12.172
(2.18)
-1.532
(0.43)
-12.772
(2.70)
-1.157
(0.36)
-12.875
(2.48)
LSQCA -1.304
(2.04)
-1.074
(1.69)
-1.201
(1.99)
-0.932
(1.60)
-1.383
(2.16)
LSAV 0.424
(0.16)
-0.508
(0.21)
• « • • • • • • •
GRO -0.123
(3.10)
-0.129
(3.16)
-0.130
(3.36)
-0.139
(3.58)
-0.135
(3.25)
GDP 0.0001
(0.43)
0.0003
(1.17)
• • • • • • • • •
EXBOR -15.374
(3.04)
-23.496
(4.40)
-13.874
(3.72)
-21.466
(4.43)
-15.025
(3.74)
LNDX • • • 0.734
(1.92)
• • • 1.273
(4.15)
• • •
XGR • • • • • • • • • • • • -1.424
(0.94)
Observations 640 640 670 670 574
Reschedulings 22 22 22 22 20
Chi-Square b. 
Error (%):
772 762 812 795 700
Type I 9.1 18.2 9.1 13.6 10.0
Type II 13.6 14.6 13.0 16.1 12.5
a. t-statistic in parentheses.
b. Type I: Failure to predict actual rescheduling. Type
II: prediction of rescheduling when none occurs.
Cutoff=.041.
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a.
Table 14. Estimates of Cline's Logit Model of Rescheduling; 
Large Debtor Sample (31 countries)
Model L
Variable Coefficient
LDSR 12.77
(3.63)
LRSM -16.74
(3.02)
LAMZ -15.72
(2.25)
LSQCA -2.23
(1.92)
GRO -0.24
(2.93)
EXBOR -15.83
(3.08)
DMEX -0.97
(0.72)
Observations 362
Reschedulings 14
Chi-Square 442
Errors (%); b.
Type I 22.4
Type II 2.6
a. t-statistic in parentheses.
b. Cutoff probability = .24.
216
Table 15. Debt Rescheduling Cases
Argentina - 1976, 1982 
Bolivia - 1981 
Brazil - 1982 
Chile - 1982 
Costa Rica - 1982 
Ecuador - 1982 
Gabon - 1978 
Jamaica - 1978, 1981
Mexico - 1982 
Nicaragua - 1982 
Peru - 1976, 1978, 1982 
Philippines - 1982 
Sierra Leone - 1977, 1980 
Togo - 1979
Turkey - 1978-80, 1982
Zaire - 1976-77, 1979,
1981
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Tables 16. Countries Included in the Logit Analysis 
of Debt Rescheduling
Brazil 1976-82 Trinidad & Tobago 1979-82
Argentina 1976-82 Paraguay 1978-82
Chile 1978-82 Dominican Rep. 1978-82
Venezuela 1976-82 Panama 1978-82
Peru 1976-82 Nicaragua 1978-82
Bolivia 1978-82 South Korea 1976-82
Uruguay 1978-82 Turkey 1976-82
Colombia 1978-82 Togo 1977-80
Ecuador 1978-82 Sierra Leone 1977-82
El Salvador 1978-82 Gabon 1977-79
Mexico 1976-82 Ghana 1977-82
Indonesia 1976-82 Zaire 1977-82
Philippines 1976-82 Yugoslavia 1977-82
Egypt 1976-82 Thailand 1977-82
Nigeria 1976-82 Malaysia 1977-82
Costa Rica 1978-82 Burma 1977-82
Jamaica 1978-82
Table 17. Estimates of the Logit Model of
Debt Rescheduling: All Debtors
Variable Model IA Model IB
Intercept 0.007 -1.553
(0.00) (0.61)
DSR 0.014 -
(0.72)
RSM -0.075 -0.051
(5.58) (2.57)
I NX 0.958 -0.356
(4.15) (0.23)
AMZ 0.043 0.078
(1.32) (3.64)
SQCA 0.004 -0.004
(0.24) (0.23)
SAV -0.004 -0.007
(0.03) (0.08)
GRO -0.104 -0.095
(5.49) (4.60)
GDP -0.229 -0.151
(0.13) (0.05)
EXBOR -0.152 -0.125
(2.69) (1.71)
XGR -0.004 0.002
(0.08) (0.03)
NDX - 0.013
(6.19)
Observations 190 190
Reschedulings 26 26
Model Chi-Square (df) 40.58 (10) 46.69
D .368 .419
219
Table 18. Correlation Matrix of the Estimates:
All Debtors (DSR)
Inept GDP GRO SQCA DSR RSM XGR EXBOR AMZ SAV INX 
Inept 1.000 
GDP -0.088 1.000
GRO 0.257 0.005 1.000 
SQCA 0.232-0.062 0.303 1.000 
DSR -0.054-0.278 0.066-0.007 1.000
RSM -0.164 0.012 0.031-0.150-0.225 1.000
XGR -0.083-0.177-0.372-0.248-0.121 0.025 1.000
EXBR -0.863-0.095-0.145-0.146 0.127-0.012 0.085 1.000 
AMZ -0.098 0.045-0.258-0.150-0.130 0.069 0.105-0.062 1.000
SAV -0.156-0.139 0.014-0.014-0.106 0.047-0.107 0.048-0.521 1.000
INX -0.070 0.101-0.065 0.269-0.545-0.029 0.065-0.211 0.153 0.085 1.000
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Table 19. Correlation Matrix of the Estimates:
All Debtors (NDX)
Inept GDP GRO SQCA NDX RSM XGR EXBOR AMZ SAV INX 
Inept 1.000 
GDP -0.111 1.000 
GRO 0.230 0.020 1.000 
SQCA 0.218-0.061 0.306 1.000 
NDX -0.326-0.041 0.052-0.024 1.000
RSM -0.188-0.082 0.108-0.127 0.218 1.000
XGR -0.143-0.241-0.336-0.244 0.148 0.029 1.000
EXBR -0.841-0.057-0.156-0.134 0.115 0.002 0.105 1.000
AMZ -0.211 0.026-0.218-0.132 0.355 0.075 0.145-0.023 1.000
SAV -0.129-0.168 0.024-0.025-0.096 0.012-0.144 0.077-0.551 1.000
INX 0.170 0.018-0.077 0.170-0.814-0.268-0.079-0.184-0.194 0.080 1.000
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Table 20. Final Estimates of Logit Models IA and IB
Variable Model IA Model IB
Intercept 0.621 -4.983
(0.14) (32.76)
GRO -0.092 -0.097
(5.83) (5.79)
RSM -0.074
(6.14)
EXBOR -0.162
(3.40)
INX 1.176
(11.16)
NDX - 0.012
(19.47)
AMZ - 0.071
(4.27)
Observations 190 190
Reschedulings 26 26
Model Chi-Square (df) 37.61 (4) 38.52 (3)
D .442 .463
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at P*=.5 .847 .889
Errors (%):
Type I 13.1 10.1
Type II 71.4 27.3
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) .71<P*<.83 .863
b) .39<P*<.42 .895 
Errors (%):
Type I 13.8 9.1
Type II 0.0 28.6
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Table 21. Model IA Errors
p* Type 1
.00 0 ( - )
.05 1 (1.3)
.10 3 (2.6)
.15 5 (3.8)
.20 9 (6.3)
.25 9 (5.9)
.30 11 (7.0)
.35 16 (9.6)
.40 16 (9.4)
.45 21 (11.8)
.50 24 (13.1)
.55 25 (13.6)
.60 25 (13.3)
.65 25 (13.3)
.70 25 (13.7)
.75 25 (13.8)
.80 25 (13.8)
.85 26 (13.7)
.90 26 (13.7)
.95 26 (13.7)
1.00 26 (13.7)
Type II Total
164 (86.3) 164 (86.3)
90 (78.3) 91 (47.9)
53 (69.7) 56 (29.5)
39 (65.0) 44 (23.2)
30 (63.8) 39 (20.5)
21 (55.3) 30 (15.8)
18 (54.5) 29 (15.3)
13 (56.5) 29 (15.3)
10 (50.0) 26 (13.7)
7 (58.3) 28 (14.7)
5 (71.4) 29 (15.3)
5 (83.3) 30 (15.8)
1 (50.0) 26 (13.7)
1 (50.0) 26 (13.7)
1 (50.0) 26 (13.7)
0 (0.0) 25 (13.2)
0 (0.0) 25 (13.2)
0 ( - ) 26 (13.7)
0 ( - ) 26 (13.7)
0 ( - ) 26 (13.7)
0 ( - ) 26 (13.7)
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Table 22. Model IB Errors
p* Type I Type II Total
.00 0 ( - ) 164 (86.3) 164 (86.3)
.05 2 (2.7) 91 (79.1) 91 (47.9)
.10 6 (5.4) 58 (76.3) 64 (33.7)
.15 9 (6.5) 34 (66.7) 45 (23.7)
.20 11 (7.5) 28 (65.1) 39 (20.5)
.25 13 (8.1) 16 (55.2) 29 (15.3)
.30 15 (8.9) 11 (50.0) 26 (13.7)
.35 16 (9.2) 7 (41.2) 23 (12.1)
.40 16 (9.1) 4 (28.6) 20 (10.5)
.45 18 (10.1) 3 (27.3) 21 (11.1)
.50 18 (10.1) 3 (27.3) 21 (11.1)
.55 19 (10.5) 2 (22.2) 21 (11.1)
.60 20 (10.9) 1 (14.3) 21 (11.1)
.65 20 (10.9) 1 (14.3) 21 (11.1)
.70 22 (11.9) 1 (20.0) 23 (12.1)
.75 22 (11.8) 0 (0.0) 22 (11.6)
.80 23 (12.3) 0 (0.0) 23 (12.1)
.85 24 (12.8) 0 (0.0) 24 (12.6)
.90 25 (13.2) 0 (0.0) 25 (13.2)
.95 26 (13.8) 0 ( - ) 26 (13.7)
1.00 26 (13.8) 0 ( - ) 26 (13.7)
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Table 23. Final Estimates of Logit Models IAA and IBB
Variable Model IAA Model II
Intercept -1.229 -4.275
(1.72) (17.05)
INX 1.242 -
(11.19)
GRO -0.090 -0.092
(5.75) (5.30)
RSM -0.073 -0.069
(5.76) (4.66)
MEM5 1.062 -
(4.07)
OPECM -5.554 -
(4.15)
NDX - 0.011
(15.03)
MEM10 — 1.096
(4.13)
AMZ - 0.069
(3.98)
Observations 190 190
Reschedulings 26 26
Model Chi-Square (df) 41.88 (5) 48.04
D .458 .501
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at P*=.5 .863 .895
Errors (%):
Type I 11.1 9.5
Type II 45.5 20.0
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at:
a) .63<P*<.65 .874
b) .46<P*<.51 .905
Errors (%):
Type I 13.3 9.0
Type II 25.0 18.2
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Table 24. Final Estimates of Logit Madels IAAA and IBBB
Variable Model IAAA Model IBBB
Intercept -1.851 -5.476
(1.40) (10.82)
INX 2.429 -
(10.07)
GRO -0.083 -0.096
(2.06) (2.68)
RSM -0.096 -0.123
(3.01) (4.08)
MEM5 2.035 -
(5.35)
OPECM -10.779 -
(6.91)
III 0.013 0.016
(0.31) (0.45)
NDX - 0.015
(11.38)
MEM10 - 2.344
(7.11)
AMZ - 0.030
(0.18)
Observations 114 114
Reschedulings 17 17
Model Chi-Square (df) 32.75 (6) 34.36
D .551 .573
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Table 25. Final Estimates of Logit Models IIA and IIB
Large Debtors
Variable Model IIA Model IIB
Intercept 1.149 -5.904
(0.22) (17.69)
GRO -0.364 -0.325
(11.24) (7.86)
EXBOR -0.300
(4.54)
INX 1.638
(9.18)
NDX - 0.019
(12.11)
Observations 110 110
Reschedulings 14 14
Model Chi-Square (df) 33.28 (3) 40.19 (2)
D .570 .657
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at P*=.5 .891 .900
Errors (%):
Type I 8.8 7.1
Type II 37.5 36.4
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) .37<P*<.41 .900
b) .54<P*<.57 .918 
Errors (%):
Type I 7.1 11.1
Type II 36.4 0.0
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Table 26. Final Estimates of Logit Models IIIA and IIIB
Small Debtors
Variable Model IIIA f . Model IIIB
Intercept -2.636 -4.068
(4.70) (17.59)
INX 2.353
(9.13)
DSR -0.065
(3.32)
AMZ 0.065 0.074
(2.14) (3.74)
NDX - 0.009
(7.70)
RSM -0.110
(2.20)
Observations 80 80
Reschedulings 12 12
Model Chi-Square (df) 17.14 (4) 10.03 (2)
D .365 .299
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at P*=.5 .880 .867
Errors (%):
lype I 11.3 13.4
Type II 25.0 0.0
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) .41<P*<.56 .880
b) ,41<P*<.45 .880
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Table 27. Final Estimates of Logit Models IIAA and IIBB
Variable
Intercept
GRO
INX
OPECM
NDX
Observations
Reschedulings
D
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at P*=.5 
Errors (%):
Type I 
Type II 
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) .61<P*<.69
b) .47<P*<.89 
Errors (%):
Type I 
Type II
Model I IAA 
-1.691 
(1.90) 
-0.342 
(10.10) 
1.947 
(10.10) 
-11.662 
(5.97)
110
14
.595
.880
8.9
44.4
.910
9.4
0.0
Model IIBB 
-3.739 
(4.90) 
-0.332 
(7.25)
-8.670
(3.23)
0.019
(12.01)
110
14
.672
.936
5.1
18.2
.936
5.1
18.2
229
Table 28. Correlation Matrices of Significant Variables 
in Models IIAA and IIBB with Variable III
Model IIAA with Variable III
Intercept GRO OPECM INX III
Intercept 1.000
GRO -0.949 1.000
OPECM -0.847 0.970 1.000
INX -0.039 -0.275 -0.496 1.000
III -0.977 0.991 0.934 -0.168 1.000
Model IIBB with Variable III
Intercept GRO OPECM NDX III
Intercept 1.000
GRO -0.967 1.000
OPECM -0.966 0.993 1.000
NDX 0.841 -0.940 -0.945 1.000
III -0.985 0.986 0.980 -0.905 1.000
230
Table 29. Final Estimates of Logit Models
IIAAA and IIBBB
Variable
Intercept
OPECM
INX
III
NDX
Observations
Reschedulings
Model Chi-Square (df)
D
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at P*=.5 
Errors (%):
Type I 
Type II 
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) ,22<P*<.37
b) .33<P*<.49 
Errors (%):
Type I 
Type II
Model IIAAA 
4.514
(2.20) 
-46.205 
(6.88) 
7.034 
(5.09) 
-0.102 
(4.43)
68
10
42.21 (3) 
.799
.96
3.4
11.1
.985
0.0
9.1
Models IIBBB 
0.885 
(0.06) 
-29.481 
(5.79)
-0.093
(3.27)
0.036
(4.72)
68
10
41.80 (3) 
.794
.97
1.7
10.0
.985
0.0
9.1
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Table 30. Correlation Matrices of the Estimates
Intercept
OPECM
INX
III
Intercept
NDX
OPECM
III
Model IIAAA
Intercept OPECM
1.000 
-0.462 1.000
0.100 -0.898
-0.720 0.640
Model IIBBB
INX III
1.000 
-0.536 1.000
Intercept OPECM INX III
1.000 
-0.400 1.000
-0.283 -0.722 1.000
-0.507 -0.442 0.673 1.000
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Table 31. Final Estimates of Logit Models
IIIAAA and IIIBBB
Variable Model IIIAAA
Intercept 0.545
(0.39)
III -0.105
(5.06)
NDX
Observations 46
Reschedulings 7
Model Chi-Square (df) 8.86 (1) 
D .418
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at P*=.5 .848
Errors (%):
Type I 15.2
Type II 
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) ,44<P*<.45 .848
b) .52<P*<.67 
Errors (%):
Type I 13.6
Type II 50.0
Model IIIBBB 
-1.392 
(0.73) 
-0.078 
(2.35) 
0.006 
(2.01)
46
7
11.14 (2) 
.426
.848
11.9
50.0
.891
11.4
0.0
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Table 32. Final Estimates of Logit Mpdels IVA and IVB
Large Debtors - Latin America
Variable 
Intercept
GRO
RSM
Observations 50
Reschedulings 9
Model Chi-Square (df) 20.39 (2)
D .590
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at P*=.5 .830
Errors (%):
Type I 7.3
Type II 33.3
Predictive Accuracy of
the Model at .64<P*<.65 .880
Errors (%):
Type I 11.1
Type II 20.0
Models IVA & IVB 
0.442 
(0.21) 
-0.349 
(5.65) 
-0.102 
(4.56)
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Table 33. Final Estimates of Logit Models VA & VB
Small Debtors - Latin America
Variable
Intercept
INX
NDX
AMZ
Observations
Reschedulings
Model Chi-Square (df)
D
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at P*=.5 
Errors (%):
Type I 
Type II 
Predictive Accuracy of 
the Model at:
a) .43<P*<.87
b) ,49<P*<.87 
Errors (%):
Type I
Type II
Model VA 
-3.662 
(11.59) 
1.143 
(3.24)
49
5
3.25 (1) 
.196
.898
10.2
.898
10.2
Model VB 
-6.893 
(8.90)
0.014
(5.74)
0.171
(3.44)
49
5
10.10 (2) 
.435
.920
8.3
0.0
.920
8.3
0.0
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Table 34. Correlation Matrix of Significant Variables in 
Models IVA and IVB with the Variable III
intercept GRO RSM III 
Intercept 1.000
GRO -0.665 1.000
RSM -0.929 0.587 1.000
III -0.991 0.703 0.879 1.000
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Table 35. Summary Rssults
Model Obs. Resch.
Model Chi- 
Square (df) D
Predictive Accuracy 
Min. Error P*=.5
IA 190 26 37.61 (4) .442 .863 .847
IAA 190 26 41.88 (5) .458 .874 .863
IB 190 26 38.52 (3) .463 .895 .889
IBB 190 26 48.04 (5) .501 .905 .895
IIA 110 14 33.28 (3) .570 .900 .891
I IAA 110 14 35.71 (3) .595 .910 .880
I IB 110 14 40.19 (2) .657 .918 .900
I IBB 110 14 43.87 (3) .672 .936 .936
IIIA 80 12 17.14 (4) .365 .880 .880
IIIAA 80 12 17.14 (4) .365 .880 .880
11 IB 80 12 10.03 (2) .299 .880 .867
IVA/B 50 9 20.39 (2) .590 .880 .830
VA 49 5 3.25 (1) .196 .898 .898
VB 49 5 10.10 (2) .435 .920 .920
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Table 36. Comparison of Type I_ and Type II Errors 
among Models IA, IB, and IIA with 
Cline's Models C, D, and L
Model Type I Type II
IA 13.8 0.0
C 9.1 13.0
IB 9.1 28.6
D 13.6 16.1
IIA 7.1 36.4
L 21.4 2.6
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Table 37. Probability Intervals Associated with
the Minimum Total Errors Rule for Predicting 
Debt Reschedulings
Model Interval
IA ,71<P*<.83
IAA .63<P*<.65
IB ,39<P*<.42
IBB .46<P*<.51
IIA .37<P*<.41
I IAA .61<P*<.69
I IB .54<P*<.57
I IBB .47<P*<.89
I IIA .41<P*<.56
IIIB .41<P*<.45
IVA/B •64<P*<.65
VA .43<P*<1.00
VB ,49<P*<.87
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Table 38. Predicted probabilities
Model Country
Argentina
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
I IBB .060* .004 .109 .005 .031 .821 .995*
VB Bolivia n.a. n.a. .438 .247 .169 .183* .136
I IBB Brazil .005 .051 .246 .069 .054 .604 .925*
IBB Burma n.a. .014 .068 .050 .020 .058 .285
I IBB Chile n.a. n.a. .022 .004 .002 .035 .999*
I IBB Colombia n.a. n.a. .002 .001 .001 .011 .135
VB Costa Rica n.a. n.a. .289 .495 .066 .039 .354*
VB Dom. Rep. n.a. n.a. .110 .090 .044 .039 .108
I IBB Ecuador n.a. n.a. .010 .011 .016 .157 .595*
I IBB Egypt .046 .031 .283 .094 .015 .171 .415
VB El Salvador n.a. n.a. .005 .004 .012 .018 .022
IBB Gabon n.a. .359 .419* .356 n.a. n.a. n.a.
IBB Ghana n.a. .055 .014 .015 .061 .121 .076
I IBB Indonesia .001 .003 .017 .001 .001 .001 .032
VB Jamaica n.a. n.a. .190* .035 .048 .069* .087
I IBB Malaysia n.a. .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .002
I IBB Mexico .205 .479 .214 .006 .007 .018 .780*
VB Nicargua n.a. n.a. .023 .026 .188 .300 .868*
I IBB Nigeria .000 .000 .097 .001 .001 .085 .085
VB Panama n.a. n.a. .036 .035 .016 .013 .013
VB Paraguay n.a. n.a. .009 .009 .008 .010 .010
I IBB Peru .100* .436 .761* .026 .017 .149 .420*
I IBB Philippines .002 .003 .020 .007 .006 .042 .400*
I IBB South Korea .000 .000 .001 .001 .018 .002 .011
IBB Sierra Leone n.a. .031* .063 .071 .125* .154 .266
I IBB Thailand n.a. .001 .001 .001 .000 .001 .015
IBB Togo n.a. .037 .035 .124* .227 n.a. n.a.
VB Trin. & Tob. n.a. n.a. n.a. .001 .001 .019 .001
I IBB Turkey .004 .204 .601* .653* .606* .065 .076*
VB Uruguay n.a. n.a. .012 .014 .016 .013 .061
I IBB Venezuela .000 .001 .015 .028 .024 .037 .134
I IBB Yugoslavia tl D ^ .000 .003 .001 .002 .008 .030
IBB Zaire n.a. .411* .282 .162* .079 .896* .112
n.a. Not Available
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Table 39. Parameter Estimates of Equation 6.9
Sixteen"Largest Debtors
Country b(0)
Brazil -2.56
(-2.23)
Argentina -6.91
(-0.39)
Chile -1.59
(-1.47)
Venezuela -7.60
(-6.81)
Peru -2.32
(-4.47)
Colombia -7.22
(-5.73)
Mexico -1.60
(-2.08)
Indonesia -4.83
(-5.96)
Philippines -7.43
(-3.57)
Egypt -1.34
(-2.00)
Nigeria -3.20
(-4.88)
South Korea -5.64
(-7.01)
Turkey -0.89
(-0.85)
Yugoslavia -5.14
(-6.74)
Thailand -7.53
(-1.14)
Malaysia -7.31
(-8.95)
b(l) b(2)
6.77 0.34
(2.09) (0.03)
3087.93 -526505.47
(0.35) (0.08)
7.27 -16.98
(0.42) (-0.55)
121.90 50.56
(5.50) (1.43)
19.58 -50.43
(3.42) (-2.44)
507.05 -211.85
(4.70) (-1.61)
7.91 -16.76
(1.22) (1.10)
-54.75 -80.78
(-0.22) (-0.27)
155.01 85.86
(3.98) (0.62)
1.70 -4.92
(0.44) (-0.59)
0.05 -16.33
(0.00) (-0.25)
-49.09 59.46
(-0.26) (1.01)
0.36 0.40
(0.20) (0.23)
154.50 -449.16
(0.61) (-0.56)
2717.98 -2717.98
(0.41) (-0.41)
405.80 -9890.34
(0.38) (0.00)
a. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic "t" statistics.
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Table 40. Final Parameter Estimates of Equation 6.9
Country b(0) b(l) b(2)
Brazil -2.54 6.77 _
(-2.79) (2.24)
Venezuela -6.76 131.58 -
(-8.16) (5.64)
Peru -2.32 19.58 -50.43
(-4.47) (3.42) (-2.44)
Colombia -10.93 825.07 -
(-6.10) (5.06)
Philippines -7.43 167.13 -
(-3.82) (3.61)
a. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic "t" statistics.
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